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Introduction 
This thesis is based on a comparison of two Shakespearean figures: the Fool of Lear 
and Iago from Othello. Regarding the number of the obvious differences between the Fool 
and Iago, a question may be raised as to the validity of such an undertaking. The characters 
clearly embody opposite poles of behaviour and even their function may be contrasted. It is 
enough just to think of the Fool who always utters the truth, while Iago is the great liar and 
deceiver. The Fool says things that are true but difficult to accept, while Iago tells credible 
lies. If we leave out the character of the Fool from the play (as he was indeed left out after 
Shakespeare had been ironed to fit the neoclassical taste) the play may still be called The 
Tragedy of King Lear, while Othello without Iago is just unimaginable. The Fool is not an 
intriguer, he does not have a direct effect on the events, he is rather a mere commentator, 
while Iago is the engine of the plot in his play. Still, in spite of all these differences, there are 
a number of generic, dramatic and functional similarities between them that I would like to 
expand. 
Apart from throwing light upon our ways of interpreting these two figures, my aim 
with such a comparison is to explore their common dramatic origin, the morality Vice figure, 
as well as other characters within the same generic group. In a wider context the comparison 
will also make it possible for us to gain new insights about the plays of the period and 
examine ideas that did not invite our attention because we did not have the necessary 
interpretative matrix for them. This matrix emerges by contextualising, on the one hand, the 
epistemological and representational crisis as it appeared in the culture of early modem 
England and, on the other hand, ideas of intellectual history and theatre history within 
poststructuralist theories of the sign, drama-semiotics and in general the new trends of re-
reading the Shakespeare-corpus. The matrix that I use is a combination of several 
considerations: a historical, "archeological" approach in regarding the Vice as an inherently 
and uniquely complex root of the characters I examine; an understanding of Iago and the Fool 
as Vice-successors and thus as agents of involvement and interaction within the logic of the 
renaissance stage, focusing on their effect on the audience; an examination of the 
metadramatic consequences of such an involvement; as well as of theories on the 
epistemology and semiotics of renaissance plays and play-texts, with special emphasis on the 
problematisation of mimetic representation and meaning. 
Within this background the comparability of Iago and the Fool will gain its validity. A 
contextual outlook will also emerge, in which relevant statements can be made on other - in 
some sense similar - contemporary characters and their ancestors. During the analysis it will 
emerge, on the one hand, how a specific sense of humour typical of the Vice disappears from 
drama during its history, and on the other, why critics are reluctant to acknowledge this sense 
of humour retrospectively. 
An overarching idea of the examination is the Vice figure as a way to understand and 
analyze a crisis that I will term a representational crisis. Thus, I base my comparison of Iago 
and the Fool first of all specifically on their common dramatic origin in the Vice of the 
morality plays. I see them function similarly in their respective dramas: they are both 
outsiders to the networks of the other characters, both reflecting and criticising the social and 
the signifying systems they are set into, but first of all - and this is what I would like to 
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illustrate in my analysis - I see them both as agents of representational crisis, a crisis which 
concerns a disconnection between signs and their meaning, which is characterised by an 
experience that language is inappropriate for dealing with reality, as well as the 
questionability of reality itself - not only the impossibility of making meaning, but also the 
absence or emptiness of reality. I will position my argument within the critical discourse and 
explicate my main theoretical terms in my first chapter. This is where I will give a more 
detailed explanation of my understanding of the term "representational crisis," and of what I 
ultimately intend to discuss: the way it manifests itself uniquely in tragedy. Here I would like 
to reflect on the main assumptions and themes of my undertaking. 
Taking the Vice of the morality as a starting point for the comparison of Iago and 
Lear's Fool I see as fruitful and justified because in that character several traditions are 
merged, such as the fool figure of popular festivities, the devil character of the mystery plays, 
and even the seven deadly sins. The comic and evil Vice became a rather conventional type in 
the late moralities, and it went more or less out of fashion1 in Elizabethan drama, leaving its 
traits on a number of psychologically much more complex villain characters. In my view the 
two Shakespearean figures feature the original "components" of the morality Vice - the 
already heterogeneous prototypical figure - so that these seem to be separated again in such a 
way that the separation allows new forms and new characters to be bom, characters who 
employ modified dramatic functions as well. In other words, the "components" of the Vice, 
the fool and the devil appear in later, Shakespearean characters that originate in the Vice: the 
Fool of Lear and Iago from Othello "split" their common root, the Vice into its original 
"components," i.e., the fool and the devil. Obviously, these original "components" this time 
1 As Happé has it: "...The taste for the Vice was created and used on the popular stage. Later, by the time of 
Twelfth Night or Old Fortunatus or The Staple of News, he had gone out of fashion, and this, too, is the fate of 
the popular theatre in general" Peter Happé, "'The Vice' and the Popular Theatre, 1547-80.," in Anthony 
Coleman ed. Poetry and Drama 1570-1700 (London and New York: Methuen 1981), 13-31, p. 28. 
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appear in a much more complex form, and put the original complexity or heterogeneous 
quality of the Vice in a new light. It is the journey into this complexity and its mapping that I 
embark upon with this present project. 
I hope to show that no matter how distinct the Fool and Iago may seem to be, some of 
the essential characteristics of both are clearly detectable and inherently intermingled in this 
earlier figure. It seems to me that these descendants of the Vice, who are set into a different 
epistemological context than the Vice of the moralities, are capable of reflecting on the 
problems of representational practices in society in a much more sensitive way than other 
characters, precisely because of the complexity of their distinct dramatic origin. It is 
worthwhile to examine them both from a great distance - taking them both as representatives 
of one type - from where their differences are diluted by their common origin, as well as from 
a closer perspective, and try to give explanations for their obvious differences as well. 
The procedure of my investigation will be the following. In order to establish the 
background for comparison, in the second chapter of my study I will examine the aspects of 
the morality Vice that are relevant for my investigation. I will try to map out the most 
important issues of the critical debate concerning this figure in order to reveal some inherent 
contradictions within this debate. One crucial aim in introducing major assumptions 
concerning the connection between the Vice and the Fool will be to point out that 
characteristics which make the Vice resemble the popular fool or clown are treated as not 
representative of the Vice by most major critics of this character, surprisingly even by those 
who do acknowledge that there are cases when it is impossible to make a distinction between 
the Vice and the fool or clown. I will take issue with scholars whose understanding of the 
Vice disallows such complexity where the vice, fool and clown can be used as synonyms - as 
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they certainly were in a number of cases. A number of scholars, first of all Bernard Spivack2 
have already dealt with Iago as the heir of the morality Vice. Although the Vice's traits are 
clearly more detectable in Iago than in Lear's Fool, I would like to stress the important 
element of the popular fool in the amalgam of the Vice. In order to provide a broad spectrum 
of examples of the type, I will include in my argument plays from a wide span, beginning 
with plays written several decades before Shakespeare's two discussed figures were created. 
The two subsequent chapters focus on two different topics: Chapter Three on 
metadrama and Chapter Four on laughter. Each of the two chapters concentrates on features 
that are likely to be taken as characteristic of either Iago or the Fool respectively; however, as 
it will turn out, they are each fruitfully applicable to the other as well. The structure of the two 
chapters is similar: they both start with the characteristic to be discussed as it appears in the 
common root of the Fool and Iago, the Vice. After the discussion of the two figures one by 
one, the similarities and differences are explained. Iago is the character that is more explicitly 
a Vice-successor; thus, in my third chapter I concentrate on his metadramatic activities that 
are intrinsic to a Vice, and the consequent ways he plays with the emptiness of words and 
shows. I will show how, surprisingly, the Fool is playing a similar game, and that, from the 
perspective of the structural similarity of the two figures, the relevance of the difference in the 
motives of their deeds - for example Iago's iniquity versus the Fool's benevolence -
vanishes. While Iago is more easily recognised as metadramatic than the Fool, it is easier to 
see the comic or humorous side of the Fool than that of Iago. This is why I discuss the Fool 
first and Iago second in my fourth chapter on their comedy. The Fool's method is to take the 
edge off woeful events with his grotesque humour by showing the questionability of their 
meaning, but the same can be said of Iago as well, despite the fact that, as I will argue, in his 
play tragedy is rooted precisely in the fact that meaning is proven to be questionable. I will 
2 Bernard Spivack, Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 
1 9 5 8 ) 
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look at the similarities and differences of the Fool and Iago and I will present an 
understanding of the two Shakespearean figures in which they are both pointing backward as 
well as forward in an epistemological context, but embodying two different possibilities for 
dealing with a crisis. I hope to arrive at a complex understanding of the function of these 
figures as two agents of representational crisis, a crisis that springs from the awareness the 
characters have of the ultimate defectiveness of the production of meaning. In the final 
chapter I will argue that the acts of the Fool and Iago are organically embedded in the world 
of the plays, and finally I will concentrate on the dramatic consequences of the denial of folly, 
as well as with the wider, philosophical and epistemological consequences of such a denial. 
I have stated above that the starting point of my comparison of the two characters is 
that they are both successors of the Vice. As it will appear later in the paper, a number of 
problems arise in defining this character. There is another problematic point regarding their 
common root: how far should one go back in time in presenting the common origin? It seems 
to me that the furthest one can get is the archetypical trickster. Although with such an insight 
in my case I am left with little specific explanation about Iago and the Fool as agents of 
representational crisis in their given context, seeing them both as tricksters does give an 
explanation on some of their functional parallels. In his book about subversive Shakespearean 
characters, Richard Hillman does something similar.3 He discusses subversive practices in 
Shakespearean drama, and among other examples (which are not exclusively characters) 
includes both Iago and Lear's Fool in his discussion. Although his subject goes beyond 
trickster-characters, he uses the figure of the archetypal trickster as a conceptual anchor. His 
way of thinking allows me to discuss the two figures and their comedy in the dramas based on 
the Vice in such a way that I place them outside a moral framework. This motif is fruitful for 
my understanding because I find it insufficient to take Iago's wicked nature and the Fool's less 
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wicked, perhaps benign, nature as an explanation for the difference in their trickery. With the 
trickster as common denominator we do not have to make artificial distinctions between 
playful villains who play in the service of harmony and those who play in order to divide and 
destroy.4 I will show that even if it is not the trickster but the Vice that is regarded as the 
common denominator of Iago and Lear's Fool, as in my approach, this does not have to imply 
a necessarily moral explanation of their behaviour. 
As I have mentioned about the method of the investigation, in my approach I combine 
a historically oriented view (the development of the morality Vice) with a semiotic 
perspective (the function of these characters in generating and reflecting on the very idea of 
meaning within the play) - and I employ this method in establishing both the similarities and 
the differences between the two figures. I find the idea of Timothy Reiss useful, when he 
suggests a "historically oriented view not of the meaning of individual tragedies but of what 
tragedy does."51 take a similar approach in examining the two characters: I am looking at the 
fact of their being embedded in an earlier tradition, and in this light at their potentials - what 
they do to the audience if these potentials are exploited - even if a contemporary audience did 
not consciously perceive them in a way that our perspective allows us to do. I try to 
understand the characters historically, by discussing their dramatic context, but I explain their 
function from a semiotically informed perspective. To put it differently, if Reiss concentrates 
on what tragedy does, these characters seem to be aware continuously of what signs do. I see 
them as embedded in a specific epistemological context and thus having a unique possibility 
to reflect on drama and play, and more precisely to reflect on the defects and problems of 
representation. Certainly, the original "productions" of these plays cannot be reconstructed, 
but, based on the texts and their interrelatedness, I will make performance-oriented semiotic 
3 Richard Hillman, Shakespearean Subversions. (London and New York: Routledge: 1992), 8. 
4 Hillman quotes McAlindon who makes this distinction, Hillman, 11-2. 
5 Timothy Reiss, Tragedy and Truth (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 25. 
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explanations6 through trying to excavate the way these dramas may have worked, explaining 
them with the vocabulary provided by semiotics. My aim is to illustrate that the texts do allow 
solutions which support my idea of Iago and the Fool as agents of this representational crisis. 
I claim by no means that they were so understood by a contemporary audience, but that such 
is the logic according to which they worked. In the present thesis the re-examination of the 
morality Vice serves two purposes: on the one hand, the thorough and new interpretation of 
these two figures, including their comparison and contrast, and on the other hand, by relying 
on the comparison of Iago and the Fool as Vice-successors, the understanding of the morality 
Vice's transformations in a wider epistemological context, and seeing his transformations as 
symptomatic of an epistemological shift. Although such an examination is not within the 
scope of the present project, once the Vice is re-interpreted, one could revise systematically 
other Shakespearean characters that are traditionally understood as Vice-successors. 
6 Such an approach is characteristic of the works of Alan Dessen, Robert Weimann or Attila Kiss. My 
indebtedness to the works and ideas of Attila Kiss cannot be adequately reflected in the individual references to 
his work, since my own project has been developing and acquiring its shape during invaluable discussions with 
him. 
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1. Theoretical background, methodology 
I would like to outline three contexts that are essential for my argument, and in this 
outline my basic theoretical assumptions will also unfold. The first two contexts I intend to 
delineate are the epistemological background and the place of theatre and representation 
against this background. 
As for the ultimate concern regarding the time period dealt with in this dissertation, it 
is both easy and difficult to define it. Easy, because the two central figures featuring in two 
Shakespearean tragedies were born as particular characters within a timeframe that is possible 
to define with little problems: the two dramas were written at the very beginning of the 
seventeenth century, within a few years. And it is difficult, since my examination of these 
figures is done in the light of the changes the Vice character has gone through, and these 
changes are folded into a larger issue of epistemological change. I admit that the idea of an 
epistemological change is a highly problematic one because of its illusiveness and debatable 
nature. Still, since I am convinced that it can help me to give an account of how and why 
certain dramatic types or figures entered the stage at one point of the sixteenth century and 
left it at another in the seventeenth, it is the more compelling to deal with it. 
I will introduce the term representational crisis in more detail to characterise what I 
see contemporary drama was capable of expressing and reflecting on. Outlining the third 
context will allow me to present my focus, and to position my own argument within the 
discourse on representation and its problems in Shakespearean drama. 
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1.1 The question of epistemological crisis 
The first context of my analysis is the epistemological background, more specifically 
the period of dynamic epistemological change and crisis at the turn of the 16th-17th centuries. 
Providing such a broad context reflecting on whole epochs and epistemes, and an analysis 
itself that deals with dramas and dramatic characters from such a wide span of time, may 
harbour pitfalls of imprecision and generalisation. Still, as it will appear from my analysis, 
such an approach can throw new light on the development of the Vice and its later 
Shakespearean successors, exactly because it allows us to see how similar devices and 
techniques applied by these characters have significantly different effects in a changed 
epistemological context. 
It may appear to some that since Shakespeare's active period is not much more than 
two decades, in this approach all his dramas belong to a single episteme, and thus it is 
impossible to account for the differences between his early and mature works. The dramas in 
my narrow focus are, indeed, the ones that are traditionally regarded as the "masterpieces of 
Shakespeare's maturity," but from my perspective many differences between the early and the 
mature works are irrelevant exactly because they belong to the same episteme or rather, to the 
same crisis of it. I have chosen this broad, epistemic perspective because I find a 
revolutionary possibility in drama, specifically tragedy in the age to reflect on the peculiar 
epistemological situation, and this possibility can be very well grasped in the comparison of 
the two characters discussed, with special consideration of their Vice-heritage. 
My basic assumption is that there has been a major epistemological shift at the end of 
the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century that brought about the gradual appearance and 
solidification of a new way of thinking, characterised by the achievements of the scientific 
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revolution, the reformation, the rationalism of the rising bourgeois class and the early signs of 
the Cartesian understanding of the self. These changes can be regarded as contributing to the 
emergence of a radically new episteme, radically new compared to the Middle Ages, and 
actually underlining the similarities of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in spite of their 
diverities, if compared to the age that solidified during the 17th century. A consequence of the 
epistemological change, what might be called an epistemological crisis, is in my view an 
essential context of English Renaissance drama - a period in which plays themselves address 
topical issues of truth and illusion, as well as ways of representation, or the possibilities of 
knowledge and meaning. In this sense the late sixteenth-early seventeenth century is an "in 
between" territory. Obviously, any issue of an epistemic nature, be it even a major crisis, 
would be experienced and recognised unevenly. Most probably we rightly suspect that for 
many people there was no "crisis" at all. I will give examples in the present chapter of 
contemporary writings where I see this crisis manifest itself - because I wish to illustrate what 
I mean by epistemological crisis, uncertainty and change - ultimately I am interested in the 
way this crisis is expressed uniquely in tragedy. 
As said above, issues of epistemic change cannot be but experienced unevenly by 
individuals. If we see connections between selected phenomena that may be regarded as 
individual manifestations of a more general crisis, we will not arrive to the reconstructed 
experience of the late-renaissance man, but a cultural construct of our own time. Still, it is 
exactly our contemporary perspective that grants us the possibility to see such connections 
between seemingly isolated phenomena. And the connection seen between the diverse events 
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of the late Renaissance helped intellectual historians of the 20 century to build this construct. 
Before I take a look at excerpts from non-dramatic texts that may be understood as reflecting 
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on the epistemological crisis of the age, let me introduce how the idea of the changing 
episteme was discussed and constructed by scholars at the initial stages of this understanding. 
The idea that there are several common characteristics of the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance that can be opposed to the period following the Renaissance was addressed in 
detail in the 1940s and 1950s, when dealing with the history of ideas was a wide-spread 
phenomenon in Western cultural history. Hyram Haydn, for example, has convincingly shown 
that a broad perspective on the Renaissance allows us to see the connection or even similarity 
between Luther and Montaigne, or Luther and Machiavelli, namely their similar fight of 
disreputing the scholastic-medieval-renaissance etc. ideology.7 Such disreputing resulted in 
what can be considered a crisis, or in Haydn's words "distrust" of the attainability of truth by 
man, and a consequent insecurity that manifested itself in various cultural and social practices. 
As Haydn has it, 
religious fideism and philosophical scepticism, occultism of various sorts and radical empiricism, an 
assertive individualism and a conviction of man's utter dependence on God - these and other 
superficially paradoxical allies consorted in the common distrust of the efficacy of man's speculative 
mind to grasp truth, and of his natural reason to come by virtue.8 
The end of what Haydn calls "scholastic-medieval-renaissance etc. ideology" is 
discussed by Theodore Spencer as a background of Shakespearean drama in his book 
originally published in 1942.9 His description of "The Renaissance Conflict" is at several 
points parallel to Haydn's discussion of the Counter-Renaissance, including the itemization of 
the major events that contributed to the shattering of the earlier model. These events 
considered crucial are first of all the Copernican revolution, Montaigne's ideas on natural 
order and men, and Machiavelli's revolutionary ideas on ethics presented in The Prince. 
Spencer claims that great tragedies are written in ages when conventional patterns of belief 
7 Hiram Haydn, The Counter-Renaissance (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), Introduction. 
8 Haydn, 83. 
9 Theodore Spencer, Shakespeare and the Nature of Man (New York: Collier Books, 1967). 
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and behaviour are violated. The convention and its violation may be, for example, social or 
religious. In Shakespeare's age the violation was particularly destructive, since it included all 
the spheres of culture and convention. Spencer gives an expressive account of this matter at 
the end of his chapter on the Renaissance Conflict: 
In Shakespeare's day the convention included everything - it was the whole inherited picture of man in 
the system of the universe, of Nature and of state; it was religious, moral and social; it was a vast 
inclusive pattern of order. The violation of this order [.. .] was being felt everywhere at the end of the 
sixteenth century, and it was a violation which when it occurred in any one part, was felt throughout the 
whole structure. 10 
The Copernican revolution is a highly expressive example among the ones in which 
the crisis unfolded, because it involved not merely a different understanding of the system of 
the universe, but entailed severe implications concerning the position of man and his world 
within this new system, and it also entailed more general epistemological questions on the 
possibility of knowledge about the universe and man. The shock the Copernican turn created 
shattered not only the physical, but as significantly the spiritual universe as well. A reaction 
on Copernicus's De Revolutionibus by Nicolaus Raimarius Ursus suggestively shows the 
more general consequences of discrediting the old system and introducing a radically new 
way of seeing the world. As Ursus' example shows, the effect of such turn may be that the 
very possibility of belief becomes uncertain, which in turn results in an overall 
epistemological instability. According to Ursus, Copernicus "transposed and converted the 
places of the sun and the earth...By an act of imagination he, so to speak, transferred and 
relocated the earth, together with the air surrounding it and the moon that rides upon the air, to 
the place of the sun."11 The reaction of Ursus is that he ridicules the whole profession by 
claiming that for him it is no problem to come up with ever new and better hypotheses every 
, 0 Spencer, 50. 
" The English translation of extracts from Ursus' Tractatus and Kepler's Apologia against Ursus (Apologia pro 
Tychone contra Ursum) are available in N. Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1984) 41-57 and 134-207. 
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1 *) day. He displays a radically destructive and sceptical attitude, in Ronald Levao's words a 
"corrosive scepticism, a Pyrrhonian game of infinite regression that, in doubting the 
foundation beneath foundations, subverts the stability of any intellectual construction."13 
Kepler in his response to Ursus' treatise tries to argue for some sort of epistemological 
stability against the subversive claims of Ursus. 
For in architecture the builder is content to lay down foundations below the ground for the future mass 
of the house, and he does not worry that the ground below might shift or cave in. Just so in the business 
of geometry the first founders were not, like the Pyrrhonians who followed later, so obtuse as to want to 
doubt everything and to lay hold on nothing upon which, as a foundation, sure and acknowledged by all, 
they would wish to build the rest. Those things that were certain and acknowledged by all they used, 
therefore, to call by the special name "axioms," that is to say, opinions which had authority with all.14 
The beauty of Kepler's response is that while he needs to deal with the problem of 
"foundation" in order to argue against Ursus, he cannot come up with any absolute authority 
either. He uses a common comparison of the period between hypotheses and the foundation of 
a house,15 and although he does not say explicitly that the "axioms," i.e., claims that have 
authority with all, at the foundation of a construct might eventually turn out to be false, in his 
parallel the builder decides "not to worry that the ground below might shift or cave in" (my 
italics). Both Ursus and Kepler are embedded in the context of epistemological doubts of the 
late-Renaissance, they need to address the issue of the possibility and certainty of knowledge, 
however Kepler, by admitting but stepping over the sceptical challenge, may be seen as 
paving the way to a new episteme and a belief in the absolute authority of objective science. 
A notion such as an epistemological change, or an epistemological crisis is difficult to 
nail down in general, but if we compare phenomena that are further away from each other on 
12 It seems that Ursus had indeed become disappointed with astronomy, since by the end of his career he lost the 
favour of the king in the Prague court precisely for claiming that astronomy is mere cheating. Ursus' attitude was 
not an isolated and singular one. As Jardine argues, "Ursus is an exponent of a sceptical position widely adopted 
by astronomers of the period". Jardine, 37. 
13 Ronald Levao, "Francis Bacon and the Mobility of Science," Representations 40 (1992): 1-32. p 11. 
14 N. Jardine, 137. 
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the sequence of the change, it becomes much easier to understand it. If we have a look at the 
ways the logic of signification worked in different historical periods, and consider how 
radically it could change, the situation becomes much clearer. As I will present below using 
the example of semioticians' approaches to Shakespeare, scholars dealing with semiotics or 
questions of representation do think within the broad frame of epistemological contexts. The 
reason for this I see in the fact that opposing systems are much more clearly detectable 
regarding the logic of representation or the way systems of signification worked, compared to 
the myriad of social and cultural data within which it is so difficult to perceive clear 
tendencies, let alone epistemic shifts. Taking the most obvious theatrical example, it is 
beyond question that there must be a characteristic and different view of reality and its 
representability behind the signifying logic of a ritualistic, Medieval, allegorical theatre, 
compared to the other system to which it gradually gave way: a completely new, realistic and 
photographic-type theatre, the centre of which is illusion. Renaissance emblematic theatre is 
historically in between these two models and can be interpreted from both ends, exactly 
because it displays a mixture of elements from both systems, able to be interpreted from both 
perspectives, as I will also illustrate in the forthcoming analyses. In my view Shakespearean 
theatre, being at the threshold of an old and an emerging new system not only in theatrical but 
also in epistemic terms, does something similar to Ursus' reflections on the problem whether 
knowledge about the celestial spheres is possible or whether knowledge at all is available for 
man. I will show how the plays themselves reflect on the questionability of any foundation, 
including the one that is called reality. 
Michel Foucault deals directly with the different logic of signification within the 
different epistemes.16 The terms he uses are the Renaissance versus the Classical episteme. I 
15 Jardine notes (137) that this comparison was included in a passage that was used as an elementary Greek text. 
16 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), esp. 3-71. 
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will use the terms Medieval/Renaissance versus Early-Modern to make clear, on the one hand, 
that the earlier is the one which enfolds the similarities between the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, and the common features of these two are opposed to the succeeding epoch and, 
on the other hand, to emphasise that the succeeding epoch provided the essential ground for 
Modernism. Foucault imagines the two systems with no transitory period between them. 
However, for me the crisis that is rooted partly in the gradual disintegration of the old system 
and partly in the gradual emergence of the new is of crucial importance, because it allows the 
self-reflection on and questioning of the epistemic assumptions of a given moment in history -
such as the above example, the controversy fuelled by the Copernican turn. 
Foucault's model is particularly useful for my investigation because, as I have 
mentioned, he too discusses the characteristic issues of representation of the respective 
models. Until the end of the 16th century, the end of what he calls the Renaissance model, 
knowledge was constituted based on the logic of resemblance, and representation was posited 
as a form of repetition, based on that resemblance: 
Up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role in the knowledge of 
Western culture. It was resemblance that largely guided exegesis and the interpretation of texts, it was 
resemblance that organized the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and 
invisible, and controlled the art of representing them. 17 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, however, similitude ceases to be the form 
of knowledge. It will be order, based on identity and difference, that will constitute 
knowledge: 
This relation of Order is as essential to the Classical age as the relation to Interpretation was to the 
Renaissance. And just as interpretation in the sixteenth century, with its superimposition of a semiology 
upon a hermeneutics, was essentially a knowledge based upon similitude, so the ordering of things by 
means of signs constitutes all empirical forms of knowledge as knowledge based upon identity and 
difference.18 
17 Foucault, 17. 
18 Foucault, 57. 
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From Foucault's argument it appears that in the previous model a sign is intrinsically 
bound to what it "refers to." In other words, there is a motivated relationship between the two, 
in Foucault's words the sign is "bound to what it marks by the solid and discreet bonds of 
resemblance or affinity."19 In the latter model, on the other hand, a new logic occurs, and here 
the signifying element will have no content, no function, and no determination other than 
what it represents. It is because of this transparency of the signifying element to the signified 
that Foucault suggests that "[f]rom an extreme point of view, one might say that language in 
the classical era does not exist." Indeed, the idea may be applied to my earlier example: 
language is as transparent to what it expresses as the illusory reality in photographic theatre is 
regarded as a perfect replica of the empirical one. 
The recognition of the instability of the relationship between signifier and signified is 
reflected on by Montaigne. In his Essays he gave voice many times to his deep scepticism 
towards the world view he inherited. He begins his essay Of Glory with the crisis that reveals 
itself in the practice of representation, with the very problem of the unmotivated relationship 
between word and thing: "There is both name, and the thing: the name, is a voice which 
noteth, and signifieth the thing: the name, is neither part of thing or of substance: it is a 
stranger-piece joined to the thing, and from it."21 The essay discusses virtue, and says that a 
heroic action is sometimes performed in the hope of fame, in which case the act that is 
supposed to reflect virtue does not correspond to what is seemingly represents. In other words 
the relationship between the signified (virtue) and signifier (the heroic act) is a deceptive one. 
And as it appears form the first sentence of the essay, Montaigne displays a general distrust 
towards language, since he suggests that words characteristically do not belong to the things 
they signify, there is no organic relationship between them (contrary to a preceding system 
19 Foucault, 58. 
20 Foucault, 79. 
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that is based on resemblblance) a word here is a stranger-piece joined to the thing. The 
significance of Montaigne's position within a historical sequence appears nicely when his 
ideas are compared to Bacon's, since Bacon too addressed the problem of representation and 
the unreliability of language, the customary code. When talking about literary language in The 
Advancement of Learning,22 although he frequently seems to agree with Sidney's Apology, 
Bacon demonstates a certain distrust towards poesy. It seems that he is of the opinion that 
mere mental representations can be contrasted with the true nature of things. He discusses 
within the same train of though Poesy Representative, i.e., drama, and at the end just drops in 
passing: "But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre."23 Still in the Advancement, when 
addressing the issue of "false appearances that are imposed upon us by words," Bacon is to 
some extent comparable to Montaigne because of a similar distrust towards words. Words are 
deceitful, they seem to be impossible to govern or use properly, because they may betray us: 
"...although we think we govern our words [...], yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's 
bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert 
the judgement... ."24 Bacon thus explores the same issue, but it is not the problem of deceitful 
words that is in his focus, rather the solution to the problem, a reliable system of codes, the 
one of the Mathematician. This turns out from the continuation of the above quotation: " so as 
it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the 
Mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, 
that others may know how to accept and understand them..." This is why Bacon, contrary to 
Montaigne, does not exemplify the crisis of representation, because although he too is aware 
of the problems of language, he reveals the problem, gives a diagnosis and already makes a 
21 Michel de Montaigne, Essays. John Florio's Translation (New York: The Modern Library, n.d.), 560. 
22 Francis Bacon, A critical edition of the major works. Brian Vickers ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) 186-9. 
23 Bacon, 188. 
24 Bacon, 228. 
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gesture towards a new ideal, the system of Mathematics, a reliable language to deal with 
reality, a language that fits within the emerging episteme. 
1.2 Dialectical Tragedy: epistemic change in theatre 
"Perplexed in the extreme" 
Othello (5.2.47) 
I have mentioned above that I intend to introduce three contexts which help me 
approach my specific topic, the comparison of Iago and the Fool. The second issue 
concentrates on an understanding of tragedy, and particularly understanding its specific 
function within the given epistemological context. In other words, I wish to describe the 
relationship of this mentioned context and drama - especially tragedy - of the age. In my 
argument I am deeply indebted to and relying upon the ideas of Timothy Reiss about the 
function of Elizabethan tragedy within a dynamic epistemological frame.25 
Clearly, in an age where the traditional and accessible modes of knowledge are 
undermined by fundamental doubts, the same doubts will be reflected in the outputs of social-
cultural production. As we have seen, one such vivid example is Montaigne's understanding 
of the relationship between acts and deeds, words and things, signifiers and signifieds. Since 
drama by its very nature deals with representation, it is full of such instances. Great tragedy is 
traditionally considered to be the medium of expressing doubts, painful dilemmas and 
unfathomable questions. The focus on such issues may open up unexplored perspectives; as 
Spencer says in the passage quoted above on great tragedy, great tragedy is about the 
violation of conventional patterns of thinking, and in Shakespeare's case it included an overall 
violation of all the spheres of culture and convention. What I find important for my focus is to 
stress that the resulting crisis of such an overall violation is not merely about doubts 
25Reiss, op. cit. 
21 
concerning the ways we understand things; it is not only that perhaps we misunderstood the 
ways our social, moral, religious etc. setups work. But the crisis is also about the possibility or 
rather the impossibility of approach, i.e., the defect of the tool that serves us dealing with 
things, the impossibility of making meaning. This is the impossibility - a tragic impossibility 
in a curious sense of the word, as we will see - that I term "representational crisis." It resides 
partly in what Debora Shuger calls "struggle for meaning": "Renaissance works noticeably 
lack a systematic coherence, their discontinuities instead exposing the struggle for meaning 
jc 
that fissures the last premodern generation." But it is also more than the "struggle for 
meaning," since this struggle to a certain degree implies the hope in the possibility of success. 
My understanding of the representational crisis, as it will unfold from my interpretations, 
includes not only the realisation that the ways knowledge is produced are questionable, that 
the approach, the method, the language is inappropriate, but also that the supposed reality this 
knowledge tried to explore seems to fade away, by becoming questionable itself, revealed as 
absent, empty of any potential meaning to be explored - as in Ursus's view reality seemed to 
disappear among the myriads of acceptable and different hypotheses he could daily come up 
with. 
I would like to expand the notion of the representational crisis and expose this 
"struggle for meaning" with the help of Timothy Reiss's study entitled Tragedy and Truth. As 
for the positioning of renaissance drama in an epistemological context, the parallel Reiss 
draws between the flourishing of Athenian and of renaissance drama is highly revealing: 
In Greece, tragedy is part of a general development toward a particular order of rationality. Prior to the 
'Hesiodic rupture,' as Marcel Detienne has termed it, the Greek would have lived in a world of 
analogies, of sympathies between the material, the divine and the human in many ways comparable to 
26 Debora Kuller Shuger, Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), 16. 
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the multiple discourse of the European Middle Ages, indicated by Michel Foucault in The Order of 
Things under the name 'Renaissance'.27 
Reiss gives a crucial role to tragedy in these periods of epistemological shifts, 
because there it performs "a specifiable role in the establishment of the episteme of analysis 
and referentiality." 
Before I introduce briefly how we are to understand this role of tragedy, I would 
like to reflect on why it is tragedy of all the other discourses that is so specific. As already 
mentioned, theatre is frequently considered as a place where issues of representation become 
more explicit than elsewhere. This is no surprise, since theatre is intrinsically about 
presenting, depicting or standing for things that are not in direct reach, but are depicted, made 
present by the play. In Jonathan Baldo's words "In the theatre, literature's capacity for 
Oft 
representation seems extended, the degree of 'standing for' seems heightened." Reiss uses 
the process of "coming to signify" epitomised by tragedy, although it may be characteristic of 
all the discourses of a given society. Still, he finds tragedy specific because in his view 
"[t]ragedy makes it possible for its companion discourses to take the possibility of referential 
truth as a given."29 
One essence of Reiss's theory is a differentiation between tragedy and tragic. In 
this system tragedy would be the ordered discourse that deals with the tragic, which is a 
"dimension of life," and is by definition inexpressible; it is "the mark, the presence there of 
chaos, of the impossibility of order."30 But it is exactly tragedy that names the tragic as tragic, 
that speaks of the tragic as some extradiscursive reality: "The tragic [...] is an extrapolation 
11 
from the naming that occurs through the discourse, tragedy." This is the way that tragedy, 
within the discourse which seeks to create a referential truth, is capable of grasping and 
"Reiss, 18. 
28 Jonathan Baldo, The Unmasking of Drama.Contested Representation in Shakespeare's Tragedies (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1996), 12. 
29 Reiss, 37. 
30 Reiss, 16. 
31 Reiss, 11. 
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enclosing a certain "absence of significance." This absence of significance "may well be 
common to all discursive acts at the 'inception' of the discourse making such acts possible, 
and that renders //«possible, before such particular ordering, the meaningfulness of any such 
discourse." Reiss's argument is that in the moment of a shift in the discursive order that rules 
a society, tragedy makes this new class of discourse possible. Tragedy in his view shows "the 
manner in which that discourse which seeks to create a referential truth overcomes all 
questioning (as to how, for example, it can in any sense whatever come to mean anything 
outside itself - and communicate such meaning." 
For the purpose of focusing on Shakespearean drama, Reiss's distinction between 
two kinds of tragedy during the Renaissance is particularly useful. The two types of theatre 
are the dialectical and the analytical. The former is the one that "seeks to draw the spectator 
almost physically into action, to cause the condition of his life to be fused momentarily with 
what is carried out not so much in front of him as with his participation." This, he says, is 
represented by Shakespeare, Alexandre Hardy, and Lope de Vega. In their tragedies there is 
"a play of theatrical elements, of interference of several semiotic systems."33 The other, 
analytical type of theatre has no such semiotic interference, and is the one where the spectator 
is not drawn directly into the action, the conditions of his life do not mingle with the action 
going on on stage, the spectator is "involved" in the action to the extent that he may identify 
with the dramatic situation or a character. This is the type of theatre "in whose terms 
Shakespeare, for example, will be recuperated by neoclassical critics."34 
32 Reiss, 3. 
"Reiss, 4. 
34 Reiss, 5. 
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1.3 "If a code is crumbling..." 
At this point it is possible to clarify why I feel the need to introduce the term 
"representational crisis." I accept Reiss's definition of an episteme, namely than it is "that 
accumulation of discourses whose process of producing meaning characterizes a sociocultural 
domain at a given time and place." Everything that connects to the doubt about the outcome 
of the process producing meaning, everything that makes clear its limits, everything that 
problematises its possibility or makes its validity questionable is a matter of an 
epistemological crisis. As for my understanding of representational crisis, it is an element and 
consequence of the epistemological one, and appears when a self-reflective discourse is 
commenting on the problems that arise in the process of accumulating discourses, as the 
failure of the method, of discourse itself, in the very mechanism of making meaning. At 
certain periods in time, as in the Renaissance, tragedy is an agent of searching for truth. And 
"[tjhere [in the Renaissance] one can follow a gradual enfolding of a particular trace within 
discourse of the impossibility of signifying, of ordering something supposed as outside it."36 
This trace of discourse reflecting on the impossibility of signifying is what I term 
representational crisis. 
This definition of "representational crisis" reveals that my understanding of the 
notion "representation" is quite different from understanding it as mimesis, since mimesis 
implies an imitation of something outside of it. I cannot identify with understanding 
representation as mimesis because it contradicts one of my basic assumptions: in a period of 
epistemological crisis as described above, the imitation of reality becomes impossible if we 
accept that the solid concept of reality itself is shaken. Thus, representation is not a mimetic 
reproduction of a reality that is outside, but rather a struggle to create one within. This double 
35 Reiss, 2. 
36 Reiss, 36-7. 
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meaning of representation is inherent in the root of the term, "represent" as well, which 
appeared in England in the 14th century: on the one hand it meant "making present to the mind 
and the sense," even in the sense of presenting oneself to some person of authority, and on the 
other "standing for something that is not present." The first meaning would allow synonyms 
like "learn," or "gain knowledge of," where representation is the way we get in touch with 
elements of reality, while in the second, representation is a substitute for some element of 
reality that is out of reach - in their advancing and distancing, the two meanings are almost 
opposites of each other. 
Representation in the first sense understood radically already implies the 
impossibility of a reality unmediated by representation, thus foreclosing the possibility of 
mimesis.38 The same problem is addressed by Attila Kiss and formulated as the duality of 
photographic mimesis versus metadrama: "Dramatic art either suppresses the representational 
insufficiency arising from the gap [between signifier and signified] in mimesis, or 
foregrounds it in metadrama, and involves the spectator in a game where borders merge and 
identities come into play."39 
Reiss's term "dialectical theatre," tragedy where what Reiss calls "a certain 
absence of significance" has not been enclosed entirely, is perhaps similar to the notion of 
Kenneth Burke who says for Hamlet that it is essayistic (subjective) and is in opposition to 
another way of thinking that he calls dramatic (objective). In this sense "The essayist, in 
contrast to the dramatist, can dispense with a maximum of certainty in ideology. If a code is 
37 Raymond Williams, Keywords. A vocabulary of culture and society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
266. 
38 An interesting explanation of the term is given by Felperin, who maintains the notion mimesis, but says that 
the imitation it refers to is not the imitation of a reality, but of previous art. Thus his understanding is close to 
mine, because in the end representation will mean not "standing for" any reality directly, but will be a 
constructed view of it, an understanding of a reality that would otherwise be unattainable: "What art does 
manifestly imitate is previous art or the artistic constituent of human life without which human life would be 
literally inconceivable and unimaginable. This is implied whenever we use the term 'representation' as a 
synonym for mimesis, since there is no reason why life should have to be represented if it could be presented 
directly. It is the mediating convention of presentation, which is art, that is presented again and again in 
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crumbling he can, with all the convenience of the world, say so."40 The reason Burke feels the 
need to term this attitude essayistic even in a drama, is perhaps that drama gradually 
developed in a direction where such a self-reflective questioning of the code disappeared, or 
at least was not customary. 
Thus the definition Reiss gives for tragedy, according to which "[t]ragedy is a 
discursive process that creates order and makes it possible to ascribe meaning to that order,"41 
is actually revealed and reflected on by examples of dialectical theatre itself, which is capable 
of creating a new reality as not seen before, via its power of addressing epistemological 
questions and (re)arranging epistemological boundaries. In later periods and in analytical 
theatre, tragedies merely enact the already established epistemological order; they do not 
work as original interpretations of a reality outside discourse, but imagine reality within, and 
follow the truth of that order. Consequently, when I am interested in dialectical theatre, I see 
my task in detecting not only the kind of reality these dramas attempt to create, but rather 
what they say about the methods and tools of creating it, about how reality is manufactured.42 
A major inference about Shakespearean tragedy based on Reiss's theory on the 
difference between tragedy and tragic, and the creation of the latter by the former is the 
following. If it is indeed the "analytico-referential" discourse that is being formed in 
Shakespeare's time precisely through the plays of Shakespeare and his intellectually 
adventurous contemporaries, what they wrote are not proper tragedies, in the sense that the 
tragic as something outside discourse has not been created yet. In other words, there is no 
Shakespearean tragedy proper, because a major element of tragedy is missing: the dignity of 
the idea that the tragic that belongs to real life with all its anguish and torment is encapsulated 
continually altered forms." Howard Felperin, Shakespearean Representation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), 39-40. 
39 Attila Kiss, The Semiotics of Revenge (Szeged: Department of English "József Attila" University, 1995), 69. 
40 Quoted by Baldo, 84. 
41 Reiss, 17. 
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by the tragedy as the discourse about it. And the reason for this is that a play ("tragedy") as 
life and tragedy as discourse about life are not yet clearly separated. In other words, the 
"source" of tragedy, the tragic experience, the experience of the absence of meaning is not 
encapsulated securely within a play that can be watched and contemplated upon by the 
spectator from a safe distance: his life is fused with the unresolved cruxes and uncertainties 
pried into by the play. 
1.4 Representational crisis in Shakespeare 
It is clear by now that I rely heavily on a tradition that is influenced by the history of 
ideas, when delineating the background against which I deal with the issues of the 
representational crisis and the ways it manifests itself in semiotic terms. The history of ideas 
as an approach is far from being significant today in Shakespeare criticism. Still, there are 
contemporary scholars, representatives of influential schools who, like Jonathan Dollimore, a 
representative of cultural materialism, consider that a major context for understanding the 
drama of Shakespeare and his contemporaries is exactly that this drama was a response to a 
crisis, and that "certain Jacobean tragedies disclose the very process of historical transition 
which brings them into being."43 
Taking into consideration that the different practices of signification, if compared, can 
serve as very tangible examples of epistemic changes, it is perhaps not surprising that within 
Shakespeare criticism it is scholars dealing with semiotics or questions of representation who 
like to regard the dramas within a broad epistemological context. Alessandro Serpieri, for 
example, talks about a representational crisis between the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
42 This is, of course, to say, that representation itself is a culturally produced discursive version of reality, a sort 
of fiction, which understanding is one of the semiotic/philosophical implications of those poststructuralist 
theories of meaning and signification that are in the focus of current cultural theories of the post-modern. 
43 Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 8. 
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centuries as a consequence of the conflict between different world models, between a 
classical-medieval-renaissance heritage and the modern age.44 Another scholar, Franco 
Moretti, puts the emphasis not on the clash of two systems but on the crisis of a previously 
dominant one, claiming that "[a]t the bottom of English tragedy is nothing less than the 
negation and dismantling of the Elizabethan world-picture."45 At the background of such 
semiotic investigations of the dramas of Shakespeare and his contemporaries there is a strong 
reliance on the Russian formalist school, particularly the semiotician Jurij Lotman, and his 
modelling of the semiotic modalities of cultures.46 Lotman differentiates between a symbolic 
and a syntagmatic model. As Serpieri has it, the two models reflect "two distinct visions of 
language itself as the primary modelling system of a culture: motivated language versus 
arbitrary language."47 Language is motivated in a system where the words belong 
intrinsically to the things they signify, where signifier and signified are not separated, but are 
elements within a vast organic system, and according to the logic of resemblance belong 
together and reflect each other within this system - this is also how Foucalt describes the 
system he calls Medieval. On the other hand, as we have seen, for Montaigne language is 
arbitrary, because there is no intrinsic relationship between signifier and signified, and as a 
consequence, what the signifier seems to imply may not even be there: although a heroic act is 
interpreted as the manifestation of virtue, it may not necessarily be a result of it. 
Although I have no knowledge of anybody using the term "representational crisis" 
within a Shakespearean context in the meaning I described above in 1.2, as it will turn out 
below, others have already dealt with similar issues in Shakespearean drama, namely, with the 
44 Alessandro Serpieri, "Reading the signs: toward a semiotics of Shakespearean drama," in John Drakakis ed., 
Alternative Shakespeares (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), 125. 
45 Franco Moretti, "Tragic Form as the Deconsecration of Sovereignty," in Franco Moretti, Signs Taken For 
Wonders. Essays in the Sociology of Literary Forms (London and New York: Verso, 1988), 48. 
46 Jurij Lotman, "Problems in the Typology of Cultures," in D. P. Lucid ed., Soviet Semiotics (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1977), 214-20. 
47 Serpieri, 126. 
29 
crumbling code that is revealed in the plays. It seems to me that there are two basic ways of 
addressing the issue of representation, and the approach to some extent depends on an 
understanding of mimesis. Critics who claim that "mimesis is mimesis of something, or it is 
not mimesis,"48 quite obviously will not see the ambiguities of a struggle for creating meaning 
in Shakespearean drama that I ascribe to the plays. Much closer to my approach are scholars 
who do see systems of signification questioned in and by the dramas themselves - as I have 
noted, this is exactly what I consider as a manifestation of the representational crisis. Such 
scholars include Howard Felperin and Jonathan Baldo, who both see that a critical self-
reflection on representation can be detected in Shakespearean plays, which is a consequence 
of changing practices of representation in the age, in the context of a larger cultural and 
epistemic shift. Felperin in his admirable book, Shakespearean Representation, outlines a 
pattern of Shakespearean drama where the understanding of plays is strongly determined by 
an intermingling of two facts: one, that the dramas are embedded in a representational context 
still strongly defined by medieval drama, and two, that plays are at the same time our 
contemporaries, approachable with our modem notions of the individual, his or her 
psychological motivations, even existential indeterminacy. He admits both an archaeological 
approach trying to resolve the problems of tragedies in the morality tradition, as well as a 
"romantic, or modernist, or even characterological" approach, no matter how remote the 
composition of the dramas examined was from us in time. Representatives of the former 
method (e.g., Spivack) see the tragedies as displaying a strong medieval dramatic heritage, 
where this heritage to a significant extent defines the drama, which is sometimes reduced to 
being seen as the repetition of the prototype. Critics employing the latter approach, like 
Coleridge, treat the dramatic characters as real people, and the dramas as autonomous pieces 
without artistic precedent. In Felperin's view the tragedies inherently display these two 
48 A.D. Nuttall, A New Mimesis, Shakespeare and the Representation of Reality (London and New York: 
Methuen, 1983), 182. 
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possibilities precisely because they are "structures which can never quite reunite with their 
own dramatic models nor leave those models definitely behind."49 The interplay of an older 
system of representation and its constant questioning, which makes the plays modern, 
contributes to a "truer, more austere mimesis,"50 exactly because in this way the outdatedness 
of the old system is made explicit, but that system is never completely repudiated. 
According to Felperin, the heart of Shakespearean tragedy is the way sign systems 
coexist: compared to the received, morality mode, the other is a departure from the older in 
direction to present life. The same coexistence exhibits at the same time a discrepancy 
between forms of prior art versus life. It appears from Felperin's argument that he does see 
here an attempt and a possibility of representing life within tragedy, an attempt to try to find 
more adequate ways of representation in order to reach a "truer and most austere mimesis." 
The way he imagines the older and the new systems, their interplay, their coextistence and 
mutual questioning of each other, is in fact very close to my understanding of the 
representational crisis, since in my view, too, the dramas express the untenability of the old 
system. Still, I do not see a possibility for "truer mimesis" in them, because the ultimate 
problem is not the démystification of the old model, but rather the possibility of any model of 
representation, embedded in the recognition of the illusory nature of what is regarded as 
reality. 
Thus, if this dynamism of the two systems does contribute to a representation that is 
truer to life, in my opinion the subject of this truer representation has to be precisely the 
untenability of the old system, which does not contain or express any other "reality." Still, in 
spite of the fact that at this point I disagree with Felperin, because I see more cynicism in this 
coexistence than a solution towards a new and more adequate mimesis, I perfectly agree with 
him on another matter. This concerns what he says about the way the tragedies exploit the 
49 Felperin, 87. 
30 Felperin, 102. 
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coexistence of binary opposites, such as morality versus madness, meaning versus absurdity 
and accommodation versus disaccommodation: the old one is continually discredited by the 
new one; nevertheless, it is never completely left behind. 
Jonathan Baldo in the foreword to his book The Unmasking of Drama states the 
following: "The tragedies stretching from Hamlet to Coriolanus and Timon of Athens 
constitute English Rensaissance tragedy's most strenuous attempts to unmask its 
representational practices and to penetrate its ordering principles."51 This is exactly what 
makes the dramas I intend to discuss so interesting for my examination of the representational 
crisis: these texts offer an example of critical self-reflection on their own practices of 
signification. Baldo's idea is that "the shifting structures of Shakespearean representation 
belong to a larger history of the concept and practice of representation."52 He, too, does not 
deal with the question of representation as mimesis or the imitation of reality, since the thing 
he finds important is to view Shakespearean representation culturally and historically, by 
placing the accent not on what, but on how and whom, on the questions "that govern 
discussions of political representation." Baldo is looking at major tragedies in which modes of 
representation meet resistance either from within or from emergent, alternative modes of 
representation.53 Under modes of representation he includes the following: the representation 
of the whole body politick by a universalised protagonist; representation of specific by 
general; visual by verbal; power by its manifestations; wholes by parts. In my examination of 
representational crisis I am not so much examining how Shakespearean tragedy challenges the 
relationship between words and things. This is an issue among the ones in Baldo's focus, 
positioned in a Foucauldean context of epistemological change. I am rather interested in the 
way the tragedies simultaneously challenge the validity of words and at the same time seem to 
state that the only way to "get hold of ' or represent things is through words. 
51 Baldo op. cit., 13. 
52 Baldo, 12. 
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Yet, the period when the code, the method of representation (be it language or 
theatre) acknowledges its own incompetence is followed by an obscuration of such an insight, 
or in Reiss's words it is followed by a "...denial, an occultation, of the acknowledgement that 
the human view of the world is necessarily a perspectival one."S4 As for the effect of such a 
denial and occultation of acknowledgement on tragedy, it looks as if it was not tragedy that 
created such a view and such a reality, but rather it is imitating a reality that exists outside 
itself: "It is as though tragedy has created a meaningful order which has in turn been 
transferred into the world itself. The order is no longer one of discourse: it belongs to the 'real 
world'."55 Here the code is seen as a tool to serve and mirror this reality. The converse side of 
this reality is when methods of procedure explicitly intermingle with things themselves and 
the code may come in focus. In such a case it is inevitable that the problem inherent in 
modelling any reality is made explicit. Knapp,56 when explaining a certain tension in 
Shakespeare that may be called "ambiguity, complementarity, dialectics, or indecidability" 
gives an interesting explanation. In his understanding this tension is not due to the 
contradiction between meanings of two versions of reality, one of which is medieval and the 
other early modern, but instead it is "the dramatic manifestation of a tension inherent in 
language - and perhaps in any modelling of reality - between two not quite complementary 
poles that have been variously conceived and named." The terms used are, for example 
semiotic and symbolic by Kristeva, performative and cognitive by de Man, metonymic and 
metaphoric by Jacobson, scandal and structure by Felman. Knapp describes the two poles the 
53 Baldo, 12. 
54 Timothy Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 37. 
55 Reiss, 1980, 8. 
56 Robert S. Knapp, Shakespeare - The Theater and the Book (Princeton, New Jetsey: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), 128. 
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following way: "...we have on the one side an independently figured, but finally unbounded 
reality (the body of the sign); and on the other, representation (the idea of the play)."57 
Through examining the successors of the Vice in Shakespearean tragedies it is 
exactly this ambiguity that I am interested in and propose to scrutinize, and not the tension 
dwelling in the contradiction between two versions of reality - a contradiction that I consider 
a prerequisite for the representational crisis to become manifest. I will analyse how the 
impossibility of signifying anything outside the system is reflected on by Iago and the Fool, 
whose self-reflexive questioning of the code is combined with the possibility of not signifying 
outside, but creating within the system. I will argue for the interference of the semiotic 
systems within the dramas not only as "a tension inherent in language" (an indirect 
consequence of conflicting epistemes), but also as a consequence of the Vice's inherent 
ambiguity deriving from the interference of a Christian versus a popular understanding of the 
figure. 
57 Knapp, 129. 
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2. Haphazardly Ambidextrous: the Vice-Family 
2.1 Problems of definition 
My interest in the Vice is fuelled by his unique position, his essential function within 
the play as well as his effect on the audience. I am interested in both mapping out his possible 
effects on a hypothetically constructed contemporary audience as well as a present day 
account and interpretation of those effects in their larger theatrical, social and critical 
contexts. 
As will be seen in the following discussion of some important works on the Vice, apart 
from the problem that there are no precisely given guidelines as to which character in which 
play can be classified as the Vice, the definition of his function and moral evaluation is even 
more contradictory. Can we call a figure "Vice" if this title is not given to him in the play, but 
in his function he seems to comply with those figures that are? Does the term apply to 
characters that appear in morality plays only? If a figure is called Vice in the play but does not 
feature characteristics that are usual for other Vices, can we still regard that character as a 
Vice? 
Although my intention here is not to provide finite answers to these questions, I will 
have a closer look at different accounts of the character, by which I hope not only the main 
concerns of the discourse on the Vice will emerge, but also that we will get a sketch of a 
range of suggested characteristics of the figure- although not all of them are compatible with 
each other - as well as the possible explanations of these characteristics. As a next step I will 
look at the applicability and relevance of these characteristics to actual examples of morality 
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Vices as well as successors of Vices in later drama, and particularly to the two Shakespearean 
figures discussed in my subsequent chapters. 
The basic problem with the morality Vice is the sense of comedy that makes him, 
although evil, appealing. His comedy has long worried critics because of its obvious moral 
implications. They tried to explain this comedy in several ways. Some tried to justify the 
comedy by interpreting it as fitting into the morality structure, or by presenting it as a safety 
valve that makes it possible to sustain the otherwise rigid moral structure, or by understanding 
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it as offering simple "comic relief," a non-significant, perhaps even artistically clumsy 
intermezzo within the treating of a serious theme. Some critics, however, acknowledged a 
possible threat in this comedy either to the unity of the play or to the morality as a literary 
genre or, as a consequence, have seen it to present a possible threat to the social and religious 
structure that served as its context. The comedy of the Vice can be, according to some, a 
source of condemning laughter, or as a tool for deceiving mankind - therefore it is not so easy 
to dismiss it, because the Vice's comedy presents a real threat, a dangerous sport: he has to be 
genuinely appealing to the audience in order to be strong enough to seduce the main hero and 
make the seduction plausible for the audience. Another possibility is to see that character 
either as "Vice-as-clown" or "Vice-as-tempter."59 The former type is the more problematic in 
critical literature because of the assumptions that in the Vice-clown the figure's original 
signification has been lost.60 Let us see now in detail different views that can be developed on 
the function and effect of the same figure. 
58 As Hillman reminds us, "[c]riticism of Shakespeare's tragedies has long outgrown the impulse to excuse (and 
therefore the impression of not excusing) the presence of fools and clowns as 'comic relief." Hillman op.cit., 4. 
He is certainly right, but the question becomes the more intriguing since it may question in retrospect the 
understanding of the comedy of the ancestors of Shakespeare's clowns, the comedy of the Vices in the same 
way. 
59 Discussed by Alan Dessen, Shakespeare and the Late Moral Play (Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press: 1986), 33. 
60 This view is held by Bernard Spivack in his Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil. I will discuss his views 
below when exploring the connections between the Vice and the Fool. 
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"You will learn to playe the vice": problems of interpretation 
The harsh critic of theatre, Philip Stubbes, in his Anatomy of Abuses describes 
everything bad that can be learned from playing and acting: 
If you will learn falshood; if you will learn cozenage; if you will learn to decive; if you will learn to 
play the hypocrite, to cog, to lie, and falsify; if you will learn to jest, laugh and fleer, to grin, to nod, and 
mow; if you will learn to play the vice, to swear, tear, and blaspheme both heaven and earth... [etc., 
etc.] and commit all kind of sin and mischief, you need to go to no other school, for all these good 
examples may you see painted before your eyes in interludes and plays.61 
The Vice in Stubbes's text most probably refers to the character in theatre, because he 
uses the phrase "learn to play the..." three times in the long (and in the above quoted version 
cut) passage, and in all these cases he continues the phrase with mentioning stock characters 
on stage, like the hypocrite, the vice, the glutton. There is no question about whether the Vice 
is condemnable or not in this context, actually he can even be understood as the epitome of all 
the immoral falsities of theatre, since he features most of the elements of the sinful behaviour 
described so minutely by Stubbes: he not only lies and falsifies by profession, but laughs, 
jests and fleers, as well as murders, steals and robs. The Vice may be seen as a character who 
embodies all the attributes of an actor in theatre, and perhaps it is no incident that Stubbes 
himself uses the word "ambidexter" [name of the Vice in Cambises] as synonym for actors.62 
But even if theatre is not perceived as an institution spreading immoral practices, and not all 
actors are seen as identical to Vices,63 the Vice is most frequently seen as condemnable. In 
61 Philip Stubbes, Anatomy of Abuses in Tanya Pollard ed. Shakespeare's Theater. A Sourcebook (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), 121-2. 
62 "Beware, therefore, you masking players, you painted sepulchres, you double dealing ambidexters..." 
(Pollard, 118.) A parallel passage that sees the Vice as the epitome of theatre can be found in a later 
antitheatrical treatise, William Prynne's Histriomastix. Prynne is grieving over the unfortunate fact that "witty, 
comely youths" devote themselves to the stage, "where they are trained in the School of Vice, the play-house..." 
(Pollard, 291). However, not only Vices can turn out to epitomise actors but fools as well. Welsford notes that 
"supposed early references to fools prove to be references to 'histriones', 'buffoni', 'joculatores' and other vague 
terms for actors and entertainers." Enid Welsford, The Fool: His Social and Literary History (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1961), 114. 
63 It is an interesting addition that Stubbes developed his radical opinion on actors and plays after the first edition 
of his Anatomy, since in the first edition he still included a preface that was cut form the subsequent editions, and 
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my discussion of different views on the Vice I have chosen to introduce in greater detail ones 
that offer some possibilities of the acceptability of the Vice together with his appeal and 
humour. I have chosen to do so because, as it will turn out below in my argument, the extent 
to which the Vice can be accepted and the specific features that make him acceptable are of 
crucial importance because of their broader theatrical and critical implications. 
Two comprehensive and major accounts of the Vice were included in books published 
in 1958 and 1962 respectively. One is Bernard Spivack's Shakespeare and the Allegory of 
Evil, and the other is David Bevington's From Morality to Marlowe. Bevington discusses the 
development and structure of morality plays as well as their effect on later drama, while 
Spivack centers on Shakespeare's villains and their dramatic heritage from earlier drama. I 
will refer to both of these books as I develop my argument concerning interpretations of the 
Vice. I would like to start with a detailed discussion on essays that illustrate the main currents 
in understanding this character. 
Somerset in his article entitled '"Fair is foul and foul is fair1: Vice-Comedy's 
Development and Theatrical Effects" deals with the Vice characters of the early period of the 
morality play's development, which he places around 1480-1540.64 He suggests that by the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the concept of the Seven Deadly Sins "had more or less 
run its course."65 Earlier literary and artistic depictions served to show the horrible nature of 
evil, grotesquely portrayed and deformed in a way that it horrified the viewer, and the sins 
appeared to the audience exactly as they appeared to the hero.66 Later on, however, much 
more attention was given to deceit and the complexity of the problem of sin. Somerset says, 
"[t]he usual solution, it seems, was to make the vices comically appealing, so that the hero's 
in which he states the following "...some kind of plays, tragedies, and interludes in their own nature, are not 
only of great ancientness, but also very honest and very commendable exercises, being used and practiced in 
most Christian commonwealths..." Pollard, 117. 
64 Somerset, J.A.B. "'Fair is foul and foul is fair': Vice-Comedy's Development and Theatrical Effects," in G.R. 
Hibbard ed. The Elizabethan Theatre V. (Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 1975), 54-75. 
65 Somerset, 60. 
66 Somerset, 58. 
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amusement (which we share) enables us to understand how he is misled. (...) Comedy is the 
main vice weapon."67 He points out that since the vices do appeal to us as audience by making 
us laugh, many critics have termed the effect caused this way either functionless comic relief 
or they have suspected that the play was faulty. In his opinion, this type of the comic may be 
called relief, but it is part of the method of the play in presenting the conflict between virtue 
and vice. He claims,"[t]he vices succeed at times in detaching us from our moral attitudes and 
making us relax, momentarily suspending our moral judgments or making us add to our sense 
that they, are evil the further response that they are entertaining and funny." 
Although Somerset does not make it explicit, he manages to develop a double view of 
the vices by dividing their functions as dramatic characters and as players, actors of a play: 
"They realize (and remind us) that we are 'come to se a play,1 and they forge, through 
laughter, a group of individual spectators into an audience. Hence they remind us of the 
communal nature of theatre, and show that they realize their function as entertainers."69 This 
double view of the Vices, dealing with this character in terms of his theatrical reality, no 
matter how remote that reality is from us now, is essential for making their comedy 
legitimate: together with the hero they try to corrupt the audience as well, but what the 
audience finally gets is entertainment, at the end of which a moral lesson is taught. Had it not 
been so, as Somerset himself points it out, we may as well call the plays that feature the vices 
"immorality plays."70 
Although I agree with Somerset that in many cases this is exactly what happens in a 
morality, namely, that evilness and the funny nature of the Vice do not exclude each other and 
these attributes often seem to coexist without any trouble in the same character, the case, as I 
will try to argue below, is more complicated than that. I am somehow reluctant to accept the 
67 Somerset, 63. 
68 Somerset, 64-5. 
69 Somerset, 68. 
70 Somerset, 69. 
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idea that evil should be depicted and accepted within this duality without any problem: it 
seems to me contradictory to acknowledge genuine evil as genuinely entertaining and funny, 
even if it is clear that such a combination gave no moral misgivings to the majority of theatre-
goers of the period. In the mysteries, as Somerset himself reminds his readers, evil was 
depicted as horrifying and disgusting, inviting repudiation from the part of the audience. If the 
funny and entertaining attribute of the Vice is taken to be genuine, that is, the deception is not 
carried out solely with the specific and exclusive aim of luring the hero and the audience into 
the world of sin, but also to offer joyous entertainment, then we cannot be completely 
satisfied with Somerset's idea of "making us add to our sense that they are evil the further 
response that they are entertaining and funny." 
Happé takes the Vice to be the heir of the following figures: "the folk-play fool and 
the presenter, the court-clown, the cheeky servant, the impertinent messenger, the mystery-
play Devil, all roles which are not characters so much as embodiments of dramatic forces 
directing the attention and controlling the response of the audience."71 Somerset focuses his 
exploration on the period between 1480-1540, while Happé starts where Somerset finished: he 
considers plays written after 1547, the year from which he sees it indispensable for a writer of 
moral interludes to include a Vice. The plays included in the list he deals with "are written to 
a conventional outline which involves the mockery and destruction of the hero by the Vice. 
Often the hero is vindicated and there are variations in which the Vice is punished or 
escapes."72 He sees the Vice offering the audience a licence for virtue, but with a sense that 
his activities are restricted. Happé claims this sense "may be intensified at times by his 
relationship with the Devil, whom he mocks and yet who has power over him." Another 
connection between the Devil and the vice is that the latter inherits "from the Devil a desire to 
71 Happé op. cit., 17. 
72 Happé, 19. 
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humble all men."73 The general function of the Vice, as Happé sees it, is as tempter and 
destroyer, while in the world of the audience he is "a successful performer who exercises 
great virtuosity."74 As for the characteristic comedy of the Vice, Happé claims that the final 
joke is not on the victim, but on the Vice: "His comedy is full of false notes and crude 
deceptions," and its function, which both disarms the audience and involves him in self-
ridicule, "is to bring about the downfall of the hero in such a way that we cannot but perceive 
the workings of justice."75 Happé, although he recognizes that the actor of the Vice may 
separate himself from the other actions in many ways, even, for example, by abandoning 
formal style or by employing special kinds of ridiculous movement characteristic only to him 
among the characters, suggests that the Vice fits well in an overall moral setup because he has 
an expository function: "He acts for the dramatist, fulfils the cultural code of explaining the 
moral doctrine of the play," through which the didactic experience is reached, building on 
"7/ 
"satire, ridicule, and an assumption of agreed values." 
Later I will argue that the successors of the Vice clearly lack this didactic trait and it is 
much more problematic, eventually even impossible, to assume that they are explaining some 
moral doctrine. Still, as I will try to show in my analysis, in case the Vice is taken merely as a 
tool of the workings of justice, he is not realising his enormously exciting potential. 
Alan Dessen addresses the issue of the comic and diabolic associations of the Vice in a 
way that acknowledges its entertaining appeal, but does not give any real threatening force to 
it, by saying simply that the association of the Devil with the Vice gives its humour a distinct 
edge. 
Admittedly, the late morality play Devil is often a comic, blustering figure who sets the Vice in motion 
and is mocked in the process. Nonetheless, the association between the two figures (with the consequent 
link of the Vice to sin, Hell and damnation) is prominent both in the extant plays and the memories of 
the next generation. Thus, the entertainment function of the Vice-comedian is to be found in the late 
73 Happé, 21. 
74 Happé, 27. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Happé, 28. 
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moral drama and is remembered, but the diabolic associations (as well as the implications for the Vice's 
victims and society) give that humour a distinct edge.77 
In his view the Vice is dangerous both to the victims on stage as well as to the audience of the 
play. 
The way the vices are presented by Somerset, Happé and Dessen shows that these 
scholars are sensitive to the morally problematic nature of the character. Still, they feel that 
this figure fits in a larger, complex system, capable of encompassing comic evil: a system 
where the comic vices are indirectly supporting a moral world-view, where finally the 
audience laughs not so much with them, but at them. This would be indeed difficult to apply 
to the descendants of the Vice I am interested in, because in their context it is exactly the 
assumption of agreed values that is challenged, which makes the target of satire and ridicule 
unforeseeable. Still, it is not necessarily the dissolution of the moral universe behind the 
morality plays (this moral universe being at its most only residual in Shakespearean tragedies) 
that makes the descendants of the Vice impossible to contain safely. In Mares' opinion the 
morality Vice is not devoid of this feature either. He claims that this Vice comes into the 
drama from the popular festival, he is established as a stage clown before he appears in the 
•jo 
morality at all, and does not do so until the morality is in decline. After listing plays from 
the period between 1533 and 1579 in which there is a character explicitly named Vice, Mares 
finds that it is not moral allegory that is a common feature of these plays, but rather the 
company, which was of limited size, and in which the Vice, who was a favourite with the 
70 
audience, was played by the major actor of the company. 
As we have seen, according to Somerset the Vice stands outside moral law to the 
extent that the Vices are acknowledged and accepted entertainers, and their game serves to 
77 Dessen op. cit 22. 
78 Frances Hugh Mares, "The origin of the Figure Called 'the Vice' in Tudor Drama," Huntington Library 
Quarterly 12 (1958-1959): 11-23. p.l 1 
Mares, 13. 
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teach a moral lesson. The idea of the "outsider" Vice is formulated differently by Mares. He 
points out that there was a non-dramatic Vice figure in popular festivals before any dramatic 
Vice would have appeared on stage. By this, in my opinion, he implicitly explains the fact 
that the Vice is obviously an outsider in the plays when he addresses the audience: with his 
comments he foretells the action of the play or lets the audience into his confidence but is 
really not part of the play's events. Still, Mares does not make a distinction between the Vice 
as an extra-dramatic versus dramatic figure when he comments on his being outside the moral 
law. It seems to me that to some extent both Somerset and Happé make that distinction: it is 
as if the morally acceptable "side" or layer of the Vice in their view was in his being the chief 
entertainer. If we consider moralities as strictly homiletic, the conclusion of Mares is 
challenging: "[The Vice] is not subject to the limitations of the other characters, and seems 
often to be outside the moral law. He is not evil disguised as good as the conventional 
morality explanation would lead one to expect, but does both good and evil 'Haphazardly'."80 
Perhaps this attribute of the Vice is the one that makes him potentially more subversive than 
simply being the embodiment of tempting evil, since if it was not a haphazard operation but 
the world clearly turned upside down by him, then in its effect the Vice would also 
acknowledge order, by constituting its exact opposite. In being merely a character standing for 
the opposite of virtue he would more obviously occupy a definable place in the moral setup. 
By being unpredictable, however, this is not what he does. Still, this does not have to mean 
that as a consequence he necessarily undermines the same moral setup. 
Mares gives us a quotation to illustrate the unpredictability of the Vice's behaviour. In 
the morality The Tide Tarrieth no Man, the Vice Courage says the following: 
... Cor age contagious, 
And eake contrarious, both in me do rest: 
For I of kind, am always various, 
And hange, as to my mind seemeth best. (sig. C3vf 
80 Mares, 14. 
81 Ibid. 
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Like Mares, I find this characteristic of the Vice essential, although it is usually not 
taken into account in his interpretations by others, who see the primacy of the morality pattern 
essential. I do not suggest that anyone who sees the Vice clearly and safely fitted within the 
overall pattern supporting the moral message is necessarily wrong, but I would like to draw 
attention to the fact that the moral position of the Vice varies. It is quite inconsistent, even 
within one play. 
Although I will deal in much more detail with the comedy and sense of humour of the 
Vice and his successors in Chapter 4, I would like to provide insight into the Vice's comic 
behaviour, particularly a type of his verbal humour that I see a possible key for the moral 
evaluation we make of him. Apart from making us aware of the similarities between the dress 
and equipment of the Vice and the fool in the morris and sword dance, as well as the fact that 
the Vice, like the Fool, was the leader of his team of actors, Mares finds "a type of verbal 
humour that is common to both vice and mummer plays." He quotes Chambers, who 
"sternly called it [...] 'an incongruous juxtaposition of contraries...purely verbal jesting 
without salt of mind...The folk at its worst.'"84 
Distorted language as one source of comedy in the Vice's repertoire can be included 
under what Chambers calls "purely verbal jesting" and speaks reprovingly about its nonsense. 
82 For example at the beginning of the same play Mares refers to, the Vice informs the audience that he will try 
to corrupt as many people as possible in the short time that is available for him. 
83 Mares, 18. 
84 Mares, 19. Mares does not qualify Chambers' opinion, but it is possible to disagree with Chambers not only 
because after Bakhtin, Weimann, Gash and others (whom I discuss in my Chapter Four on laughter) we have 
learned to appreciate the "popular" type of comedy and comic, both dramatic and non-dramatic, but also because 
this type of humour was not restricted to products of popular culture. For instance Heywood's Vice in The Play 
of the Weather, a product of an author who was writing and working for the court, is displaying similarly 
"empty" verbal jesting when he, as a typical well-travelled Vice is enumerating for more than twenty lines the 
places where he has been (cf. 11. 198-211), not to mention that he likes to make scatological and lewd jokes too. I 
find it unfortunate to dismiss such Vices as allegedly "not quite Vices" when they lack the moral dimension 
regarded typical of the type. Cf. Happé: "Nevertheless, it appears that John Heywood's Merry Report and 
Neither-Loving-Nor-Loved were not quite Vices because they lacked moral dimension." op.cit., 18. 
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A good example is Mischiefs mocking (actually levelling) of Mercy in Mankind5 for the use 
of his pompous language flaunting Latin expressions. Mischief comes up with nonsensical 
language, actually a riddle that is nonsensical, except for the punch-line that encourages the 
listener to give money to the Vice: 
I beseech you heartily, leave your calc 'ation, 
Leave your chaff, leave your corn, leave your dalliation; 
Your wit is little, your head is mickle, ye are full of predication. 
But sir, I pray this question to clarify: 
Mish mash, driff draff, 
Some was corn and some was Chaff 
My dames said my name was Raff; 
Unshut your lock and take an halpenny. 
11.45-52. 
Mischief in this example refutes the very idea of a riddle, namely, that it has a 
meaning that can be reached if one is intelligent or witty enough to solve it, because the core 
of his riddle is that it clearly has no solution, no meaning. Still, it is called a "question" and 
looks like a riddle formally, no matter how nonsensical. I have not come across anyone 
criticising this particular type of humour of the Vice for its being threatening to the moral 
well-being of either the audience or the characters on the play. Chambers' critique is directed 
towards the lack of intellectual witticism, not the possibility of moral corruption. I would like 
to suggest that the above example and the type of verbal humour it represents is organic to the 
other schemes of the Vice, and may be seen as just as ambiguous in a moral sense as the Vice 
himself is. It can be regarded as a parallel to the ambiguity of the Vice's moral evaluation, his 
haphazard behaviour: this character maintains meaning as unreliably as a required pattern of 
even evil behaviour.86 
85 Cf. 11 45-52 in Mankind. The edition I refer to is J.A.B. Somerset, Four Tudor Interludes (London: Atholone 
Press, 1974), 25-51. 
86 Another such example, a nonsensical speech of a Vice is discussed below in 2.2.1., from The Tyde Tarrieth no 
Man. 
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Not surprisingly, the examples we choose for talking about the Vice will to some 
extent determine the view we present of them - or perhaps we choose the examples already 
having the view in mind. An interesting instance is Alan Dessen's interpretation in his book 
quoted above. 
Dessen's opinion is that "the emergence of the Vice as the central figure in the 
interludes of the 1560s and 1570s represents a practical theatrical answer" to the problem of 
the sinful world corrupted by a particular force, which is in the end defeated and the sin 
corrected."87 Thus he sees that the Vices are necessarily defeated as part of a clear moral 
pattern: 
The spectator was therefore regularly confronted with a lively, often very funny figure who sets up a 
special bond with his audience and then acts out with wit, energy, and comic violence the power of 
some corrupting force upon society (e.g. Covetousnesse, Revenge, Newfanglednesse, Infidelity, 
Inclination) only to be defeated or transcended in the play's final movement.88 
This final movement of the play is called a "second climatic movement" by Dessen, 
who thus considers the Vice's function in "a two phased movement," a first part in which the 
Vice is active and influences the events in his often funny way, and a second in which he is 
defeated and order is restored. The Vices Dessen enlists as examples indeed are unambiguous 
in their standing for a particular sin, made explicit in their names. However, in his choice I see 
inherent his overall opinion of the Vice. What to do with Vices whose name is Merry 
Report89, or Ambidexter, or Haphasard, even Nought or Courage - names that Dessen does 
not include in his examples? The vices suggested by these names are not as clear-cut sins as 
Dessen's examples, they invite a more philosophical problematization and a more complex 
moral interpretation of the character, and subsequently the plays as well. Dessen has it, that it 
is the "modern aversion to didactic" that leads us to "casually dismiss the original logic of 
87 Dessen, 22. 
88 Dessen, 24. 
89A later Vice in Thomas Garter's Vitruous and Godly Susanna (1569) has a Vice called 111 Report who pretends 
in the play that he is really Will, but with the appearance of True Report he is deemed to fall. Compared to 
Heywood's Merry Report who is not vicious and serves Jupiter rightly even though at one point he says he 
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these morality plays,"90 and sees that "with the translation of the Vice into a mere clown or 
buffoon, the interpreter often metamorphoses this distinct figure into terms more amenable to 
the twentieth century, which finds the process of temptation more accessible than the allegory 
of the health of a kingdom."91 I would rather suggest that perhaps it is exactly the insistence 
on the Vice's comedy as one of a "mere clown or buffoon" that simplifies this distinct figure, 
who may be included in a nicely presented allegory, but does not have to support its moral 
message. 
Considering the accounts of the Vice character, in summary on the issue of moral 
problematics, I would like to make two points. The first is that I see no strong evidence 
suggesting that we should stick so eagerly to the idea that the Vice in the end contributes to 
the moral stability of the system he is presented in, particularly when, like the quoted critics, 
we acknowledge facts that may contradict this idea. Somerset, for example, gives an 
insightful account of the Vice's comedy, but still maintains that the audience sees him as evil. 
Happé refers to examples where the Vice is not punished but escapes in the end - an idea that 
makes difficult the application of the workings of Justice. Should a strict moralist frown on 
reading this, they will be soon relieved, because Happé points out that the final joke is still on 
the Vice. Dessen gives a detailed overview of the entertainment function of the Vice 
comedian and his relatedness to the jester and the fool, and still, finds the "diabolic 
associations" so significant as to dismiss this comedy in the end by simply saying that it has a 
distinct edge. 
I would like to suggest, and this is partly what I will try to demonstrate in my account 
of morality Vices as a next step, that perhaps we should accept that even if a play has a clear 
moral doctrine, the Vice, by being outside of it as he frequently indeed is outside, does not 
would rather be the devil's servant, these two opposing Vices actually may be considered as embodying a moral 
shift: when the good and bad characteristics of the same figure are split and made black and white. 
90 Dessen, 35. 
91 Dessen, 34. 
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need to contribute to this doctrine, quite on the contrary. Also, since he is not necessarily evil, 
he does not necessarily have to be punished - again supporting the idea that he may have 
nothing to do with the moral doctrine of the play. Perhaps critics in the quoted accounts of the 
Vice feel that if it is acknowledged that the Vice is outside the morality pattern, it would make 
the whole system supporting this pattern questionable - an idea that seems rather 
anachronistic in the given period. However, the fact that a character is or may be outside the 
dominant pattern does not necessarily question the pattern itself; it rather questions certain 
ideas about that pattern, ideas that cannot imagine elements within the system contradicting 
its foundations. In other words, instead of eliminating "not characteristic Vices," we should 
rather broaden our understanding of the category "Vice." 
The issue is further problematised when the character who has the last word and who 
gives the final interpretation of the events is not a virtuous character, such as, say, the one 
called Remedy, as in Wealth and Health, but a Vice. If he is both involved in evil schemes 
and is a director-entertainer Vice, the origin and prime mover of the whole play, the worst 
thing we can say about him is that he presents himself paradoxically in his own play in a 
morally condemnable way, in order to make the moral message complete. Another problem 
with the Vice's comedy, also to be discussed below, is that it may be in many cases justified 
to laugh with rather than at the Vice. In these cases the audience may completely identify with 
the Vice's stance, as for example in Mankind, when, as we have seen, Mercy is mocked for 
his pretentious and pompous Latin. 
2.2 Vices 
I would like now to have a look at actual plays containing a Vice in order to show the 
colourful palette of his appearance, to support my argument that he is perhaps not best 
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understood as contributing to a structure of a clear moral message, and also to provide basis 
for further analysis of the successors of the same character. My choices of plays are purposely 
diverse. I will discuss in relative detail the vice of a play that is called a comedy, another vice 
that appears in a combination of history play and morality, an exemplum, and I will draw on 
examples taken from other texts as well, such as moralities illustrating proverbs - in order to 
show that no matter how different the genres are (and probably the aims of the several authors 
as well), there are significant similarities in Vices even in plays as different as the ones I 
examine. 
Merry Report 
The first instance of the description "the Vice" among characters of a play appears in 
two comedies by John Heywood, The Play of Love (from the 1520s or early 1530s)92 and The 
Play of the Weather (1527-33). Heywood's Vices are considered atypical by many 
interpreters because they lack a supposedly essential characteristic: they hardly seem to be 
evil at all. This is why, for example, Bernard Spivack delivers a carefully structured 
argument in which he explains why these "Vices" are not representative vices in the first 
place, and also, why it is erroneous to draw consequences about the genus vice based on these 
instances. Spivack refers chiefly to Chambers94 when he disagrees with earlier commentary 
on the Vice, and presents his own view on Heywood's vices in the above mentioned plays: 
9 2 1 give the dates of the non-cycle dramas I discuss in this part of the paper following the data given by Darril 
Grantley, English Dramatic Interludes 1300-1580, Cambridge UP, 2004 
93 Interestingly, however, these comedic figures may be linked to a stage device with demonic connections, as in 
The Play of Love the figure called No-lover nor-loved, who is referred to as "vice" in the cast, runs among the 
audience crying "water, water, fire, fire," while his head is full of squibs, implying that his hair caught fire while 
off-stage. The connection is made by the use of "squibs," fire-crackers: these were used by earlier stage devils, 
and thus Heywoord's Vice could at this point probably be associated with them by the audience. For this remark 
I am indebted to Kent Cartwright. 
94 "...the character of the Vice is derived from that of the domestic fool or jester. [. . .] the Elizabethan writers 
speak of his long coat and lathen sword, common trappings of the domestic fool. Whether he ever had a 
coxcomb, a bauble, or an eared hood is not apparent. A vice seems to have been into one or two of the later 
miracle-plays. At Bungay in 1566 he 'made pastime' before and after the play, as Tarleton or Kempe were in 
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Both roles, superficially examined, seem to present nonallegorical comedians, provoking at least one 
scholar to argue that the Vice is essentially a dramatic outgrowth of the medieval clown or jester, 
extraneous to the morality drama and brought into it merely to create its comedy.95 
Spivack even explains how such a Vice appeared on stage. He claims that the vice 
who distinguished himself from his allegorical cohorts and developed into a theatrical 
personality (I take it that he means the master of ceremonies-type vice who is surrounded by 
similar minor and less potent vices, such as Mischief and his three companions in Mankind) 
subsequently "could be lifted out of his allegorical and homiletic context and cultivated in 
comedy of the type Hey wood was writing."96 Such an explanation eliminates any other ideas 
about vices that would not fit into Spivack's main idea about the Vice as radix malorum, the 
origin of all evil, an explanation that in my view leaves out a crucial attribute of this figure. 
Hey wood's Vice in The Play of the Weather91 is indeed not evil, but I would not like 
to exclude him from a discussion of the Vices exactly because he has much in common with 
the allegedly "all-evil" Vices. Also, he is impudent enough to mock the chief god, Jupiter, 
already at his entrance on the stage. As Merry Report enters, Jupiter asks him who he is: 
"Why, what arte thou that approchyst so ny?" (1101), to which the Vice answers: 
Mery Report. Forsothe, and please your lordshyppe it is I. 
Jupiter. All that we knowe very well, but what I? 
Mery Report. What I? Some saye lam perse f8. 
But what maner I, so ever be I, 
I assure your good lordshyp I am I. 
(11. 102-6) 
As he himself gives an explanation of his name, it is Merry Report because he will 
report even the sad news merrily: 
Andfor my name, reporting alwaye trewly 
What hurte to reporte a sad mater merely? 
(11. 136-7) 
time to do with their'jigs' upon the London boards. And probably this was his normal function on such 
occastions" (Chambers, 204-5). 
95 Spivack, 136. 
96 Ibid. 
97 In The Plays of John Heywood. Richard Axton and Peter Happé eds. (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1991). 
9B In editorial notes, p. 289: "7 am perse I: I am unsurpassed, the thing itself (per se spoken as one word)." 
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I find it interesting how Merry Report seems to imply that until the report is true, there 
might be nothing wrong with its indecorously merry delivery. Another characteristic of his is 
that he has no prejudice, no attachment to anything. All weather is the same for him, therefore 
he is able to report on people's opinion without bias: 
For all wethers I am so indifferent, 
Wythout affeeccyon standynge so up right — 
Son lyght, mone lyght,f...J 
Temperate or dystemperate - what ever yt be, 
Ipromiyse your lordshyp all is one to me. 
(11. 154-60) 
He employs the characteristic tool of audience-involvement of Vices and addresses the 
audience after Jupiter sends him away to his job: 
Now good my lorde god, Our Lady be with ye! 
Thynke ye I may stand thrustyng amonge you there? 
Nay by God, I muste thrust about other gere. 
(11. 175-8) 
Also, he says, 
Now syrs, take hede for here cometh goddess servaunt. 
Avaunte, carterly keytyfs, avaunt! 
Why, ye drunken horesons, wyllyt not be? 
By fayth, have ye no ther cap nor kne? 
(11. 186-9) 
On the one hand, he is humiliating members of the audience ("drunken horesons"); on 
the other, he is stressing his own importance as being "goddess servaunt." Although Merry 
Report has mocked Jupiter at the beginning with his entrance by not giving due respect to the 
main God, in the end he indeed makes a good and faithful servant considering how he carries 
out his job. He does give a truthful account of the different opinions of people, representatives 
of different social types about what sort of weather they would like to have. He boasts about 
his position of being god's servant, but establishes a questionable reputation when saying that 
being the devil's servant could be more fun: 
51 
I thynke goddess servauntes may lyve holyly 
But the devils servauntes lyve more meryly 
(11. 988-9) 
Still, no matter what he says, he seems rather merry even as Jupiter's servant. He is not cruel 
or mean, apart from his longing to be the devil's servant instead. The only thing that makes 
him potentially condemnable is when after having presented their wishes the suitors leave 
him, he pretends not to care for them. But again in the end he does not betray either of them, 
and indeed he is indifferent in presenting their various wishes to Jupiter. He does not have to 
escape or be punished either in the end. 
In the introduction to The Plays of John Heywood, the editors describe Hey wood's 
Vices the following way: 
They are playmakers and go-betweens, not fixed in any social 'estate', but able to mimic any. They 
relate as easily to the audience as to other players, taking liberties with both. Their capers and apparent 
improvisations add movement, dance perhaps, and song-like antics often reminiscent of children's 
games. But the Vice figures are the least innocent of Heywood's roles: knowing, verbally clever, and 
irrepressibly bawdy." 
Based on this view another opinion can be formed that opposes Spivack's ideas. The 
comedy of this Vice is not entirely benign, but there are other things that are much more 
important: the fact that his behaviour is not consequent or logical (he does not behave 
according to his opinion expressed in his side remarks), that he relates to the other characters 
and the audience in the same mockingly disrespectful manner, he does not belong to a social 
position but, as was pointed out in the quotation above, he can mimic any such position. 
Ambidexter 
Similarly to Merry Report who was reluctant to reveal his name to Jupiter, 
Ambidexter from Cambises (1558-69)100 is creating suspense too by delaying disclosure of 
99 Axton and Happé, 13. 
100 A Critical Edition of Thomas Preston's Cambises. Robert Carl Johnson ed. (Salzburg: Institut fur Englische 
Sprache und Literatur, Universität Salzburg, 1975). 
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who he is, what name he is called by. He pretends to have forgotten his name, but once he 
remembers, he gives an explanation of its meaning./0/ 
Ha, my name, my name would you so fain knowe? 
Yea, iwis shall ye, and that with all speed: 
I have forgot it therefore I cannot showe, 
A, A, now I have it, I have it in deed. 
My name is Ambidexter, I signifie one, 
That with bothe hands finely can play 
(11. 146-51) 
This half morality, half history play, a transition towards the chronicles, similarly to 
the previous play, features a Vice who is capable of behaving as people belonging to different 
social level; he very skilfully plays his different parts. After Ambidexter has fought with the 
ruffians and taken part in the lewd and comic conversation with Meretrix in scene 2, at the 
beginning of scene 3 he prepares to meet Sisamness and says he will behave like a gentleman: 
Beholde where he cometh, I wil him meet: 
And like a gentleman I meane him to greet 
(11. 305-6) 
As it turns out, however, in this particular scene his "gentleman-like" behaviour is 
restricted to showing some respect to Sisamenes in acting as benevolent advisor and 
suggesting that he "play with bothe hands and turn with the winde." (1. 321) 
Ambidexter proves to be a forerunner of Iago when he very skilfully makes the King 
suspicious of his brother, no matter how ungrounded this suspicion is. The Vice is 
withholding the truth: he pretends to be reluctant to utter a lie, intensifying the tension when 
suggesting the king Cambises that his brother is looking for his death. His method is to reveal, 
while acting as if he were denying what he reveals. 
King. How sayst thou? speake the trueth, was it so or no? 
Ambidexter. I think so if it please your grace, but I cannot tel. 
(11. 685-6) 
101 "The earliest sense in English (1532) was restricted to law: 'one who takes bribes from both sides.' In 1555 
the word is used by Bishop Ridley with the sense of a 'double-dealer,' but these are the only two recorded usages 
prior to our play. The sense of double-dealing or playing on both sides is germane to our character." In. Johnson 
ed., explanatory notes, 170. 
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Ambidexter is capable of displaying histrionic skills in a spectacular way on stage. 
The way he pretends to be sorry for the dead queen is highly ironic, since the audience has 
just noticed the sad event of the Queen's song, an improvised, psalm-like farewell before she 
leaves the stage to be executed. 
A, A, A, A, I cannot chuse but weep for the Queene: 
Nothing but mourning now at the Court there is seen. 
Oh, oh, my heart, my heart, Oh my bum wil break: 
Very greef so torments me that scarce I can speake. 
Who could but weep for the losse of such a lady? 
That can not I doo, I sweare by mine honesty. 
(11. 1127-32 
Funnily in the last line, when he swears he is true and honest, he indeed cannot 
identify with crying from heart - although we have seen him cry ironically in the previous 
lines. But actually there is nothing he will identify with, since he is constantly playing. His 
laughter is no more true than his weeping, as he himself points it out in another example; 
laughter is just the other side of his ambidextrous quality. Ambidexter's pretence of weeping 
and being sorry after another execution, the one of Lord Smirdis, displaces the audience's 
genuine sorrow after they saw the tragic circumstances of his death. Ambidexter first pretends 
to weep and then ironically bursts out in laughter: "Ha, ha, weep, nay, laugh, with both hands 
to play." (1. 744) 
As these two examples show, Ambidexter comes very close to being the epitome of 
actors, whose tears and laughter are no more real than his. But he is indeed the explicator of 
the moral message: before the king enters dying at the end of the play, he foreshadows the 
fate that the King deserves. 
He hath shed so much blood that his wil be shed: 
If it come so to passe, in faith then he is sped. 
(11. 1151-2) 
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And the moral message is reinforced by the dying King as well: 
A just reward for my misdeeds, my death dooth plain declare. 
(1. 1 1 6 6 ) 
At the end of the play Ambidexter is not punished for anything; he just leaves the stage: 
Farewel my maisters, Iwil go take barge. 
I meane to be packing, now is the tide. 
(11. 1178-9) 
Johnson in his critical introduction to the play stresses several times how the play does 
not necessarily need Ambidexter's character to go on. He sees the employment of this 
character as evidence of his popularity and as a problem of historical structure (the tradition, 
the historical function of the Vice) versus artistic motivation.102 After showing how 
Ambidexter's presence was not essential for any of the main events, he summarises the 
Vices's function in the following way: "Ambidexter's role is reduced to that of expositor; he 
is the link between scenes, the reporter of off-stage events, the prophet of future events, the 
philosopher, the knave. He exists to entertain and elucidate."103 The two comic scenes are 
Ambidexter's, and although they counteract the serious tone of the main plot, as Johnson 
points out, they also "suggest a secondary theme: men play with both hands and turn with the 
wind at all levels of society." In this function the Vice is the one to reveal how corrupt people 
are, rather than corrupting them himself. It is clear also that the only character in the play he 
ostensibly "corrupts," namely Sisamnes, had been corrupt already, even before he met 
Ambidexter. 
To sum up Ambidexter's role in Cambises, I would like to draw attention to his 
presence in the play rather as an idea of playing and entertainment than as a powerful and 
vicious character. If we accept Johnson's view of the subplot supplementing the main one and 
showing how people are the same in all layers of society, then the corrupting schemes of the 
102 Johnson, 18. 
103 Johnson, 22. 
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Vice depend rather on revealing the corruptedness of society on its several layers than actual, 
"original" corruption. Outside his element, the comic scenes, as Johnson reminds us, 
Ambidexter is quite ineffective, an ineffective courtier of some sort. 
Haphazard 
The prologue of A New Tragical Comedy of Appius and Virginia104 (1559-67) makes 
clear that the play is an exemplum. In the prologue we read that both married women and 
virgins are to follow the way Virginia remained pure and chaste, even if the only way of 
preserving her chastity was to ask for her own death. The Vice of the play is called 
Haphazard. At the Vice's first entry, before he reveals his name, he asks the audience who 
they think he is. Although they may probably guess that he is a Vice-like character from his 
reference to the devil ("Who dips with the devil, he had need have a long spoon..."), the Vice 
enters into a long but, in its heterogeneity, quite funny and intriguing monologue enumerating 
a whole colourful spectrum of real and metaphoric occupations and characteristics, ranging 
from lawyer through "sower of lies" to mackerel. 
Yet, a proper gentleman I am, of truth: 
Yea, that may ye see by my long side-gown: 
Yea, but what am I? A scholar, or a school-
master, or else some youth: 
A lawyer, a student, or else a country clown? 
A broom-man, a basket maker, or a baker of pies, 
A flesh or a fishmonger, or a sower of lies? 
A louse or a louser, a leek or a lark, 
A dreamer, a drumble, a fire or a spark? 
A caitiff, a cut-throat, a creeper in corners, 
A hairbrain, a hangman, or a grafter of homers? 
By the gods, I know not how best to devise, 
My name or my property best to disguise. 
A merchant, a may-pole, a man or a mackerel, 
A crab or a crevis, a crane or a cockerel? 
104 John S .Farmer ed., Five anonymous plays (London: Early English Drama Society, 1908), 10-11. 
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And at this point, although he has not yet completed his list, which goes one for 
another dozen of lines in a similar fashion, Haphazard gives an answer to the questions he 
posed before: 
Most of all these my nature doth enjoy; 
Sometime I advance them, sometime I destroy. 
Thus, the answer to the question which one of all these should be accepted as his 
identity is that he can be anything, quite freely, just the way he fancies to advance or destroy 
his nature, or in other words, his "identity." The other possible explanation of these lines is 
intriguing as well: it is according to his fancy that he will destroy or advance the enumerated 
occupations, or their representatives. I would like to stress again the actor-like playfulness in 
his juggling with his self, and his "identity" that is exactly inconstancy, a no-identity, a 
function that is a possibility of anything. 
The haphazardness of the Vice is not a distressing or a threatening one. It fits well in 
the topsy-turvy tradition of the comic, as is clear from his monologue describing the world 
turned upside-down haphazardly, where wives wear the cod-piece, and maids are the masters: 
Hap may so hazard, the moon may so change, 
That men may be masters, and wives will not range: 
But in hazard it is, in many a grange, 
Lest wives wear the cod-piece, and maidens coy strange. 
As peacocks sit perking by chance in the plum-tree, 
So maids would be masters by the guise of this country. 
The effect of such topsy-turvydom is entirely comic in its fiction of infinite 
possibilities where even a gentleman may have to go begging, where anything that does not 
comply with the existing order may happen. The effect of the comic is intensified by the twist 
that Haphazard makes in the lines quoted above: it is now the existing order that may happen 
by hazard, namely, that the men be masters if the moon changes so. But no matter what 
happens (and the Vice is playing with "hap" meaning both his name and things that happen), 
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even events that should signify the end of the world, everything is comic in the end, even if 
the sky falls on the earth: "If hap the sky fall, we hap may have larks." The speech is ended 
elegantly by Haphazard urging the audience to pay: 
Well, fare you well now, for better or worse: 
Put hands to your pockets, have mind to your purse. 
(p. 17) 
As for his corrupting force, Haphazard is not very strong in that, since Appius is 
already prone to lust even before Haphazard arrives, and positive allegorical characters, 
Justice and Conscience, try to counteract the Vice's influence in vain. Funnily, Haphazard 
does not promise the judge he corrupts that he will surely get Virginia; this is just a 
suggestion, a mere tip: 
There is no more ways, but hap or hap not, 
Either hap or else hapless, to knit up the knot: 
And if you will hazard to venture what falls, 
Perhaps that Haphazard will end all your thralls. 
(p. 20) 
Still, Haphazard knows beforehand that the Judge has no chance, and in this he 
reinforces the audience's expectations of rightfulness. Although it may seem from his 
explanations that there might be some haphazard chance for anyone and it is worth giving it a 
try, the play shows that he is not trustworthy: the events demonstrate that following his advice 
leads to destruction. The speech in which Haphazard reveals this to the audience contains 
humorously nonsensical elements: 
When gain is no gain, sir, 
And gauds nought set by, 
Nor puddings nor pie-meat 
Poor knaves will come nigh, 
Then hap and Haphazard 
Shall have a new coat. 
And so it may happen 
To cut covetousness' throat. 
Yea, then shall Judge Appius 
Virginia obtain; 
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And geese shall crack mussels 
Perhaps in the rain. 
(p. 22-3) 
The nonsensical elements reveal a partly comic and fictive, partly deadly time, a 
quasi-future, which on the one hand makes Appius ridiculous because he has no chance to 
have Virginia (have her when geese crack mussels), and on the other hand makes clear that he 
will be punished for his sin and will die. So it is not only that the Vice will reinforce the 
audience's ideas about sinful behaviour and its punishment, but also he actually seems to be 
the one to punish the sinner. As he puts it, it may happen that Haphazard may cut 
covetousness's throat. 
When Appius is just about to meet his death, Haphazard comes and has a confusing 
speech of seven lines, which are hardly intelligible because he speaks half-nonsense, half a 
riddle, as if it meant something. And actually Appius does pick up the important idea that 
foreshadows his doom: 
Haphazard. I came from Caleco even the same hour, 
And hap was hired to hackney in hempstrid: 
In hazard he was of riding on beamstrid. 
Then, crow crop on tree-top, hoist up the sail, 
Then groaned their necks by the weight of their tail: 
Then did carnifex put these together, 
Paid them their passport for clust 'ring thither. 
Appius. Why, how now, Haphasard, of 
What dost thou speak? 
Methinks in mad sort thy talk thou dost break. 
Those three words, chopt all in one 
Is carnifex: that signifieth hangman. 
Peace! no such words before me utter. 
(p. 38-9) 
At the end of the play, Haphazard turns to Reward to get reimbursed for his services of 
keeping Appius informed following the logic that he advised Appius earlier, namely that the 
worst thing that can happen is a no. However, Reward informs him that his reward is a rope. 
Haphazard attempts an escape first, but he is held back, after which he pleads for his life in a 
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manner that suggests that even before being hanged he is still in his comic element rather than 
desperate: 
Must I needs hang? By the 
gods! It doth spite me 
To think how crabbedly 
this silk lace will bite me. 
(p. 44) 
His humour, however, does not save him. He is given no mercy, and exits the stage 
while urging his cousin Cutpurse to follow him, in fact to "follow the livery." Haphazard's 
example is such that in the end the final joke is on him, and the idea he stood for has proven 
unwise to follow. Thus he reinforces morally correct behaviour, including in the scene where 
he was explicitly critical of the covetousness of the judge. 
Punisher or punished? 
Another example of a play in which the Vice receives his final punishment is Horestes 
(1567)/05 where he appears as a beggar in the end of the play. Still, I would like to draw 
attention to the fact that no matter how sad the end of the Vice may look (sad from his point 
of view), his opinion may be different about it. We have seen above how the final joke is 
indeed on Haphazard, but still he is capable of commenting mockingly on the sad end of his 
career. The instance of Horestes' Vice is even less clear-cut. It seems that although he (who 
called himself Revenge in the same monologue) does advertise his poor and lamentable 
condition of becoming a beggar at first, he does not identify with this condition in the long 
run. First he perceives it as punishment for his "labor," and feels miserable: 
105 Marie Axton ed. Tree Tudor Classical Interludes (Cambridge: D.S.Brewer and Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1982). In his commentary on the play Darryl Grantley says that this play is the first English one to 
draw upon classical tragedy as well as the first extant English Revenge play. On the Vice he points out the 
following: "The Vice of the play is never given a name, though he does at one point briefly adopt an alias. 
Though in some respects he fulfils the traditional function of a Vice, for much of the time he provides narrative 
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I woulde I were ded and layde in my grave. 
Oundes of me, I am trymley promouted. 
Ah, ah, oh! Well, now for my labor these trynketes I have. 
(11. 1038-40) 
But he soon changes his mind about it, and finds the bright side even of being a 
beggar: 
But peace! Who better then beggars doth fare -
For all they be beggares and have no great port -
Who is maryer then the pooryste sort? 
(11. 1049-51) 
I am not considering here how inconstant the Vice is even in this second and more 
cheerful opinion, namely, that after having found the merry side of being a beggar he decides 
rather to be a servant, and offers his service to members of the audience. What are the moral 
implications of the fact that the Vice became a beggar? Can this demotion be seen as a final 
punishment for his schemes? Once the Vice has found the merry side of being a beggar, the 
punishment does not seem to be severe because it has no bad effect on him, at least in his 
interpretation: he was simply able to reinvent the negative context he was put in. Although in 
the eyes of the audience he may be an ignorant fool not to understand his real situation and 
perhaps even be laughed at, his perspective cannot be entirely dismissed, as we will see in 
examples when Lear's Fool similarly creates extra contexts to the otherwise sad events of that 
drama which in this way become comic. 
It is not only the final punishment of some Vices that is not clear-cut, but also their 
evil nature is unreliable as well. In the next example, the Vice is much less a corrupting force 
than an agent who plays in order to punish the corrupt. In Like Will to Like106 (1562-8), 
Nichol Newfangle the Vice offers Tom Tosspot and Rafe Roister lands of St. Thomas-a-
Watering and Tyburn Hill - both places of execution: 
infill and choric comment on the action. Ha also, however, embodies strife, as his redundancy at the end of the 
play confirms" lGrantley, 48). 
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But thou shalt have it, if thou prove thyself the Verier knave; 
A piece ofground it is, that of Beggars' manor do[th] hold, 
And whoso deserves it, shall have it, ye may be bold -
Call'dSaint Thomas-a-Waterings or else Tyburn Hill 
(p. 324) 
By doing this as part of the joke he is playing on them, Nichol Newfangle acts out 
justice, and the audience will laugh together with the Vice at the stupidity of the ruffians. 
Laughing with the Vice is quite essential in my argument, because we see here an instance 
where the audience's merriment regarding the Vice's schemes is connected to the audience's 
complete approval of the same deeds. Similarly, when he hands over his former companions 
Cutpurse and Pickpurse to Severity the judge and helps him to tie them up, Nichol Newfangle 
has a double function: he betrays his friends, thus appearing clearly untrustworthy, but at the 
same time he is an agent that helps the workings of justice be realised - no matter that he 
admitted at his entry that Lucifer is his godfather, and it is the devil who taught him "all kinds 
of sciences." (p.310) 
Two explanations are possible for the fact that the Vice may be working in line with 
justice. One is that he is indeed part of the moral scheme: he is engaged partly in corruption 
and partly in punishing of the corrupt - the way it is expected from him in a given situation, 
so that in the end he contributes to the overall working of justice. We see that Lucifer fits well 
in the moral structure, too, and he makes it clear that he is proud and arrogant and cannot 
stand seeing vicious people in the company of virtuous ones.107 Here Lucifer, the embodiment 
of evil, openly acknowledges its corruption and thus fits himself into the system. The other 
explanation for why it is sometimes with and sometimes at the Vice that the audience laughs 
is that the Vice is indeed an outsider, not an intrinsic element of the moral world, a character 
106 W. Carew Hazlitt ed. Old English Plays. Vol.111. (London: Reeves and Turner, 1874). 
107 "Thou knowest I am both proud and arrogant, 
And with the proud I will ever be conversant; 
I cannot abide to see men, that are vicious, 
Accompany themselves with such as be virtuous" (Hazlitt, 312). 
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with exemption who is quite inconsistent in his malevolent behaviour and whose schemes are 
not clearly predictable. 
At the end of the same play, Nichol Newfangle is carried out on the Devil's back, and 
he bids merry farewell to the audience, and speaks of his return: 
Farewell, my masters, till I come again, 
For now I must make a journey into Spain. 
(p. 353) 
The beauty of these lines I see as the way the Vice makes the play open-ended and at 
the same time presents himself as somebody who transcends the confines of a single play. 
Another example of how it is not necessarily and always categorical deception that the Vice is 
up to is a scene from the play The Tide Tarrieth no Man (1576). If we compare the chief vice 
and his three minions in the drama, we see that the Vice does not necessarily hide his evil 
identity behind an appealing and cheerful façade with which he is trying to mislead people, 
but that he is rather ambiguous. When the evil characters decide to go about the business of 
corrupting humans (Courage informs the audience about this in his entry), the Vice's three 
minions all change their real names to other names by dropping the negative and revealing 
adjective, so that Hurtful Help, Painted Profit and Feigned Furtherance become Help, Profit 
and Furtherance. Courage, however, clearly can remain "himself with his original name. He 
even gives a nonsensical explanation of what they are about to do and why. Actually it is a 
whole nonsensical story, constantly involving breaches of logic, like dead men first being 
buried some miles away from December, and later running away, or lines such as "And after 
they louved like brother and brother / For very louve, they did kyll one another." If we are 
looking for his consequent malevolent behaviour and we want to perceive him as the root of 
all evil, the fact that the others had to change their names but he did not makes about as much 
sense as his nonsensical tale. The idea of the Vice as not exclusively malevolent is stressed by 
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Darryl Grantley in connection with a Vice called Common Conditions, a name that is 
identical with the title of the play in which he appears: 
The Vice is an interesting hybrid of the narrative specimen and the scheming servant of classical 
comedy, and though he often plots evil, his actions are far from consistently malevolent. He also 
repeatedly draws attention to his cowardice. At times, especially in the pirate episode, he appears to be 
used as a general-purpose character to animate the narrative.108 
The question remains still, how we are to interpret the power of the Vice, how 
temporary and transitional its validity is. Dessen quotes a transitional play Wealth and Health 
(1554) where in the end of the play the deeds of the two vice-like figures, 111 Will and 
Shrewed Wit, are restored by Remedy, who says that the vices may "reign a while, wrongfully 
and unjust/Yet truth will appear and their misdeeds blame" (11.931-32). Dessen's says, "The 
power of these Vices (and later the Vice) is temporary, for the short term only, a formulation 
that lasts throughout the period and indeed becomes basic to the dramatic career of the Vice" 
(23-24). Dessen's opinion may well stand; however, the message of a Vice leaving the stage 
while joking is not as clear as it would be if the Vice were entirely humiliated. It seems that 
the Vice does not subject his view to the moral one, he does not act according to a logic where 
he, as evil, has to be the loser. Still, even if here we may account for the Vice's comic and not 
repentant exit as part of the Vice's comic tradition, and remember that finally the audience 
laughed at him, the same device will still maintain a perspective (that of the unrepentant Vice) 
that is not contained within the moral one, and will be much more disturbing when the same 
behaviour appears in later drama, for example at the closing scene of the Revenger's Tragedy, 
where Vindice, after being sentenced to death by the representative of the newly established 
order, Antonio, exists to be executed, but feels that all is perfectly well: "I'faith we 're well -
our mother turned, our sister true, / We die after a nest of dukes! Adieu." (5.3.125-6)109 
An opposite of this exit would be plays where the Vice is spectacularly punished and 
humiliated on stage, and is shown as a coward - despicable for the audience. I have no 
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knowledge of such Vices, and it seems to be a characteristic of the Vice to face whatever 
punishment may come in a cheerful mood when he exits the stage.110 I claim that this tradition 
is much more than simply making the Vice a butt of laughter due to his alleged ignorance of 
his "real" situation, and it is very problematic to interpret it within the moral message of the 
play. 
In conclusion, I am suggesting that we accept the Vice, a recurring character of non-
cycle interludes, as a game-maker who is quite unreliable in his malevolence, whose schemes 
may work in order to sustain moral order, who may be but does not have to be punished after 
misdeeds, and who has affinity for nonsense and playing - in other words, a character who 
does enjoy and display a sense of liberty within the drama. We have seen examples above 
where he is reluctant to reveal his name - a parallel to his lack of a real occupation and his 
ability to play any of them. Dessen's opinion is that it is not fashionable in critical literature to 
concentrate on the moral unity and the temporary nature of the reign of the Vice. He is surely 
right, but there is another side of the coin: it is also fashionable rather to look for a larger 
pattern than to explain ambiguities not fitting an otherwise valid pattern as being merely 
inconsistencies in that pattern. 
Still, I do not insist that the Vice always and necessarily enjoys the exemption and can 
get away unpunished, although I do insist that he sometimes does. In a morality such as Like 
will to Like, written in the tradition of Protestant interludes, it is quite probable that the 
seemingly inconsistent actions of the vice (corruption as well as punishing corruption) were 
consistently contributing to the didactic point of the play - just like in a sermon. However, 
108 Grantley op. cit., 61. 
109 Cyril Tourneur. The Revenger's Tragedy. Brian Gibbons ed. (London: A&C Black, 1989). 
1,0 It is typical of Vices not to care about the punishment that awaits them, if there is punishment to come at all. 
The closest a Vice comes to humiliation is his being rather desperate, although defiant and aggressive at the end 
of Nice Wanton (11.420-30 and 1. 434). Leonard Tennenhouse, ed. The Tudor Interludes: Nice Wanton and 
Impatient Poverty (New York: Garland, 1984). Another example shows the Vice badly punished, however, he is 
not punished by the representatives of virtue for his evil deeds, but by the Devil for not carrying out his task 
properly. See Thomas Garter, The Most Virtuous and Godly Susanna, 1578, W.W. Greg ed., (Malone Society 
Reprints, Oxford University Press, 1936), 11. 1392-1403. For the references I am indebted to Kent Cartwright. 
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once the didactic message of the sermon is not controlled by a single narrative voice and the 
narrative is scattered among characters, let alone when it is exactly the Vice who is delivering 
the moral message, when we have a Vice who is the "controlling narrative voice," 
interpretations may arise that would be perhaps impossible if the "message" were delivered in 
a non-dramatic form. The dramatic form itself already contributes to the possibility that some 
voices within it may have an effect that is not consistent with the intended moral message. 
As I tried to point out in my argument on the Vice, quite a substantial effort of critics 
was spent on separating the dark and vicious Vice from the buffoonish agent who is comic 
but not harmful. I see that such a separation can be made only at the expense of his force, 
underestimating the Vice's comedy and its effect. If the Vice is seen either as supporting a 
homiletic structure or as mere buffoonery, we are missing the point. Instead of separating the 
comic and destructive elements in the Vice, we should rather see them inseparable: a unique 
merger that is intrinsic to the character, and that gives him the unfathomable energy and 
power he possesses. 
The Fool in the Vice 
Merry Report. Well than, as wyse as ye seme to be, 
Yet can ye se no wisdome in me. (11. 119-20) 
For the purpose of comparing Iago and the Fool, it is of major interest that Mares sees 
two distinct classes of characters claimed to be Vices or ancestors of the Vice."1 Into one 
class fall those who are wearing the fool's costume and act like a fool. The fool also has two 
types: the natural and the artificial, the former being often a half-wit, and the latter being one 
who, in spite of the knowledge of good, acts as if he was not aware of true values. Into the 
'"Mares, 27. 
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first class, thus, falls the fool (both the natural and the artificial), while into the other class of 
Vices falls the tempter, who represents the secular spirit and the enjoyment of pleasure. 
According to Mares, until 1533 it is easy to draw a line between the two classes: "the realistic 
representation of the riotous man and the allegorical fool figure."112 He claims that it was not 
general practice to apply the title "the Vice" to a buffoonish agent of evil in a morality play as 
long as the vice was a popular figure on public stages, "and, even where he appeared as an 
agent of evil in a morality play, he always maintained a degree of freedom from the 
allegorical framework most difficult to explain by the generally accepted 'moral' theory of his 
origin."113 The vice depicted here does not fall readily into the morality pattern, because he 
embodies a sense of freedom, something that makes him an outsider in the play not only 
because he is an entertainer, a link between the play and the audience, but also because he 
enjoys exemption from the strict moral rules of the allegory. Compared to later 
interpretations, I find it highly significant that Mares stresses the freedom of the Vice from the 
allegorical-moral framework of the play. He seems to imply that it is the popular origin of the 
figure that makes him difficult to fit in the morality pattern. 
I am not dealing with the extent to which the comedy of evil in moralities is morally 
problematic. But I see the trait of the popular fool-clown who allows the possibility of a 
particular, morally quite complex kind of laughter in the case of Iago and the Fool - a type of 
laughter that will become essential in my interpretation of these characters, but which some 
critics consider impossible in a Christian context. 
Mares' analysis posited two important classes within the characters who can be 
considered Vices or ancestors of the Vice, on the one hand the fool and on the other the 
tempter. Late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century dictionary entries and passages from 
translated works quoted by Alan Dessen show how the terms "jester," "fool" and "vice" are 
1,2 Ibid. 
113 Mares, 28. 
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used as either synonyms or closely related terms. For example, he says, "[i]n his translation of 
Pliny, Philemon Holland expands the Latin mima into 'a common vice in a play' and, a 
sentence later, describes 'such another vice that played the fool and made sport between 
whiles in enterludes'." Dessen also shows examples of how the traditional attribute of the 
Vice, his dagger of lath, would be accompanied with furred hood, a fool's coat or coxcombs 
— actually attributes of the fool.114 
Bernard Spivack uses the morality Like Will to Like in support of his argument that the 
Vice is misunderstood if taken as a fool or buffoon. He stresses the miseries Nichol 
Newfangle has brought on the characters of the play in order to remove him from the merely 
jovial side of his role. In my view, however, the example makes the complexity of the Vice 
explicit: in cases where the Vice's actions, his comedy, are morally justified because his 
comedy clearly serves the punishment of evil characters, then from the audience's perspective 
the character "Vice" appears here as one whom they can embrace with no reservation as both 
comic and supporting the accepted system of values. If this were true, there would be no 
debate about the place of the character in the moral setup. Part of the quotation from 
Stubbes's Anatomy of Abuses is inserted by Spivack in his argument in order to support "a 
very much darker picture of the Vice" that he wants to argue for as opposed to a farcical 
characterization. However, the quotations actually do not support his interpretation, because if 
the Vice did have a "homiletic substance,"115 people like Stubbes would not have been so 
outraged about him and the plays in which he appeared to the audiences delight. 
Spivack, in order to provide background for his view of the Vice as a figure whose 
humour is wrongly stressed, quotes a passage from a poem of the eighties against Martin 
Marpelate, which "shows that even in the final period of the moralities he [the Vice] was not 
regarded only as jester." 
114 Dessen, op. cit. 18-9. 
115 Spivak, 200. 
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Now Tarleton's dead, the consort lackes a vice; 
For knaue andfoole thou maist beare pricke and price.116 
Spivack seems to acknowledge that the jester indeed is an important component of the 
Vice. Still, he does not allow another interpretation of the figure than the moral one. The 
problem, however, is not in regarding the Vice only as jester, as the quotation would imply, 
but rather in regarding the Vice only as knave, a devilish intriguer, whose function within the 
play is ultimately to be condemned. By regarding the clown or fool or jester element in the 
Vice as significant, the potential moral interpretation does not disappear; rather, it becomes 
more complex and ambiguous. 
Spivack insists on the Vice whose farcical aspect "is only a dramatic glitter of his role, 
not its homiletic substance,"117 and sees a subsequent "comic degeneration of the role," which 
is not possible to discover "so long as he performs in a context of allegory, where his 
characteristic intrigue is never without its sharp edge of homiletic significance and his effect 
without grave consequences."118 However, the passage Spivack refers to in my view supports 
exactly the intrinsic connection between the Vice and the Fool, the fact the Fool is 
underestimated as a mere jester, and the fact that the fool and the Vice have never really 
separated, from the time the Vice appeared on stage, to the moment when he went out of 
fashion. 
Looking at all the contemporary examples that Dessen and Spivack enumerate, from 
the close relation of Vice and fool that becomes clearly evident, I find it indeed noteworthy 
that the scholars adduce all the illustrations merely to confute in the end the idea that the Vice 
in a number of cases is justly understood as fool, and they insist that in the end the Vice is 
116 "A Whop for and Ape: Or Martin Marpelate Displaied" (1589) in The Complete Works ofJohnLyly, ed. R.W. 
Bond (Oxford, 1902), III, 417. 
117 Spivak, 200. 
118 Spivack, 202. 
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defined by his "homiletic substance," while if he is taken as identical with a fool, then he is 
not a real and representative Vice. 
A critic with whom I agree on this matter is Enid Welsford who, although merely in 
passing, deals with the Vice of the Interludes, and mentions two examples where "the Vice is 
unmistakably a court-jester."119 David Wiles, too, deals in a few sentences with the matter of 
distinction between fools and Vices, partly drawing on Welsford's examples given on the 
costume of Vices and fools, and points out the close connection between the fool and the 
Vice.120 Similar to Mares's distinction between the natural fool and the artificial one, Wiles 
thinks, too, that there was a difference between the born or natural fool and the agent who 
played this fool, and he claims that the term "vice" was used as a synonym for fool: "The 
word 'vice' is often used as a synonym for fool in the sixteenth century. We can trace, 
however, a fine distinction between the Vice who acts the fool's part and the born or natural 
fool."121 This formulation of Wiles, apart from drawing attention to the interchangeable nature 
of the words "fool" and "vice," seems to imply the amazing fact that the fool - not the born or 
natural fool but the one who acts - may appear as the function of the Vice; that is, the fool is a 
mask or a role put on by the Vice. 
This passage is important for my argument because the fool I am looking at, Lear's 
Fool, is a "dramatic" fool in the sense that it is an actor who takes on the role - although the 
issue is slightly more complicated than that, as I will explicate when discussing the 
authenticity of Vices and Vice-successors later in my paper. This characteristic helps our 
understanding of the figure by regarding him not merely as a successor of the popular, non-
dramatic fool, but specifically as the successor of the Vice-fool. In the former case all the 
dramatic potentials of the Vice are easily disregarded, however, these features are crucial for 
1,9 Welsford, 285. 
120 David Wiles, Shakespeare's Clown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2-3. 
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Lear's Fool: he is a fool and plays a fool at the same time, both on and off stage, both on 
locus and platea, where following Weimann's terminology, locus means a place of an 
illusionary character, the setting of the playworld, while platea is "an entirely unlocalised and 
unrepresentational setting; [...]the broad and general acting area in which the communal 
177 
festivities were conducted." His playing on locus might be surprising, because the 
characteristic theatrical logic of the locus is what Weimann calls after Alter "I am not acting, I 
am another person" as opposed to the other one "I am acting." However, such a character 
within the drama, the role of the fool is the epitome of playing, exactly the role that is the non-
identity (this issue will be expanded in detail in 3.3.2), an identity that can be played but 
cannot borrow the reality of "another person" -since borrowing the reality of "another 
person" is rather what a conventional locus-oriented character builds upon. I would even say 
that the fool is a character who is intrinsically unsuitable for mimetic representation. He does 
not believe in mimesis, since mimesis has to be a mimesis of something, a representable, 
stable content, but the fool cannot stand for anything or anybody, because such behaviour 
would mean the loss of the dynamism in the fool's ever-changing character, which is his main 
attribute.123 However, once the fool is not just a non-dramatic entertainer but is included in the 
list of dramatis personae, the fact that the Fool is part of the world of the drama opens up 
intriguing possibilities for reflecting on drama and representation. 
Detecting the evolution of the fool in the Vice is essential for the consequent 
comparison of Iago and Lear's Fool. As I have noted in my Introduction, within the context 
delineated by Hillman, there is a larger frame where such a comparison clearly emerges, and 
this frame is the wide variety of subversive practices within Shakespearean drama, which 
121 Wiles, 4. 
122 Robert Weimann, Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in Theater (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns 
Hopkis University Press, 1978) 78. 
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Hillman explores in his book, and which he metaphorically attaches to the mythological 
figure of the trickster. In this sense both of my focal characters in this thesis belong to the 
same category, namely that of the trickster (and they are justly discussed so by Hillman), and 
clearly their ancestor that I am so allured by, the Vice, is a pretty trickster-specimen himself. 
This frame explains a great deal about the common characteristics of these figures and is very 
useful for interpreting the unique function these characters perform in their plays. However, to 
regard their differences while keeping in mind their generic relatedness, as I will show, 
throws light upon larger issues in the change of their acceptance as well as changes in the 
ways of representation. 
2.3. Vice-successors and Fools 
In this section I will present some descendants of the Vice and examine to what extent 
they can be regarded as similar to the two characters that I will discuss in much greater detail, 
and whether they can be regarded as similar agents of representational crisis. I will deal with 
three figures: Falstaff from the Henry IV plays, Feste, the clown of Twelfth Night, and 
Parolles from All's Well that Ends Well - all characters that, in certain respect, belong to the 
same family as Lear's Fool and Iago.124 Before I start this investigation, however, let me just 
briefly reflect upon some other Vice-descendants: intriguer-villains, who do not fall into my 
narrow focus but who also display crucial characteristics of the Vice. When Bernard Spivack 
123 As Hillman has it on the trickster: "The trickster's essence is his shape-changing, and he can only be known 
indirectly, through his entanglements" op. cit., 3. 
124 Northrop Fry in his discussion on different comic types includes both "the vice or iniquity of the morality 
plays" under the type of the tricky slave (dolosus servus) and the parasite whom he discusses under the buffoon 
(including fools, clowns, pages, singers), and considers the latter the "master of ceremonies." Thus for Frye the 
fool and the Vice are separate types, while I argue for their interrelatedness. Still, I agree with his definition of 
the vice as well as the Shakespearean characters with which he exemplifies his idea, because for him playful and 
benevolent characters (Puck and Ariel) may qualify as well as the Machiavellian villain (Edmund). The 
discussion of the comic types is included as part of the third essay ("The Mythos of Spring: Comedy") of his 
Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1957), but a very similar, earlier version discussing 
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established in Shakespeare scholarship the systematic relationship between the morality Vice 
and Iago as well as some other Shakespearean villains, these characters were mentioned 
together with Iago.125 
Intriguer villains 
Aaron, the moor in Titus Andronicus, is one such intriguer-villain. He moves the plot 
forward, he is a great deceiver, and it seems he has no other drive than to perform horrific and 
vicious deeds in which he admittedly takes delight. An illustrative example of his Vice-like 
behaviour is when he speaks of Titus ironically after the old Andronicus, in hope of getting 
back his two sons, lets his hand be chopped off. Titus is in a hurry, he wants to be quicker 
than Marcus or Lucius, who would rather offer their hands, and decides to "deceive" them. 
Titus. Come hither, Aaron; I'll deceive them both: 
Lend me thine hand and I will give thee mine. 
Aaron. [Aside.] If that be call'd deceit, I will be honest, 
And never, whilst I live, deceive men so. 
(3.1.190) 
The term "deceit" invites ironic contempt from Aaron, who clearly sees himself the master-
deceiver, far excelling the others in this trade. It is also characteristic of him that in the end he 
does not repent, not even when he is facing his sure death. On the contrary, he is rather sorry 
for the crimes he did not commit. Just like Iago, Aaron is quick and intelligent. He, too, is 
described as devilish, and indeed his wickedness and cruelty are infinite. Still, as it will 
appear from my discussion, there is a major attribute of Iago that Aaron lacks: the latter, no 
specifically Shakespearean characters is the following: "Characterisation in Shakespearean Comedy," 
Shakespeare Quarterly 4.3 (1953): 271-7. 
125 Spivack argues that there are intelligible criminals in Shakespeare, who "are bound by the moral convention 
of human life and exist in moral relationship to their crimes," and a separate group, that are not: "It is just here -
in their relationship to crime - that the great point of difference appears between the majority of Shakespeare's 
malefactors and those four who are obviously related to each other and belong to a class apart - Aaron, Richard, 
Don Jon, and Iago." Spivack op. cit., 38-9. 
126 Nicholas Brook argues that Aaron's unrepentance "stands alone to question the complacence of the 
conventional ending." Nicholas Brook, Shakespeare's Early Tragedies, (Harper and Row, 1974), 45. 
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matter how intelligent and shrewd he is, can never have the audience on his side. There is no 
genuine allure about him; the only response he is likely to get is sheer horror. He is downright 
evil, explicitly and unquestionably so, and too immersed in his devilry to have the playful and 
elegantly witty attitude that makes Iago appealing despite his villainy. 
Another master-deceiver, Gloucester of Richard III may be closer to Iago in this 
respect. He has much playfulness in the way he, just like many Vices as well as Iago, is the 
proper director of the plot, first conceiving a plan, then earring it out, and taking great delight 
in accomplishing it with great skill and success. Still, I see Iago much more forceful in his 
schemes than Gloucester. Richard III seems to be ready to stop after a while, after he is king, 
but he cannot, because the surge of events carries him on, and he loses overall control: 
Murder her brother and then marry her?— 
Uncertain way of gain! But I am in 
So far in blood, that sin will pluck on sin. 
(4.2.62-4) 
The nightmare at the end of the play shows him falling apart. He is shaken and weak, 
all his sins sit heavily on his chest, he is confused by his conscience, and he loses the creative 
and genial power he had earlier in the play. Although he will collect his strength for the final 
battle and does not die a coward, it is clear that he and what he stood for are gloriously 
defeated. This outcome will retrospectively weaken his seemingly overall power, which is not 
the case with Iago, who never gets confused, who always remains at the top of his intrigue, 
whose goal is much less definite, and who does not let himself be carried by the events. It 
seems that a major characteristic of Iago compared to other intriguers is that he does not have 
a sole specific goal, and thus there is no moment in the play where he could either stop after 
having achieved it, or instead be carried on by the swell of the events after he has completed 
his goal. 
Let me make a small detour here on the level of the composedness of a character. 
When dealing with director-player intriguers such as Iago and Gloucester, an important figure 
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at the beginning of the genealogical line should also be mentioned, namely Hieronymo from 
The Spanish Tragedy. I do not think that we should regard him as related to the Vice in any 
respect in order to understand him, although I have stated above that the Vice and the 
Revenger may be as closely related as a Vice actually called Revenge, and the main function 
of Hieronymo is to move the events forward and stage his revenge at the end of the play. I 
mention him here for two reasons, one, because he too likes to see himself as the director of 
the play, the author of the events after his son is murdered, and he actually directs plays 
within the play, and two, because in comparing the two player-directors, Iago and Hieronymo, 
it appears that Othello is wrongly conceived if regarded as a revenge play. The key in this 
respect is the end of The Spanish Tragedy}21 This is where Hieronymo successfully 
completes his play, being "at last revenged thoroughly" (4.4.176), and after he is unsuccessful 
in hanging himself, he bites out his tongue, so that after his deeds speak for themselves, he 
does not have to speak any more. This is explained by Huston Diel as the renunciation of 
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speech for the "speech of deed." At the end of Othello, Iago, too, decides not to speak: 
"What you know you know. / From this time forth I will never speak a word" (5.2.300-1), and 
his silence in retrospect similarly turns his "words" into "deeds." However, while Hieronymo 
is carried forward by inertia and commits another murder with a knife he pretended to ask for 
sharpening his pen, Iago stops playing and doing anything, although a consequence of his 
actions, Othello's suicide, is still to come. I see Iago as much more composed at the end of the 
play than either Gloucester or Hieronymo, who are at some moments mad with a passion for 
murder and are not entirely in control. 
This loss of control, or perhaps the point when the intriguer seems to be involved 
personally, with genuine interest and passion in achieving some specific goal, is one of the 
127 Thomas Kyd, The Spanish Tragedy, in C.F. Tucker Brooke and Nathaniel Burton Paradise eds. English 
Drama 1580-1642 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1933). 
128 Huston Diel, "The Iconography of Violence in English renaissance Tragedy," Renaissance Drama XI (1980): 
39-40. 
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reasons that another non-Shakespearean member of the Vice-successor intriguer villains, 
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Mosca, although similar, is again less powerful in his subversive schemes than Iago. After 
tricking everybody out of an inheritance, he, too, is interested in gaining his master's wealth. 
A more important reason for the difference between Mosca and Iago, however, is that the 
former features in a satire, where the satirical depiction of an overall corrupted society 
implicitly builds on the audience's moral sensibility. As Donald Gertmenian writes about the 
opening speech of Volpone, "Jonson gives us an open window to see the moral order 
violated."130 Although the audience can find genuine delight in the gusto, the creative power 
and the energy of the main characters, the conflict between judgement and delight that is set 
by the first scene, as Gertmenian argues, is resolved in the end against delight and in favour of 
judgement.131 
In conclusion on the intriguer-villains, it can be stated that they do display a Vice-
inheritance based on which they are comparable to Iago. Still, what they stand for is either not 
as admirable or alluring, or if it is, the intriguer-villains are more clearly defeated within the 
play. They lack the ultimate power of Iago, and thus they are unable to generate an 
atmosphere where issues of representational crisis could surface. Aaron lacks the easy trickery 
that Iago, Mosca and even Gloucester have. Gloucester becomes afraid of himself in the end 
when his conscience haunts him, while Mosca, no matter how witty, creative and shrewd, is 
presented in the play satirically, just like all the other characters in the play. 
129 On the connection between Iago and Mosca, and more generally between Volpone and Othello see Brian V. 
Tyson, "Ben Jonson's Black Comedy: a Connection between Volpone and Othello," Shakespeare Quarterly 29.1 
(1977): 60-66. 
130 Donald Gertmenian, "Comic experience in Volpone and the Alchemist," Studies in English Literature 1500-
1900 17.2. (1977): 247-58, p. 252 
131 Gertmenian, 251. Gertmenian in the article convincingly argues that the same in not true for The Alchemist, 
which differs from Volpone by being amoral and delighting, and quotes Alan C. Dessen's Jonson's Moral 
Comedy where the central characters of the two dramas are related to the morality Vice, "preying upon a gullible 
and greedy society" (113). 
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Sir John Falstaff: The Vice-Fool 
John Falstaff, the merry companion of Prince Henry in the Henry IV plays is a 
character whose Vice-allusions are easier to note due to the textual references to the character 
as a Vice: he himself mentions his dagger of lath - the attribute of the Vice in Part 1 of the 
play (2.4.134)132, and the Prince explicitly names and describes him as Vice when Harry plays 
his own father in the improvised playlet. He scolds the prince (played by Falstaff) for being in 
bad company with "that reverend vice, that grey iniquity, that father ruffian, that vanity in 
years" (2.4.447-9), and the Chief Justice says that he follows the young prince "up and down 
like his ill angel" (Part 2; 1.2.163). In the two plays, the motif of the prodigal son underlies 
the events and decisions of Prince Harry's life. The prince returns in the end to his father and 
breaks with his earlier life abundant with vices, choosing to be a virtuous, responsible king. In 
his speech of rejection directed to Falstaff and beginning with "I know thee not, old man"(Vait 
2; 5.5.47) he positions himself as the proponent of virtue, identifies with the opinion of his 
father that he played earlier when he called Sir John a Vice, and rejects Falstaff as his 
misleader. 
Thus the structure of the play presents Falstaff banished in the end as a danger to 
virtue; he appears as the element that needs to be overcome (or perhaps first needs to be 
experienced and then overcome) in the pilgrimage towards a virtuous life. Still, this is not the 
only perspective from which Falstaff s character is presented. During the play he seems to 
have an independent life of his own: his "virtues," or rather the characteristics for which he is 
liked by the audience, are his humour, his invincibly cheerful attitude, his wit, and his infinite 
ability to play and improvise. He is indeed rejected by the new King, but he is not and cannot 
be expelled for good as he stands for a principle; he is indispensable at least in theatre 
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precisely because he embodies the elements used by theatre and playing in general. In the 
epilogue, in fact, the audience gets a promise about Falstaff s comeback. He may be refused 
by the new King, but he is (actually similar to a Vice) a recurring theatrical presence. The 
epilogue informs the audience that the author will continue the story to make the audience 
merry, "with Sir John in it." The epilogue is fascinatingly witty in flirting with the audience's 
desires: with the probably rather strong appeal of Falstaff for the audience on the one hand 
and on the other with the fact that such a character has to be condemned as the opponent of 
virtue. Thus the epilogue alluringly promises the return of the character, but allows that he 
might be already killed by the assumption of the audience's rejection, given that the audience 
is virtuous) - building on the audience's guilt, should they not have rejected him already. 
If you be not too 
much cloyed with fat meat, our humble author will 
continue the story, with Sir John in it, and make you 
merry with Fair Katherine of France; where, for 
anything I know, Falstaff shall die of a sweat, unless 
already he be killed with your hard opinions. 
(Part 2, Epilogue, 26-31) 
It is as if the drama would create the rejection of Falstaff as infinite but never quite 
complete: first by Harry, then by the promised play to be written in the future, then by the 
audience's reproof, as if in a never-ending denial, where, until the denial is ongoing, the 
rejected element is still in play. 
Apart from the Vice-allusions surrounding Falstaff, there are references to him as 
"fool," and not the bumpkin, but the jester, the one who - as Mares has pointed out in 
connection with the Vice - plays the fool. He is referred to as a fool and is condemned in this 
respect both by the Chief Justice and the new King. The Justice says to him, "Now, the Lord 
lighten thee! Thou art a great fool" (Part 2; 2.1 190). The new Henry V in his rejection speech 
refers to him twice as fool and jester. Falstaff, however, has a different opinion of himself as 
132 References from the play part 1 and 2 are taken from the Arden edition, edited by A. R. Humhreys. 
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Fool. He identifies himself both as the butt of laughter and the author of it, the ultimate source 
of wit and merriment: 
Men of all sorts take a pride to grid at me: the brain 
of this foolish-compounded clay, man, is not able to 
nvent anything that tends to laughter, more than I 
invent or is invented on me; lam not only witty 
in myself, but the cause that is wit in other men. 
(Part 2,1.2.5-9) 
I would suggest considering Falstaff both Vice and Fool, had I not argued earlier that 
in my opinion the two are not clearly distinguishable, and this is the case with Falstaff as well. 
In contrast to the idea of Falstaff as the condemnable character lacking moral principle, an 
extreme portrayal of Falstaff as holy Fool is presented by Roy Battenhouse.133 He refers to 
Lord Raglan's intuition according to which "FalstafFs vocation, in the public world, is that of 
court fool and soothsayer," and stresses Auden's opinion of Falstaff as radiating happiness 
without apparent cause and serving as "a comic symbol for the supernatural order of charity." 
Battenhouse makes an interesting argument in which Falstaff can be seen as the self-
humiliating truth-teller. He, too, acknowledges the festive roots of Falstaff s behaviour in the 
Feast of Fools and the Lord of Misrule traditions, but he sees that these traditions fit perfectly 
in the Christian holiday exercises, strengthening the Christian worldview. He accepts Harvey 
Cox's argument that the feast of Fools can be paralleled with the understanding of "the 
mystery of Christ the harlequin, the spirit of play amid a world of utilitarianism."134 
Such an understanding of Falstaff is indeed challenging, and I agree with Battenhouse 
in his understanding of Sir John as an Elizabethan fool par excellence from a certain 
perspective. However, I see that the play does not exploit explicitly the soothsayer-holy fool 
potentials that are clearly inherent in a fool character. In other words, it is not primarily this 
aspect of the fool that the play builds upon. I have argued above about the intrinsic 
133 Roy Battenhouse, "Falstaff as Parodist and Perhaps Holy Fool," PMLA 90.1 (Jan. 1970), 32-52. 
134 Battenhouse, 35. 
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interrelatedness of the Vice and Fool, and I see Falstaffs case in the same way. 
Understanding him as fool does not conflict with understanding him as Vice if we have a 
sufficiently complex interpretation of the Vice, who is morally condemnable and desirable at 
the same time, who can be a ruffian lacking moral principle, while simultaneously radiating a 
non-worldly aura seemingly detached from and uninfluenced by worldly events, making 
playing and imagination his guiding principles. 
I see many similarities between Falstaff and the two characters that I will examine in 
detail, Lear's Fool and Iago. Some of these parallels are seen in Falstaffs numerous 
explanations in which he tries to validate his earlier lies or give new explanation to the events, 
once his earlier version has proven to be untrue. Similar to Iago and Lear's Fool, he, too, is 
playing with versions of reality, creating alternative plays within the play, experimenting with 
meaning, playing with identities and creating new meanings with new contexts. A good 
example to help us ponder the very idea of real and counterfeit meaning is in his soliloquy 
over the dead body of Hotspur, where he implies the baffling idea that the true and perfect 
image of life is, paradoxically, acting, or more precisely acting a dead person: 
'Sblood,, 'twas time to counterfeit or that hot ter-
magant Scot had paid me, scot and lot too. Coun-
terfeit? I lie; lam no counterfeit: to die is to be 
counterfeit, for he is but the counterfeit of a man, 
who hath not the life of a man: but to counterfeit 
dying, when a man thereby liveth, is to be no 
counterfeit, but the true and perfect image of life indeed. 
(Part 1,5.4.110-118) 
Still, in spite of all the similarities and functional analogies, I don't see Falstaff as a 
real agent of representational crisis, because the type of subversion he stands for is not at all a 
genuinely threatening or destructive force within the play. He does reflect on matters of 
reality, lies, playing and meaning, but there is a certain detectable biblical logic within the 
play, and while Falstaff may be understood accordingly as an alternative perspective or a 
necessarily rejected element within the Christian setting, neither he nor anything else seems to 
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present a threat to the existing order that would be impossible to overcome. In other words 
and perhaps in a more simple explanation, this means that since the play itself is not a tragedy 
but rather a history, there is no opportunity within it for the radical questioning of the values 
that sustain its structure, nor for a radical crisis of any sort. 
The "corrupter of words": Feste 
It appears that the Clown in Twelfth Night shares several common characteristics with 
the later clown of King Lear, and that his function as the domestic fool is the same. However, 
in a comedy the same behaviour from the clown will have a different effect than in a tragedy. 
Falstaff could be a perfect agent of representational crisis based on his behaviour, but the 
context within which he appears does not give him an overall validity within the play, 
contrary to the example of Lear' Fool, because the logic of King Lear can be considered to be 
parallel to the logic of the Fool within that drama. The case of Feste is similar to Falstaff in 
this respect: his jests and songs have the power in them to undermine the representational 
logic of society. Feste's context of the benign, comic universe, however, perfectly heals the 
potential wounds caused by such subversion. The undermining logic of Feste is enfolded in a 
larger comic scheme, within which such a "threat" is allowed - or indeed, perhaps it may 
remain a comic scheme precisely because it allows the symbolic threat. 
Feste's official status is reflected on in Olivia's speech where she admits in a pirn, 
actually taking over the logic of her clown, that the effect of the fool is to mend: the fool is 
indeed capable of offering a new and comic context for the miseries of his mistress and thus 
easing her pains. In Olivia's question "What do you think of this fool, Malvolio? Doth he not 
mend?" (1.5.71) Malvolio does not perceive the hidden meaning. Malvolio is the very 
character who takes words at their face value and does not see the possibility of play in them, 
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the possibility that "mend" may refer not only to the fool, but to the people mended by his 
jests. Olivia, however, will scold him openly for not accepting the joke of the fool: 
01 You are sick of self love, Malvolio, and taste 
With a distempered appetite. To be generous, 
guiltless, and free of disposition, is to take those 
things for bird-bolts, that you deem cannon-
bullets. There is noslander in an allowed fool, 
though he do nothing but rail; nor no railing 
in a known discreet man, though he do nothing 
but reprove. 
(1.5.89-6)135 
The pun of Olivia that Malvolio does not perceive is the basic technique of the fool, 
who, in a conversation with Viola, calls himself a corrupter of words: "I am, indeed, not her 
fool but her corrupter of words" (3.1.40). It is even more interesting that he complains a few 
lines above about the fact that words are grown false: 
Clown. But indeed, words are very rascals, since bonds disgraced them. 
Viola. Thy reason, man? 
Clown. Troth, sir, I can yield you none without words, 
and words are grown false, I am loath to prove 
reason with them. 
(3.1.20-5) 
Such an idea of the importance of words in a tragedy would have to be taken seriously, 
at least partly because they are the reason for the tragic events. In this case, however, the idea 
may go almost unnoticed, as part of a jest that is the clown's everyday duty. An interesting 
comparison is made in this respect by Julian Markels, who examines Lear's Fool and Feste as 
parallels. At the beginning of the article he considers parallels between Shakespeare's 
comedies and tragedies in general, and argues that one similarity is their shared reliance on 
"the function of the old intriguer of the Moralities, the Vice, [which] Shakespeare assigns 
indiscriminately to such as Puck and Iago."136 
135 All references from the play are taken from the Arden edition, edited by J. M. Lothian and T. W. Craik. 
136 Julian Markels, "Shakespeare's Confluence of Tragedy and Comedy: Twelfth Night and King Lear," 
Shakespeare Quarterly 15. 2 (1964): 75-88, p.75. 
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Markels argues that the difference between the two Fools in King Lear and Twelfth 
Night is the different attitudes of the other characters towards these Fools. Olivia 
acknowledges that her fool mends, while Lear offers whipping as an answer for his Fool's 
similar jests. Markels formulates the difference as follows: 
When man becomes impervious to the ministrations of the domestic fool, he must descend into the 
destructive element and reconstitute himself by becoming a natural fool. That is what happens in King 
Lear, and conspicuously does not happen in Twelfth-Night,138 
Markels does not elaborate on the possible inheritance of the two Fools from the 
morality Vice, but apart from the self-reference of Feste as the corrupter of words - a 
typically Vice-like attribute, there is another passage in the play where Feste makes an 
explicit parallel between himself and the Vice, in a song he sings to Malvolio, who bids him 
go and help him. Feste sings the following song as a reply: 
I am gone sir, And anon, sir, 
I'll be with you again, 
In a trice, like the old Vice, 
You need to sustain; 
Who with a dagger of lath, In his rage 
And his wrath, 
Cries, 'Ah, ha!' To the devil: 
Like a mad lad, 'Pare thy nails, dad, 
Adieu, goodman devil'. 
(4.2.125-32) 
The parallel between the Clown and the Vice is not merely superficial - that Feste will 
simply leave and be back in a trice like a Vice - but that he, exactly like a proper Vice, is 
playing a trick on Malvolio: he is indeed deceiving his victim, and he does it for the fun of 
both himself (and his companions in the trick) and the audience. Bernard Spivack discovers 
that the way the clown tortures Malvolio "recaptures the typical features of the comic 
137 Markels, 85-6. 
138 Markels, 84. 
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passages between the Vice and the Devil, whenever in the moralities the former comes to the 
aid of the frustrated demon ('you need to sustain') and badgers him unmercifully."139 
The Clown of this drama can be compared not only to the Vice but to its successors as 
well. An especially valuable similarity is detected between Feste and Iago by Joan Hartvig.140 
She sees a parallel between the two characters' implications of their own role in the intrigue 
as being merely agents who are "bringing about time's inevitable retributions."141 
I have said above that Feste might make a good agent of representational crisis, were it 
not for the comedy he is placed in. As a typical example I quoted his views on the corruption 
of words and the impossibility of reason with the already corrupted words - although he 
characterised himself as the very corrupter of words. Another attribute through which he 
displays the logic that will become essential for later Vice-successors, agents of the crisis, is 
his ability to recontextualise events and thus change their meaning (as in his conversation 
with Olivia, at the end of which his mistress acknowledges that he does mend), and his 
metadramatic effort to have a similar effect on the audience. These devices will be analysed in 
detail in the forthcoming chapters, and it is of particular interest that the devices that will be 
so hurtful and powerful later are deployed here in a benign form. The example I think of 
particularly is the epilogue, the song that the Clown sings at the end of the play.142 
At the end of this song Feste addresses the audience directly. As Hartvig observes, 
"[t]urning to the audience and shattering the dramatic illusion is typical in epilogues, but 
Feste's inclusion of the audience into his consciousness of the play as a metaphor has a 
139 Spivack, 203. 
140 Joan Hartvig, 'Teste's 'Whirligig' and the Comic Providence of Twelfth Night," ELH40 (1973): 501-13. 
141 Hartvig, 503, in footnotes. 
142 Another example, although not connected to Feste, is a line of Viola that will be uttered by Iago as well. She 
says mockingly, half hiding and half revealing her self to the Duke "I am not what I am" (3.1.143). No matter 
how horrific the echo of the sentence will be in the tragedy, in the comedy it has no serious consequences other 
than creating comic excitement. 
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special significance here."143 I perfectly agree with Harvig that Feste is engaging characters 
within the drama in "dialogues of self-determination" - a device that is essential for the agent 
of crisis, after which it is "more than merely appropriate that at the end of the play Feste 
engages the audience in its own definition of the self."144 
When discussing the metadramatic characteristics of Iago and the Fool, I will 
elaborate in detail how important it is in their case to provide new contexts for characters 
within the play, and how essential it is for their designs as agents of representational crisis to 
make the audience self-reflective in their perceptions of the play. However, Lear's rejection of 
his Fool, not to mention Iago's horrific schemes, will be reflected in the audience's much 
bigger trouble with these characters compared to the acceptance of Feste by others within his 
drama, whose official licence is to be the corrupter of words. 
Deceiver among deceivers: Parolles 
Although Parolles is not the most typical Vice-descendant, and traditions other than 
that of the Vice are detectable in him - the miles gloriosus, for example - he does bear 
obvious parallels with other members of the Vice group, and by examining him in the 
particular context of the play, it will appear how important it is to see the function of such a 
character embedded in the overall setting. 
A most important feature that makes Parolles akin to the Vice can be found in 
references to him by those characters who see through his lies and deceit. There are several 
references to him as "tainted fellow, and full of wickedness" (3.2.87),145 "vile rascal" (3.5.84), 
"an infinite and endless liar, an hourly promise-breaker" (3.6.10), "damnable, both-sides 
rogue" (4.4.218). Lafew describes him as a man with no substance behind the show: "there be 
143 Hartvig, 512. 
144 Hartvig, 513. 
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no kernel in this light nut; the soul of this man is in his clothes" (2.5.43). Just like the Vice, he 
is supposed to have travelled a lot, and in general he may be likened to a morality Vice first of 
all based on the "verbal facade" with which he deceives.146 Similarly to Falstaff, when his lies 
are discovered, he does not feel humiliated but tries to see the positive side of the unfortunate 
event. Since he does not exhibit any extraordinary potency as a Vice during the play, he is the 
most powerful at this point in the drama, when he is discovered, but decides to take the 
discovery lightly (like several actual Vices before him), and rather turn into a happy fool, who 
does not have to care about everyday worldly business: 
Captain I will be no more; 
But I will eat and drink, and sleep as soft 
As captain shall: simply the thing I am 
Shall make me live. Who knows himself a braggart, 
Let him fear for this; for it will come to pass 
That every braggart shall be found an ass. 
Rust, sword; Cool, blushes; and, Parolles, live 
Safest in shame; Being fool'd by fool 'ry thrive. 
There's place and means for every man alive. 
(4.4.320-27) 
Although his words here suggest no particular wisdom apart from a carefree vitality, 
the idea of "simply the thing I am" echoes the "/ am perse F of Merry Report, and 
reverberates in a much more serious manner when Lear applies it to Edgar,"the thing itself." 
As has been detected, Parolles, being the corrupt companion of Bertram, can be 
contrasted to Helena, the chaste but shunned companion, and in this scheme the traditional 
morality pattern emerges: the psychomachia-type struggle for the soul of the everyman 
between the good and the bad angels. The interesting thing, however, is not that the bad angel 
is incapacitated when there is still more than a complete act to come in the play, but rather 
that, on closer inspection, the deceits of Parolles are not necessarily so different from the 
deceits of his supposedly good counterpart. Helena at the beginning of the play explicitly 
145 Quotations from the play are taken from the Arden edition, edited by G. K. Hunter. 
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verbalises her liking of Parolles, despite his being a liar, a coward and a fool, since "these 
fix'd evils sit so fit in him" (1.1.100). Just like the beginning, the end of the play is no less 
ambiguous. As Godshalk suggests, "deceptive means have led to the union of two deceivers"; 
the King summarises that all seems well, and the cycle has not ended, because Diana will 
choose a husband in a similar fashion as Helena gained Bertram.147 The "moral," if it may be 
called so, is that the biggest deceiver wins. 
Ironically, this play that seems to propagate deceit, finally celebrates it the least. 
Although in this drama deceit is clearly presented as a tool that can be positive if used well for 
accomplishing "lawful" goals, a "wicked meaning in a lawful deed!' (3.7.45), the outcome is 
less clear-cut. What prevails is not a I'art pour I'art deceit of Falstaff or Feste, let alone Iago. 
What is cherished by Bertram and Helena is not deceit for its own sake, for the joy of it. They 
both have a clear aim, a specific goal that they want to achieve through their schemes. 
In summary: although Helena wins the play of deceit, Parolles is the one who does it 
more in the tradition of the trickster, though he does not have a big role within the play. 
Curiously, however, in this context of overall deceit, his schemes simply lose their power. 
Afterlife of post-vices and the common life of Iago and the Fool 
As we have seen, Vices typically realise their function as entertainers. And an 
important goal of the entertainment, according to Somerset, one of the Vice's functions, is to 
make us "relax and suspend our moral judgements." Suspension in the cases he discusses is 
meant to last for the time of the performance, not cancelling the moral lesson. The way I see 
146 "Most critics, I believe, would agree that Parolles attempts to deceive tout le monde by a verbal facade and, in 
so doing, repeatedly identifies himself with the morality Vice" W.L. Godshalk, "All's Well That Ends Well and 
the Morality Play," Shakespeare Quarterly 25.1 (1974): 61-70, p.63. 
147 Godshalk, 70. 
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the situation is slightly different: the Vice need not contribute to the moral lesson, and what is 
more, he may embody a "logic" that is plainly counteracting that lesson, even if he does not 
cancel it. To infer such a moral lesson, however, is clearly much more problematic in the case 
of either of the tragedies I examine. I feel for any audience that, when encountering an 
appealingly comic and/or evil character, is reluctant to relax and suspend their moral 
judgements, if they fear these judgements may remain suspended in mid-air. Still, this is 
exactly what I think both the Fool and Iago are trying to teach their audiences - with different 
degrees of success. 
As I have mentioned above, Happé sees a didactic experience of popular theatre "working 
through satire, ridicule, and an assumption of agreed values." His idea is that the vice is a 
tempter and destroyer, but part of the overall working of justice. One way a post-Vice can be 
an element of a general setup of universal justice is seen in the example of Shakespeare's 
Richard III, the scourge of God. Such an explanation, however, would hardly make Iago's 
deeds acceptable: a clear sense of purification is impossible in a play where pure characters 
like Desdemona fall victim to the tempter's machinations, too. What makes the Fool and Iago 
as successors of the Vice so intriguing is the fact that we can clearly see the elements of satire 
and ridicule in their relation to the others, but the dramas themselves do not offer a system of 
agreed values, where this satire and ridicule would take their clear place and agreed function. 
(This is why, in my opinion, Bristol is only partly right in reading Othello as charivari - see 
below in 3.2.1. The satiric effect of the charivari is really powerful only if there is a common 
agreement within a society what counts as deviant behaviour that should be punished.) The 
levelling aspect is surely there, as both Iago and the Fool work in their respective ways 
towards the destruction of the former integrity of their heroes. Clearly, the Fool's function is 
enhancing and making clear the events that have already started to head towards their end, 
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while Iago is a more active destroyer. Still, the question might be asked, to what extent is this 
distinction sustainable? I will address this issue when suggesting an explanation about the 
similarities and differences of Iago and the Fool. 
In the dramas I examine, the lack of agreed values is much more clear than in earlier 
plays, where such an agreement must have indeed been present. 
Concerning the big family of the Vice and his relatives (not those whom he claims to 
rule within the audience, like his Cousin Cutpurse, but rather the dramatic relatives) perhaps 
one of the most intriguing things is how scholars who are interested in him construct his story 
to account for why he is or is not necessarily condemnable. These opinions can later be 
related to interpretations of the successors of the morality Vice, among which we again find 
"tamed" villains, almost benign ones or simple mischiefs, such as Puck or Biron or Feste, as 
well as those who are dangerously alluring and wicked or even devil-like, such as Gloucester, 
Aaron or Iago. There are critics who find the humour of both morality Vice and his later 
14ft 
successors invariably condemnable. However, it is interesting to see that along with the 
changes the morality Vice went through to reach the forms in which he appeared on 
Shakespearean stage, the "original" Vice was still lurking in the background. The figure 
appears "in person" too, in a customary ambiguous context, familiar from the moralities. 
There is an example in Jonson's The Devil is an Ass where the Vice carries off Pug, the devil 
on his back - just the opposite way as in moralities, where the Vices was carried away by the 
devil. The Vice explains the unusual situation the following way: "The Devil was wont to 
carry away the evil; /But, now, the Evil out-carries the Devil" (5.6.76-7). Dessen refers to the 
148 Such a view is held by Charlotte Spivack, who sees that it is only the perversity of evil that is humorous, not 
only in mysteries and morality plays, but Shakespeare and his contemporaries as well: "Several of Shakespeare's 
villains are virtuous in their art, dedicated to the endless pleasure of the game, and alarmingly witty in their frank 
verbal revelations of technique. At times their horrendous deeds are almost overshadowed by double meanings, 
mocking asides, paronomasia, and miscellaneous wordplay (...). But it is not the humour that is perverse: evil by 
definition is humorous in its perversity." Charlotte Spivack, The Comedy of Evil on Shakespeare's Stage 
(Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1978), 143. 
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same passage, and concludes that the quotation presents "a deliberate inversion that twice 
equates the Vice not with 'fool' or 'jester' but with 'the Evil."149 
I would like to draw attention to the fact that the Vice here seems to have more power 
than in his earlier appearances, leaving the stage on the Devil's back, as in Fulwell's Like Will 
to Like from 1568. The inverted tradition in Jonson's play could stress his evil and deceptive 
nature - actually this is what Dessen points out in his comment - but there is another 
possibility as well, and it is the playful and comic quality of the scene, featuring a Vice who 
misbehaves from the point of view of the devil and deviates from the pattern applied in some 
morality plays, but who behaves according to the "haphazard" and comically subversive 
convention, namely to disregard all authority and all prescribed modes of behaviour. If we do 
not stick to the idea that the foolish Vice is either unrepresentative or a degeneration of the 
homiletic original, we can see Jonson as continuing the original tradition, which did allow 
such liberties to the Vice.150 
I have discussed above the epistemological prerequisites for the appearance of tragedy 
in the form of the Renaissance dialectical theatre as well as the conditions of the 
representational crisis - conditions that disappeared gradually as the new discourse and 
tragedy in its new form became consolidated. Baldo talks about "the tremors in the 
epistemological ground that would soon make tragedy in its Renaissance form obsolete."151 A 
question naturally arises about the transformation of the figures who were able to embody, 
generate and expose such a crisis. What happened in the long term to characters whose 
149 Dessen, op. cit. 18. 
l50The idea of the Vice-buffoon as degenerated is based primarily and C. H. Herford's comment on Puttenham's 
equation of the "vice" and the "buffoon," where Herford maintains a view according to which "Jonson is wrong, 
historically, about the Vice; in the earlier interludes this character was, as the name implies, the opponent of 
goodness as personified in some other character and the corrupter of mankind [. . .] But in Jonson's day the 
original significance was lost, and the Vice had sunk to the level of the clown: Puttenham can talk of 'buffons or 
vices in plays' {The Arte of English Poesie, 1589, II. Ix, p. 169)" in C.H.Herford and Percy Simpson eds., Ben 
Jonson: The Man and His Work vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925). The passage from Herford is referred to 
both by Dessen (33) and Spivack (199), and both of them see that such an identification would lead us astray 
from the homiletic substance of the Vice. Spivack maintains: "It is not necessary to minimize his farcical aspect 
to realize that farce alone is only the dramatic glitter of his role, not its homiletic substance" (200). 
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dramatic heritage included the morality Vice? The scope of activities of such a figure, 
namely, revealing uncertainties and undermining certainties, disappeared together with the 
idea that they can walk off the stage and merge the realities of play and audience. David 
Wiles says the carnivalesque Vice/clown was obliterated during the seventeenth century: 
In the long term, social realism proved a limiting factor. The stage became a mirror of society, but only 
part of society was reflected in the mirror, only one angle of vision was possible. In the course of the 
seventeenth century the stage servant became a mere cipher, unable to make any impact upon the 
decisions and life-chances of a gentleman. When the carnivalesque model of the Vice/clown was finally 
obliterated, the clown/servant fell victim to decorum and verisimilitude. 152 
With this shift it was not only the Vice/clown who was obliterated, but also the 
possibility of interpreting the Vice/clown in a way that the tension he creates is not 
necessarily taken as a threat to the existing order but rather as a process that "perpetually 
renews precisely because it never resolves."153 
2.4. The Vice-clown on the Shakespearean stage 
Before I turn to discuss the parallel metadramatic and comic behaviour of Iago and 
Lear's Fool and make comparisons between the two figures, I would like to clarify an issue 
that makes this comparison valid and which concerns the stage presence of these two 
characters compared to the stage presence of the Vice. I argue that for a contemporary 
audience the similarities between Iago and Lear's Fool on stage could have been still 
appreciable, and much more obvious than for us. This is, of course, not to say that the 
audience of the Globe would interpret the two characters in the same way, but that they would 
recognise crucial elements in their character, features that clearly connected these figures to 
the same family of trickster-Vices. As I have shown, it is easy to fall into the trap of 
separating evil Vices and comic clowns, but for the Elizabethan audience they would not 
131 Baldo op. cit., 179. 
152 Wiles, op. cit., 10. 
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come as clearly separate characters, rather as the complex one I described above, a character 
for which we only retrospectively say that it is a "blend" or a mixture of two. For the 
contemporary audience it was not unusual at all that there was not much difference between 
the clown, the devil's servant, a tricky villain and the master of the game. As already referred 
to, the terms fool and vice could be used interchangeably, and there are instances in 
contemporary texts where fools and vices or fools and devils as "parts," i.e., characters on 
stage, are mentioned as belonging together, used even as near synonyms, like in Stubbes's 
Anatomy: "For who will call him a wise man that playeth the part of a fool and a vice?."154 
Different "roles" of vices and fools could belong so strongly together, that they were 
even played by the same actor, similarly to earlier Vices and masters of ceremony played by 
the leader of the company. This I see as a very strong evidence to my presumption that the 
stage presence of the clown-Vices bore distinctive and surely recognisable features. Let us see 
a few examples that illustrate this connection. 
It is thought that Falstaff s role was written for Will Kempe, the clown who in 
Shakespeare's company succeeded Tarlton. After an established link between the Vice and 
the fool or clown, we should not be surprised at all that the role of "that reverend Vice, that 
grey Iniquity, that father ruffian" was written having in mind the acting and the performing 
style of the company clown. As for Lear's Fool, we know that the role was not only written 
for the actor Robert Armin, the successor of Kempe in the troupe, but that the clown himself 
most probably contributed to the formation of the role and presumably to Shakespeare's 
interest in wise fools as well.155 It probably comes as no surprise that the same actor played 
153 Hillman, op. cit., 5. 
154 Similarly, Jonson speaks ironically of "wiser patriots" who desire "to see fools and devils and those antique 
relics of barbarism retrieved" (Pollard, 202). For Jonson fools and devils, although not identical, definitely 
belong together as relics of an earlier type of theatre. This quotation becomes relevant for my argument 
regarding the fact that the style of acting employed by the clowns in Shakespeare's theatre was considered as 
outdated by many. On this topic and the types of clowning see Andrew Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare's 
London (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), especially 152. 
155 Charles Felver discusses the impact of Robert Armin on the Fool-roles he played in Shakespearean plays. See 
Charles Felver, Robert Armin, Shakespeare's Fool. Kent, Ohio:Kent State University, 1961. 
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the roles of Touchstone and Feste, and we readily accept that the personality of this company 
clown must have connected these figures together. This connection was established much in 
the manner of Commedia dell' Arte actor-characters, where the stock roles were always 
played by the same actors in the troupe, who improvised on the "theme" of the given stock 
character, and to some extent were even identical with the character they played, such as the 
Dottore, the Capitano, Pulcinella or Zanni. Unless we see the Vice-connections of the clown, 
we could indeed be surprised that the roles written for Armin included not only fools, but also 
characters who were not at all in the wise fool-tradition, rather admittedly evil ones.156 One of 
them is the Clown from All's Well, who talks about a prince that he serves. Who else could 
that prince be than the one whom the morality Vices served too? It is "The black prince, sir 
alas the prince of darknesse, alas the divell" (4.5.54-55). There is an interesting moment in 
the play from the perspective of the separation of the heterogeneous figure into a fool-clown 
and a villain. It is when Lafew asks the Clown whether he is a knave or a fool. The question is 
symptomatic of the change, and it is automatically asked by the 20th century audience too, 
unaware of the original intrinsic connection between the two figures. This audience, together 
with Lafew, is already on the "other side" compared to the Clown, for whom the fool and the 
villain are not separate. The Clown has admitted to be servant of the devil. However, as 
Felver notes, "when he answers Lafew's catechism as to whether he is knave or a fool, [...] he 
refers to his bauble; but he uses the term in its vulgar reference to his penis."1571 see that for 
the Clown, a representative of a fading world, this question of either-or, of knave or fool, 
clown or devil, is still irrelevant. From his point of view he is neither, because the distinction 
is not valid. On the other hand, from our point of view he is both, because he cannot be 
classified within the latter system to be clearly and only one or the other. 
156 For Armin's supposed roles, not only in Shakespeare's company, but in others as well see Felver, 55-7. 
157 Felver, 56-7. 
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Thus, we should not be surprised that another role of Armin, Thersites from Troilus 
and Cressida was also written for the same actor, Robert Armin. As Felver notes, "in most 
discussions of Troilus Thersites is treated as a foul-mouthed malcontent rogue, which indeed 
he is, but it should also be noted that Shakespeare describes him as a fool - a combination of 
1 ^ fi 
Touchstone and Jacques might be the aptest comparison." Therefore we know that 
Thersites was the role of Armin just as Lear's Fool, which shows that he was considered an 
equally fitting actor to play an evil trickster as a clown, given the intrinsic connectedness, the 
similarity of the stage presence of the two figures. Following this logic it does not matter that 
in Othello Armin played the Clown and not Iago, since on the one hand, villains were not 
aliens in his repertoire, and on the other hand the histrionic tools used by Iago still connect 
him strongly to the trickster-Vice tradition. The most obvious and significant ones of these 
tools, such as his metadramatic qualities and involvement function, i.e., serving as a 
connective link between the world of the audience and the world of the play will be treated in 
the following chapter. But there are other features of Iago that mark his stage behaviour and 
which make him more complex than a simple villain. I perfectly agree with Seltzer who, in 
his article on Elizabethan acting in Othello,159 likens Iago's stage presence not only to Vices 
like Avarice from Respublica, or Ambidexter from Cambises based on his direct addresses to 
the audience, but also to Parolles or Falstaff,160 and describes the way the role was acted in the 
following way: "The swagger, self-confidence, and friendly good humor, give some 
indication of the stance of the character on stage."161 This friendly good humour is, of course, 
the attribute of the "merry companon" as well, who might be a clown or fool, but a Vice 
158 Felver, 55-6. 
159 Daniel Seltzer, "Elizabethan Acting in Othello," Shakespeare Quarterly 10.2 (1959): 201-10. 
160 Seltzer, 204. 
161 Seltzer, 205. 
162 When discussing the evidence for the "merry companion" or the jesting parasite in England, Welsford refers 
to the sixteenth-century Interludes, "where we sometimes find the hero of the play falling in with some traveller 
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Theresa J. Faherty also deals with the stage presence and acting style of Iago, and 
places him in the stock trickster-actor tradition.163 Although she does not take into account 
Iago's indebtedness to the Vice at all, and thus in her view the type to which Iago belongs is 
not the trickster-Vice, she, too, considers Iago a trickster, and discusses Iago's central role in 
the play as characterised by his connections to the comic tradition in theatre. She sees the 
commedia's tricky valet (zanni) in Iago, whose "1 azzi (interpolated bits of comic business), 
are the snares and knots that hold the total performance together."164 Among the tricky 
servants of the commedia, she says, there is one who bears a particular resemblance to Iago: 
"Among the zanni (Arlecchino, Francatrippa, Bertoldo, et al.), Brighella is defined as 'the 
Intriguer,' the plot mover and schemer on the commedia stage."165 
I do not choose to attack Faherty's view according to which Iago belongs to the family 
of the zanni instead of the trickster Vice. Rather than trying to cut the labyrinthine 
connections between the different branches and specimens of the trickster, I would like to put 
emphasis on the living tradition of the potentially comic trickster on stage, which had clear 
markers (even the dagger is a common attribute of the Vice and Brighella)166 and with which 
Iago was quite probably associated by the Elizabethan audience. This way the contemporary 
audience could see in Iago the representative of the stage trickster with its characteristic 
schemes and humour. I assume that exactly by recognising him as trickster, the original 
audience was far less reluctant to respond to the appealing potentials of Iago than we are. In 
Faherty's words, considering the imagery of his jokes, "in the context of commedia humor, 
who converses with him in a jocular manner [...the hero] takes him into service, but not at all to his advantage, 
for his new acquaintance is in fact the Vice of the play." Welsford, 25. 
163 Theresa J. Faherty, "'Othello dell' Arte: the Presence of 'Commedia' in Shakespeare's Tragedy," Theatre 
Journal A3 (1991): 179-194. 
164 Faherty, 183. 
165 Faherty, 183. 
166 "His [Brighella's ] two invariable accoutrements are a large leather purse and a dagger" (Faherty, 184). 
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Iago's disgusting and disturbing imagery must also be recognised as having, at least initially, 
a positive comic charge."167 
167 Faherty, 191. 
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3. Metadrama 
3.1 Metadrama and the Vice. A definition of the term 
It will appear from my analysis that the metadramatic quality of Iago and the Fool has 
strong roots in the metadramatic tradition of the morality Vice or, as Robert Weimann terms 
it, the Vice's "extradramatic awareness" (the variations of the terminology will be discussed 
below). Before giving an explanation of how I understand metadrama in my analysis of Iago 
and the Fool, I will first give some illustrative examples and thus delineate the traditional 
metadramatic devices of the Vice. These techniques will be the ones that later gain a new 
function and appear in a new form, when they become what I consider the metadramatic tools 
of Iago and the Fool. 
3.1.1 The Vice as mediator 
A crucial function of the Vice is to mediate between play and audience, involving the 
audience in the performance. In Weimann's words, the Vice is both a conférencier and 
chorus: 
The Vice, already removed a step from the Psychomachia as a result of his manipulation of it, achieves 
an even greater distance from the allegorical convention through his role as conférencier and chorus: In 
so standing between the text of the play and its theatrical realisation, the Vice mediates between fiction 
and reality, the drama and the social occasion.168 
This mediatory function of the Vice gains an additional essential function in Knapp's 
view, which sees the Vice not merely as a go-between, but as the character who makes the 
168 Weimann, 157. 
97 
point, who formulates the gist, or the "message," of the play.169 The irony inherent in this 
setup is, of course, that a character who is morally at least dubious if not the embodiment or 
drive of moral corruptions is the one to usher the audience to the message of the morality. 
The character is the more compelling because apart from being the play's chorus and 
commentator, he frequently seems to be the very prerequisite or source of the play itself. An 
intriguing picture of the complexity of the Vice as agent of involvement is discussed in David 
Wiles' analysis of Mankind, where he explicates the dramatically multi-faceted nature of this 
character. Wiles points out the moment where Mischief informs the audience in his entrance 
that he came in order to entertain: "I am come hither to make you game" (1. 68). According to 
David Wiles he is "at once a villain, whom the audience learn to shun, and the welcome 
game-maker who makes the play possible."170 Wiles claims that Mischief as a game-maker 
and master of ceremonies is central to the dramatist's conception, and introduces an intriguing 
idea: although we cannot be sure about which "other" character doubled Titivillus, the chief 
devil - a character who is advertised as a major attraction to the audience before he actually 
appears on stage - we have good reason to suppose that the player of Mischief was the one to 
put on Titivillus's mask in the play-within-the-play. That is, the character who originally 
introduced himself to the audience as the prime mover of the "game" is the one to play the 
devil within the inset play.171 Wiles points out that the Vice is the chief comedian, and he is 
169 "Serving as the analogue or companionable raissoneur for those persons who are the titular heroes or villains 
of the action, the Tudor Vice gives us a merry report of what the action is about, abstracting a narrative context 
into a thematic statement, helping us to formulate the rhetorical point of the play..." Knapp, op. cit., 99-100. 
170 Wiles, 1-2. Not everyone has given so distinguished a dramaturgical position to Mischief compared to the 
other Vice-like mischievous characters of the same play. For example Jean-Paul Debax in his essay entitled 
"Vices and Doubledeckers" observes how Mischief is performing his "duties" with three other characters: 
Newguise, Nowadays and Nought, and Debax is not making a distinction between them. In Francois Laroque ed. 
The Show Within: Dramatic and other Insets. English Renaissance Drama (1550-1642), (Publicacions de 
Université Paul Valéry ~ Montpelliér III, 1990). Still, I find David Wiles' argument convincing, taking into 
consideration that the Vice had minions in other moralities as well. 
171 Wiles bases his argument on the fact that before the appearance of Titivillus there are only three other players 
visible. Actually, they are collecting money from the audience before the big spectacle. He suggests that the exit 
of Titivillus may be interpreted as the entrance of Mischief. It also seems appropriate that the par excellence 
showman doubles the part (Wiles, 3). Still, there is a lot of evidence that would support that Mercy played 
Titivillus instead of Mischief. Because of the limited number of actors the two poles of psychomachia were 
frequently played by the same actor. It is difficult to decide who is right, but regarding the complexity of the 
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the one who dominates the play whenever he is present. Likewise he has the power to juggle 
layers of reality: 
He plays at one and the same time the devil, the allegorical person Mischief, and a crooked actor 
organising robberies from houses that are empty because everyone has come to see the play. At the 
same time, the player is himself, gathering real money to fund the itinerant troupe in which he is the 
principal. There is no fixed boundary between actor and role - for to perform a play is in a sense 
necessarily to create 'mischief.172 
This multitude of the Vice's roles, namely, playing the chief comedian and game 
maker, an actor trying to earn money, as well as playing the chief devil, is interesting not only 
because it lends a highly complex existence to the player/character, but also because this 
complexity is present in his relationship with the audience. Since he is capable of shifting the 
boundaries of the action between the fiction of the play and the real world of the audience, the 
audience is put in a peculiar situation, "on the move between the polar position of observer 
and participant."173 The spectators, who are the audience of the game, the play and mischief, 
and the carnivalistic disturbance of order, become accomplices when they pay to see the devil, 
or when they witness how the vices organise the robbery of the empty houses. Titivillus, the 
chief evil makes this explicit when he suggests to the audience that they not warn Mankind of 
the perils that are ahead of him. J.A.B. Somerset points out lines from the play which suggest 
that although the audience, or in his words, we, are in a position to warn Mankind, we do not, 
since "[w]e enjoy a 'good sport' instead, performed by a villain who reminds us of vaudeville 
in his close rapport with us, playing upon dramatic illusion."174 "And ever ye did, for me keep 
now your silence; / Not a word, I charge you, pain of forty pence" (11. 590-1). Temptation in 
the play is clearly parallel to the play as temptation, and the devil is a director not only of the 
play but of the audience as well. 
Vice and the multiplicity of dramatic layers he is involved in, we cannot rule out Wiles' suggestion. The other 
solution is more characteristic to moralities where it is not the mischievous evil character who rules the stage, but 
rather the allegory of mankind. In the latter case, the allegorical mankind-figure would be the protagonist, and 
the other characters would be doubled. C.f. David Bevington, From Mankind to Marlowe (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), 87. - Bevington relates the same to Mankind as well. 
172 Wiles, 2. 
173 Wiles, 3. 
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To sum up, the peculiar quality of this particular character, Mischief, shows that the 
same actor can embody morally contradictory functions: as the game-maker, actually the 
organizer of the morality and the explicator of its message, he is clearly acceptable. As the 
embodiment of temptation and moral corruption, he is the figure whom the audience 
recognises as the allegory of evil that presents a temptation, and the morality play thus 
becomes one of the sources from which a good Christian learns how to reject this temptation. 
A very clear example where it is not the Vice but the play itself that is identical 
with temptation, and the audience identical with sinners, can be found at the beginning of Like 
Will to Like. The Vice, Nichol Newfangle, enters with a knave of clubs in his hand, and, 
according to the stage directions, he passes it over to a member of the audience: "he offerteth 
to one of the men or hoys standing by." His irony in uttering the title of the play in his first 
line immediately puts the audience in a position of meeting the Vice by the very logic of the 
proverbial title and makes them accomplices. Nichol makes the most out of the fact that the 
audience now has the opportunity to meet him. He reminds them of himself, whom they may 
have forgotten. The whole scene is alluring, where Nichol is directly addressing the audience 
and is evidently trying hard to win their sympathy.175 
Before I move on to discuss how Shakespearean post-Vices implemented and 
developed the metadramatic characteristics of their predecessors in the moralities, I would 
like to point to a very common feature of the Vice's involvement, in this case not of the whole 
audience, but of pick-pockets, who must have had wonderful opportunities for business in a 
crowd watching a play. The Vice would typically refer to pick-pockets as his men, and would 
encourage them to carry out their job. In Appius and Virginia Haphasard says: 
174 J.A.B. Somerset, Four Tudor Interludes. Introduction (London: Athlone Press, 1974), 9. 
175 The fact that the prologue has announced that, in order to please everybody, the author has mixed mirth and 
sadness (seriousness) may point towards the author's concern about the eventual negative reception of the comic 
scenes. Actually he points out how "myrt"—and in his drama it is the comic foolery of the Vice - should be 
taken with measure. 
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At hand (quothpick-purse)! 
Here ready am I. 
See well to the cut-purse: be ruled by me. 
(p. 22) 
Ambidexter in Cambises is talking about how he plays with two hands, and as if it were an a -
propos on playing, he remembers his cousin Cutpursse: 
But how now Cosin Cutpursse with whom play you? 
Take heed for his hand is groping even now. 
Cosin take heed, if ye doo secretly grope: 
If ye be taken cosin, ye must looke through a rope. 
(11. 702-5) 
The way both Vices refer to things happening off the stage and make the present and probably 
active thieves related to them (be it a thief ruled by the Vice or his cousin) is to integrate the 
off-stage events in the world of the play, and also to warn criminals to be aware that it is the 
Vice in them who operates, that they are ruled by the Vice, as well as (in the latter example) 
making them aware of the punishment that awaits them. The fact that thieves are referred to as 
cousins or relatives of the Vice, that they are ruled by him, may be a moral warning to them. 
This moral warning, however, does not always provide the message we might expect. A 
variation of the topos of the Vice addressing Cutpursse at his final exit is found in Horestes. 
In this example, the Vice suggests that the thief will not be caught in case he is ruled by him: 
Farewell, Cosen Cutpursse, and be ruled by me, 
Or elles you may chaunce to end on a tre. 
(11. 1120-1121). 
Taken that, as we have seen, the Vice did not receive any serious punishment, it does not 
seem to be a necessarily bad idea for Cutpursse to be ruled by the Vice and follow the advice 
of his master - and in this case not because the Vice refers to the punishment that awaits his 
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cousin, but rather because the Vice was tricky enough not to end on a tree. Supposing that the 
thief is as tricky, he will escape punishment too. 
3.1.2 Metadrama in Shakespeare-criticism 
To contextualise my understanding of the term "metadrama" that I use in my analysis, 
let me give a brief overview of some major works on metadrama in Shakespeare criticism. A 
major groundbreaking work on metatheatre, including its Shakesparean form, was published 
I «1/ 
in 1963, a book by Lionell Abel entitled Metatheatre: A New View of Dramatic Form. Abel 
claims that he does not insist on the term metatheatre, but he does insist that the kind of play 
he discusses needs designation.177 The volume, a collection of analyses of individual plays, 
includes one Shakespearean play, Hamlet. In this essay Abell gives a fascinating argument on 
why and how he considers Hamlet the character who is the "first stage figure with an acute 
awareness of what it means to be staged."178 Such an approach enables Abel to defend the 
drama against T.S. Eliot's judgement of the play as a defective tragedy, because in Abel's 
opinion the play should not be judged a tragedy. Eliot's objection about the impossibility of 
the "objective correlative" for the experience Shakespeare was trying to express while writing 
Hamlet is answered by Abell the following way: "to be sure, Hamlet is an objective 
expression of Shakespeare's inability to make his play a tragedy. But Shakespeare made 
something else of his play, something quite as extraordinary as tragedy."179 As I have already 
stated in my first chapter, in my opinion it is not just that Hamlet should not be judged as 
tragedy in a traditional sense, but also that there is no Shakespearean tragedy proper, no 
matter whether we see this as the playwright's fault or inability, or quite to the contrary, his 
176 Lionell Abel, Metatheatre: A New View of Dramatic Form (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963). 
177 Abell, vii. 
178 Abell, 57. 
179 Ibid. 
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ingenuity, or simply an accurate answer to a peculiar situation in dramatic history. This is, in 
Knapp's words, "an unprecedented way sharp wits filled the gap created by Tudor interludes 
that educated the audience in the dubious ways of representation."180 Thus, I perfectly agree 
with Abell's defence; it is just the degree of Shakespeare's consciousness implied in the 
argument that I rather choose not to deal with. This is partly because I see it as futile to try to 
decide whether Shakespeare was consciously writing against the tragic decorum, and partly 
because even without his consciousness I see the same effect of the plays and their place in a 
larger history within the metamorphosis of dramatic form. 
In the opening of his book Shakespearean Metadrama (1971), James Calderwood 
suggests the term metadrama instead of metatheatre in order to broaden the scope of the 
term.181 In his opinion "metatheatre" suggests that the plays it designates strain the limits of 
the drama182 and make "forays across or at least like to flirt around the borders between 
fiction and reality."183 He proposes that such plays, examples of metatheatre, "would become 
a species of metadrama devoted to exploring the nature of contextual form and the function of 
aesthetic distancing," while metadrama would be a more general term used in the argument of 
his book, according to which 
Shakespeare's plays are not only about the various moral, social, political, and other thematic issues [...] 
but also about Shakespeare's plays. Not just 'the idea of the play,' as in Ann Righter's fine book of the 
same title, but dramatic art itself - its materials, its media, its language and theater, its generic form and 
conventions, its relationship to truth and the social order - is a dominant Shakespearean theme, perhaps 
his most abiding subject. 184 
I accept Calderwood's terminology, and I also use the term metadrama and not 
metatheatre, but yet I do not see a difference between what Calderwood classifies as plays on 
the idea of the play (metatheatre) as opposed to plays on dramatic art itself (metadrama). The 
idea of artistic hubris that he wants to avoid by broadening the relevance of the term, the 
180 Knapp, 127. 
181 James L. Calderwood, Shakespearean Metadrama (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971). 
182 Calderwood, 4. 
183 Calderwood, 5. 
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hubris he sees inherent in a play's going beyond drama by dissolving "the boundaries between 
the play as a work of self-contained art and life," in my opinion is inevitably there in any 
self-reference of a play, no matter how general this reference is. The effect will necessarily be 
disillusioning. The real important thing concerning the metadramatic nature of a 
Shakespearean, or indeed, any renaissance play, is that the same device that is potentially 
disillusioning or straining at the limits of drama in a later period is a matter of dramatic 
convention in earlier plays. Boundaries between play world and reality have to start to solidify 
so that they can be strained. Thus, I see no difference between metatheatre and metadrama, 
and the reason I use the latter is that although a theatrical environment is needed for the world 
of theatre and reality to mingle, elements of such "minglings" can be coded within the 
dramatic text. It will be these codes that I focus on within the present chapter. 
A truly comprehensive and systematic analysis of metadrama is Richard Hornby's 
Drama, Metadrama and Perception,187 a book that I rely on heavily in my explanations. 
Hornby's definition of the term metadrama is broad in the sense that he defines it as drama 
about drama, "whenever the subject of a play turns out to be, in some sense, drama itself."188 
In this sense any dramatic work is experienced as metadramatic at least secondarily, because 
the subject of the drama, according to Hornby, is always the drama/culture complex, the 
definition of which is the following: 
The drama/culture complex, like a myth complex of a primitive tribe, provides our society with a vast 
model of understanding reality. A play is 'about' drama as a whole, and more broadly, about culture as 
184 Ibid. 
185 Calderwood, 4. 
186 A possibility in differentiating fruitfully metatheatre and metadrama could be that metadrama is used for 
references to drama within the play-text, which may be "contained" in that they do not have to create a 
metatheatrical effect, because in this distinction "metatheatre" could stand for an extra-theatrical spectacle, and a 
true effect of alienation, distancing the audience from the illusion that is presented on stage. Such a distinction 
could be used well in analyses that try to examine the application of metadramatic elements in actual theatre 
performances, as well as the effect of extra-theatrical ways of performance on the audience. I am grateful for this 
suggestion to Attila Kiss. 
187 Richard Hornby, Drama, Metadrama and Perception (London and Toronto: Associated University Presses), 
1986. 
188 Hornby, 31. 
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a whole, thus drama/culture complex is 'about' reality not in the passive sense of merely reflecting it, 
but in the active sense of providing a "vocabulary" for describing it, or a "geometry" for measuring it.189 
I completely agree with Hornby concerning this definition; however, in his analysis he 
is concentrating on varieties of what he calls conscious or overt metadrama - varieties that are 
helpful in my analysis and will be discussed later on, but with which not all the metadramatic 
activities of lago and the Fool I discuss can be labelled. 
My view is close to the ideas of Judd D. Hubert,190 who stresses the performative 
aspect of metatheatre, understands "performative" in a metaphorical sense, and looks for 
"performative indicators within the text instead of deriving them from stagings by famous 
directors."191 He acknowledges to "have conveniently bracketed content and mimesis in order 
to focus on Shakespeare's dramatic genius and discover in his plays revealing aspects of 
playwriting."192 In my analysis I focus on the aspects of playwriting as they are revealed by 
lago and the Fool. 
For the present purposes I will understand the term metadramatic in a broad sense: I 
will use it for those devices in the play that direct the audience's attention to theatre, both in 
the sense of stressing the theatrical aspect of the performance the audience is experiencing, 
and also the theatrical aspects of reality. In a certain sense metadramatic devices work against 
mimesis in this respect, because they, working against the achievement of some ideal 
verisimilitude, make the audience aware of the fact that what they see is not reality, but a 
play. On the other hand, metadramatic devices by their alienating effect create a tension or a 
gap not only between audience and play, but also between audience and reality. The best 
example of this is the play metaphor in drama, the idea so widespread in Renaissance England 
that "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players" (AYL 2.7.139-
189 Hornby, 22. 
190 Judd D. Hubert, Metatheater. The Example of Shakespeare (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1991. 
191 Hubert, 1. 
192 Hubert, 11. 
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140).193 Thus, the effect of metadramatic devices is double: they reflect on the play as fiction, 
but they are capable of attributing to reality characteristics that "originally" applied to theatre 
or fiction. The whole problematic, of course, is rooted in the question discussed in Chapter 
One: to what extent should theatre be regarded as illusion - illusion in the sense that there 
may be a problem with its "realness," as if it had some false way of existing, actually 
endangering the realness of reality in the way anti-theatricalists feared. The interesting thing 
about a metadramatic character like the Vice is his capability of creating a space where the 
fiction versus reality distinction cannot be made. In Weimann's words, 
the relationship between Vice actor and audience does not operate at the level of moral fiction or 
dramatic illusion, but exists rather on the very boards of the stage; for the Vice stands, as champion of 
194 
'sporte' and game, between the fiction of the moral action and the audience's festive expectations. 
As long as these festive expectations are there, as long as theatre is not simply a 
fictitious representation of a place and time that does not coincide with the one of the 
audience, the play fulfils its function as "real" and not as mere illusion. Clearly, understanding 
the function of a play in society is of crucial importance when examining the extent to which 
it can be considered fictitious. The problematics of fiction was clearly not a relevant one in 
the case of a mystery play. As morality plays such as Mankind, the ritualistic nature of theatre 
was strong enough not to direct the audience's attention towards questioning the reality, the 
mimetic adequacy or the ontological validity of the play. Characters now understood as 
metadramatic constituted a bridge between play world and audience reality as masters of 
ceremony, as characters of audience involvement. The most prominent among them, as I have 
argued, was the Vice of the late moralities. Curiously, it will be the descendants of this same 
character who will carry out, apart form their involvement function, the ostensible opposite of 
audience involvement, namely alienation. The effect of alienation, a consequence of the focus 
on theatricality, as I have mentioned, is not restricted to the play only, but expands to the 
193 The issue is examined systematically by Ann Righter. Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play (Harmondswort: 
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reality which the audience is set into. Not only the play but also the world will be conceived 
as theatre. But in this case, alienation and involvement are the same thing: the audience is 
forced to reflect on the events on stage in a way that what they see is perceived not merely as 
happening in a theatrical world separate from the "real" one but is happening to them, with 
them, no matter that they are "just" in the theatre. Metadramatic devices, devices that alienate 
the audience from the theatrical experience as safely remote, in fact involve the audience in 
the experience by not letting them apply automatised ways of understanding and forcing them 
to reflect on what they see in a personal way. The really troubling problem is not that the 
world will be conceived as theatre, but its epistemological implications: the fact that reality 
becomes theatrical. 
Iago and the Fool both function similarly on the metadramatic plain of their respective 
dramas: they are both outsiders in the network of the other characters, they are reflecting on 
and criticising the social context they are set into as well as its practices of signification, and 
they explicitly reflect on theatre, playing and fiction. This is what I will discuss in the 
following: how and why I see them as outsiders, how they reflect on social practices and 
signification as well as how they address the question of theatricality and what they say about 
it. 
3.2 Meaning as an event - Iago and Metadrama in Othello 
As has been mentioned, one of the most important features - perhaps functionally the 
crucial one - of the morality Vice is his metadramatic quality, or his "extradramatic 
awareness." We have seen above that the actor playing the Vice (usually the leading actor of 
Penguin, 1967). 
194 Weimann, 153. 
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the troupe) was present on the stage on different levels of the game, because apart from the 
role or roles he played within the drama, he constituted a direct link with the audience, in 
Weimann's words "creating and distancing the values and illusions of the play,"195 which 
necessarily endowed him with a unique quality. Weimann terms this quality as 
"extradramatic," by which he stresses that aspect of the Vice that makes him different from 
the other characters in a morality play because he is not "present" in the plot of the play 
simply on the level of other characters. In my interpretation, however, there is an additional, 
highly significant aspect of the unique dramatic quality of the Vice, namely, that he is capable 
of reflecting on the multi-layered dramatic situation and even his peculiar role within it. This 
reflection I find crucial in my understanding of the metadramatic activities of both the Vice 
and the Vice-successors. Thus, since the Vice or the Vice-successor character is making 
comments on drama itself from his extradramatic position, the term metadramatic is more 
appropriate to designate his function. 
An interesting thing about the Vice is, as we have seen, the different layers of his 
functioning, one of which is involvement. Crucially, Iago, like the Vice, has several layers in 
which he performs and is present within and without the play. As for the layers or aspects of 
the Vice, Weimann suggests the following three: 1. the Vice as protagonist and opponent to 
the figure of virtue; 2. the Vice as intriguer and manipulator of the representatives of 
humanity; 3. the Vice as producer, manager, and commentator. Although Iago has all these 
aspects of the morality Vice, in the following analysis the third aspect will be discussed in 
detail. While Weimann groups under the heading "producer, manager and commentator" 
elements that are similar in contributing to the play not so much from "within" but rather from 
"without," I will place special emphasis on the respective elements of this aspect, even above 
the ones Weimann names, since I hope to show that they all contribute to the rich 
metadramatic quality both of the character and the play. 
195 Weimann, 154. 
108 
3.2.1 Commenting on drama, involving the audience 
Iago as commentator on the actions is an easily detectable instance of his 
metadramatic schemes. The simple fact that he comments on what he does and how he 
designs his plot (examples for this will be given and analysed below) results in his making the 
audience part of his game. Still, as I will show, this function of a liaison-commentator can be 
interpreted from different, even contradictory points of view, and thus can be seen as the 
source of various functions and effects. 
Even critics such as Grudin who do not deal with Iago's (meta)dramatic heritage point 
out those attributes of Iago which are characteristic of the Vice as well: Grudin describes Iago 
as the liaison between action and audience, since Iago confides in the audience, explains what 
is happening and why he is making it happen.196 "He not only conceives and directs the 
action," Grudin says, "but also is the play's chorus, satirist and fool (...) he obviously delights 
in his own schemes and artfully ornaments them in their execution. In short, he thoroughly 
reflects, on one level, the values of the dramatist."197 
Clearly, Iago's relationship with the audience is rather complex. He wins its sympathy 
with his wit and stagecraft, but he also makes the audience his accomplice by revealing his 
sinister plans to it. The same function of Iago, namely, his audience involvement, and 
particularly its effect, is analysed by Bristol from a different perspective. He reads Othello as 
a rite of "unmarrying," and in Iago he sees not the dramatist but rather the organiser of 
charivari "organized in the protest over the marriage of the play's central characters."198 He 
claims that the play makes visible the "normative horizons against which sexual partners must 
196 Robert Grudin, Mighty Opposites. Shakespeare and Renaissance Contrariety (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), 125. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Michael Bristol, "Charivari and the Comedy of Abjection in Othello," in Ivo Kamps ed., Materialist 
Shakespeare (London and New York: Verso, 1995), 142-56, p.142. 
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be selected and the latent social violence that marriage attempts to prevent, often 
unsuccessfully, from becoming manifest."199 From Bristol's perspective, being Iago's 
accomplice implies participation in and endorsement of his performance, which is aimed 
against the deviations of social norms. It is, on the one hand, participation in the burlesque 
and caricature of the racial otherness of the protagonist, and on the other hand participation in 
"pervasive misogyny typically expressed in the charivari."200 
I find it important to point out how different the perspectives are that unfold 
concerning the effect of Iago's scheme when he is making the audience part of his game by 
addressing them in his comments. As we have seen, from Bristol's point of view the audience 
will assist in a wicked performance. I do agree with Bristol that on the play's primary level it 
is possible to see it as misogynous, a mockery of racial and cultural others as well as of an 
improper marriage. By focusing on the play's and Iago's comments on themselves from a 
metadramatic perspective, there is much more we can learn by participating in the play. 
3.2.2 Iago's book of identity and role-playing 
One reason for the complexity of this character, similar to the multi-levelled function 
of the Vice, is clearly his presence at different levels of the drama or within different qualities 
of the stage. Borrowing Weimann's terminology: his being rather a platea than a locus-
oriented character.201 A different set of angles of Iago's manifold character are rooted in the 
different theatrical traditions of the play in which he appears. In other words, in the play's 
archaeology the allegorical structure is clearly detectable, but beyond the allegory, from the 
perspective of psychological drama and proscenium stage he - along with the other characters 
- is a much more complex character as well, with psychological drives, motives and 
199 Bristol, 144. 
200 Bristol, 145. 
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doubts. Consequently, the collection of Iago's roles will include not only the roles he 
inherited from the metadramatic Vice, but also the role he feigns as a deceitful human being. I 
would like to examine now this latter Iago, and the methods and effects of this particular role 
playing of his. 
The weight of Iago's falsity is subtly accentuated by the repeated references to him as 
"honest Iago" by various characters at different point of the drama. Richard Hornby, when 
discussing role playing within the role among conscious metadramatic devices pays special 
interest to this type, the "white devil": 
The white devil, or a devil with a fair outside, whose 'false face must hide what the false heart doth 
know,' was of special fascination in Shakespeare's time, since it challenged people's basic Christian 
ideas about identity. In theory, the soul was supposed to be stamped on the face, beauty supposedly 
reflected a person's goodness, and ugliness a person's wickedness. 
If we examine Iago's deceitful role-playing, we see that he is clearly presenting a false 
picture about himself to the others, but apart from playing a role within the role, he is adding a 
twist to role-playing by acting in a uniquely playful (and thus, as I will try to explain, perhaps 
even more frightening) manner. Hornby points out that when a character takes on a role that is 
different from his usual self, this will add a "third metadramatic layer to the audience 
experience: a character is playing a role, but the character himself is being played by an 
actor."204 Hornby's perception of the function of a role within the role may help us clarify the 
threat Iago's role playing poses to the other characters as well as the audience.205 In my view, 
201 Weimann, 79. 
202 For a more detailed analysis of the play interpreted from both sides of the boundary between theatrical 
traditions see Howard Felperin op. cit., 77-8 and Agnes Matuska,, "An Ontological Transgression: Iago as 
representation in its pure form," The Anachronist (2003), 46-64. Felperin examines the Iago - Othello pair so that 
they together create the allegorical structure, but only in order that the allegory lose its validity later. I rather see 
the drama's structure as double, based on the Desdemona - Iago pair of virtue and vice as allegory, and on the 
Othello - Iago axis of different levels of definiteness of being and its envy as psychological drama. The 
opposition between the two interpretations of the drama's morality-layer is ostensible. With the three aspects of 
the morality Vice offered by Weimann, it is possible to reconcile the two views: I take him as the opponent to 
the figure of Virtue, while the way Felperin regards him is in Weimann's words "the Vice as intriguer and 
manipulator of the representatives of humanity" - see above. 
203 Hornby, 77. 
204 Hornby 68. 
205 Hornby also discusses the question of gender-identity in the context of multiple cross-dressing, a situation 
that Shakespeare loves to set up: "the multiple ironies of having a male play a female who in turn plays a male, 
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the claim "using a role within the role raise [s] questions of human identity,"206 is especially 
applicable to Iago for several reasons. 
He is not only playing the white devil, but also is making his play ambiguous. He is a 
white devil within the drama, but for the audience he is a white devil constantly reminding the 
audience of this, making playful comments about it, and demonstrating the inherent 
ambiguities of such basic values as truth and identity. One such example is when he ironically 
points out that his advice to Cassio serves the advantages of the dismissed lieutenant, so he 
cannot be a villain: 
How ami a villain 
To counsel Cassio to this parallel course 
Directly to his good? 
(2.3.343-5) 
His tactics of lying by telling the truth also contributes to this sort of rather puzzling 
than straightforward villainy. Even if it is the truth he utters, it will not function as truth; it 
will be poisoned and corrupted. It is the truth he utters, but at the same time he creates a 
context in which he makes Othello disbelieve his true but simultaneously deceitful words. The 
best instances of this are in the scene in which he claims that he thinks Cassio's an honest 
man (3.3.132), or when he is not actually admitting that he is false, but with his questions he 
is implying it, and in the meanwhile he knows that Othello will take it as modesty: 
Utter my thoughts? Why, say they are vile and false? 
As where's that palace whereinto foul things 
Sometimes intrude not? Who has a breast so pure 
But some uncleanly apprehensions 
Keep leets and law-days and in session sit 
With meditations lawful? 
(3.3.139-44) 
for example, explores interesting areas of gender identification" (68). Similarly, in the context where Bristol 
discusses Iago, Othello and Desdemona as the 'scourge of marriage', the clown and the transvestite - roles of 
participants in a charivari - sees the "transvestite" Desdemona's character (and generally female characters 
played by boy acors) "a category of woman in quotation marks" that reveal "that both 'man' and 'woman' are 
socially produced categories" (148). 
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Iago's lines such as the above, or the ones like "though I perchance am vicious in my 
guess" or 
It were not for your quiet not for your good 
Nor for my manhood, honesty and wisdom 
To let you know my thoughts 
(3.3.144) 
have a painful truth in them, a truth that is not comprehended by Othello, but that 
makes the audience constantly see double. Iago turns honesty inside out, and the value of the 
line results in an oscillation between truth and falsehood. Members of the audience are 
constantly made aware of the several layers of playing with meaning: the words are true, but 
are uttered within a false scheme, are mistakenly understood by Othello as untrue, while the 
whole scene, including Iago, is mere illusion taken to be true: presented on stage, acted out by 
players. The illusion, however, may be taken to be true because it may show an ideal, not 
corrupted reality that is accessible merely through the stage. Still, the play does not serve as a 
transparent device, it is not pointing to that ideal the way earlier drama may have functioned. 
I have said above that Iago's role playing within a role contributes to the questioning 
of human identity for several reasons. One reason is the problem of the deceitful appearance, 
which Hornby himself examines: 
The fact that both Duncan and Othello turn out to be wildly wrong about identity would have been seen 
in Shakespeare's time as a result of man's fallen state; [...pjrobing a little deeper, however, we can see 
that such misgivings about identity reflect the growing size of cities, the rise of international commerce, 
the increases in the size and complexity of government, and the resultant increased amount of social 
intercourse in the Renaissance as compared to the Middle Ages.207 
Hornby points out that in medieval drama usually the hidden identity was the good one 
- as in the case of Robin Hood or Jesus. If we compare the ugly and repulsive-looking 
allegorical representations of sins in early moralities with "honest Iago," who is artfully 
206 Ibid. 
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mastering the stage, the change in the understanding of evil's nature by the end of the 
sixteenth century is evident. Evil identity is no longer revealed by appearance. 
The other question Iago raises about identity springs from the ambiguous ways he 
presents himself as a white devil. In the audience's eyes, the fact that appearance may be 
misleading is not the real problem, but rather, as I was trying to demonstrate above, that truth 
may be corrupted. Identity can be corrupted as well: Iago is able to deprive Othello of his 
identity. This again contributes to Iago's metadramatic repertoire: by turning his noble master 
into a jealous monster he is actually suggesting that it is not only he who plays with identity: 
selves of the characters may be taken as simply assumed; they are not intrinsic to their 
identities - whatever this word may mean after being emptied and equated with roles actors 
play in a drama. 
Perhaps the most radical way of Iago's questioning human identity is his apparent lack 
of it. Since Coleridge, many critics have analysed the motives of Iago's actions. Clearly, we 
do not need to search for an explanation for his deeds if we take him to be a Vice, because 
then he is merely carrying out his duty in a larger setup. But since the larger setup, the 
background of the morality play, although residual, is not so easily accessible, it is important 
that we try to look at him as a human being: after all, he is a member of the represented 
Venetian society just as are the other characters in the play. The numerous and the diverse 
motives of his villainy that are offered by him and the play, however, are indeed so puzzling 
and some of them quite improbable, that it is almost impossible to take them for granted.208 
Even if we take no notice of his playful and play-oriented, explicitly metadramatic nature and 
interpret him as a human being, it will still be his emptiness or nothingness that seems the 
207 Hornby, 78. 
208 His jealousy of Cassio, his frustration and anger towards Othello of not making him lieutenant, his fear that 
Othello has made him cuckold, and his love (!) towards Desdemona. An example of the other opinion can be 
found in A. L. Rowse's Introduction to Othello of 1978. "It [Iago's hatred] has usually been found inexplicable, 
but though rare, it is understandable." He claims that Iago's hatred is understandable exactly because of the 
reasons listed above, and the ultimate reason being Iago's consequential unhappiness. A.L.Rowse. Introduction 
to Othello. In The Annotated Shakespeare (London: Orbis Publishing), vol. 3,268. 
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most characteristic. Alessandro Serpieri in his semiotic analysis of the play209 describes Iago 
as not being able to identify with any situation or sign or énoncé, which is Serpieri's term for 
something that represents the definiteness of being. Facing the lack of his own self, in his 
envy of the others' énonciations, he deconstructs them and transforms them into simulacra.210 
He defines Iago's identity exactly by the lack of it: "Iago, in fact, is a prisoner of his own 
imaginaire, and thus condemned to not being in reality: his manifest desires and motives are 
only the slidings of an unspeakable desire. If criticism considers him at the level of being (and 
identity: jealous, Machiavellian, diabolic etc.), it is in danger of missing his actual dramatic 
depth."211 
Iago, an ensign, a nobody on the social scale, and a character lacking identity and 
eating away the identity of the others, on a metadramatic level not only shows how he can 
juggle with identities, but also reflects on the issue with his comments on honour, good name 
and reputation. The novelty of his ambiguity seems never to wear off: he may utter radically 
different opinions of the same issue yet he may be right in both cases, although in the 
meantime he is misleading his listener within the drama. 
Cassio, who thinks he lost his reputation, the "immortal part" of himself, is consoled 
by Iago with the following words: 
Reputation is an idle and 
most false imposition, oft got without merit and lost 
without deserving. You have lost no reputation at all, 
unless you repute yourself such a loser. 
(2.3.254-7) 
On the other hand, when he is ostensibly reluctant to share his negative opinion of the 
same Michael Cassio, he argues thus: 
209 Serpieri, 119-143. 
210 Serpieri does not define the term simulacra. In Baudrillard's use simulation is "the generation by models of a 
real without origin or reality," it is "substituting signs of the real for the real itself' cf. Jean Baudrillard, 
"Simulacra and Simulations" in Selected writings, ed. Mark Poster (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 166-7. 
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Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls: 
Who steals my purse steals trash - 'tis something-nothing 
'Twos mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands -
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed. 
(3.3.159-64) 
Is good name or reputation, then, intrinsic, or is it a "false imposition?" Will you be 
annihilated when robbed of your "immediate jewel of the soul" or are you the one to generate 
your own name in society? 212 It is indeed spectacular how Iago is right in both cases: as for 
Cassio, it turns out that his reputation could have been regained indeed, since Desdemona was 
willing to help, and Othello would have been inclined to accept Desdemona's plea to put 
Cassio back into office213 had Iago not enveloped him in a cloud of suspicion. In the second 
quotation, on the other hand, we learn that depriving someone of his or her good name does 
not bring profit to the "filch" (is not Iago himself doing it for the sheer pleasure of the game?), 
but destroys the "immediate jewel" of the soul. And as the drama shows, with this tactics Iago 
is paving a direct road towards Desdemona's death. 
The question here, however, does not seem to be primarily whether reputation or good 
name are important, whether they reflect man's immortal self. The real problematic issue is 
rather that it is questionable in both cases whether there is something genuinely immortal in 
211 Serpieri, p. 136. 
212 Another Shakespearean example of the same dilemma of the age appears in Edmund's soliloquy on his being 
a bastard: an outcast, a stigmatized person of society - although the stigma stands for no necessary intrinsic 
quality. The fact that the bastard Edmund is the bad boy and the legal Edgar the good one does not lessen the 
legitimacy of the bastard's critique of society's logic of signification: 
Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit 
The curiosity of nations to deprive me, 
For that I am some twelve of fourteen moonshines 
Lag of a brother? Why bastard? Wherefore base? 
When my dimensions are as well compact, 
My mind as generous, and my shape as true, 
As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us 
With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base? 
(1.2.2-10) 
Edmund's repetition of the word "base" has the effect of emptying it of its meaning. 
213 C.f. "Let him come when he will, 
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us, and supposing there is, whether that something is or can be manifest. In other words: does 
the opposite of "false impositions" exist? Once the "essence" does not make itself manifest, 
once it is not represented, it seems it is lost. This predicament, together with Iago's multiple 
ambiguity, casts a rather sinister shadow on society's logic of representation. It is inevitable 
that the question of identity and truth, essence and falsity are considered, and they appear as 
anything but unproblematic. 
3.2.3 Plays within - Iago as director 
No matter how much Iago is in some sense the embodiment of evil according to a 
religious moral scale (and according to the references to him in the drama after his 
machinations are revealed), he is a necessary and ultimate driving force behind the game. His 
function as director and dramatist is discussed by Patricia Parker as well. Counterfeit 
representation and juggling with time by precipitating and delaying events are interpreted as 
tools of Iago in manipulating his environment, in his making the others see a reality that he 
wants them to see.214 And similarly, he is making the audience see his presentation, or 
perhaps his presentation of reality as a play - in its two senses. 
An objection could perhaps be raised against Iago's function as director and dramatist, 
since in the end he is incapable of controlling events and finds himself enmeshed in his own 
web. This objection is answered if we look at him from the Vice tradition, since similar 
characters - let us just think of Weimann's three aspects of the Vice - are able to be present in 
the play on several levels at the same time. The play does not feature Iago's clear-cut victory 
if we suppose some sort of vaguely specified revenge to be behind Iago's intrigue: although 
I will deny thee nothing'' (3.3.75-6) 
214 Patricia Parker, "Shakespeare and rhetoric," in Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman eds., Shakespeare and 
the question of theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1985) 54-74, p. 65. 
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he achieved a bloody goal, he was consumed by it as well. Iago as the master of ceremonies, 
however, may account the play to his credit, since he successfully manipulated both the 
characters and the audience throughout the play. And his defeat is not unambiguous either: 
with his last words "From this time forth I will never speak a word* (5.2.103), with his refusal 
to speak he also refuses to take part in whatever will happen to him or the others.215 We will 
not see him executed either. The only death still to come is Othello's suicide, suggesting that 
the machinery Iago set into motion is still running. 
Perhaps the most obvious dramatic self-reference, a reference of a play to itself as 
theatre, is the play within a play. Evidently, Iago does not direct any overt plays within the 
play that would be set apart from the main action as clearly as, say, the Mousetrap in Hamlet. 
Still, apart from the play as a whole, there are play-like, minor scenes as well, the effect of 
which may result in the audience's "seeing double" or estrangement the same way as Hornby 
finds it characteristic of "proper" metadramatic devices, like play within a play, where the two 
(or more) plays and layers are clearly separable. 
One such significant instance is at the beginning of act two, actually foreshadowing 
the method Iago will use later on: he theatricalises reality in order to re-interpret it. In other 
words, he watches a scene of the play's reality, cuts it off from its original meaning, and 
applies another one that is equally plausible, if the participants of the scene are taken to be 
actors, acting out a different situation from the original one. If the meaning is not taken 
automatically, as a matter of routine, the same signs may carry different meanings. In this 
particular scene we see Desdemona and Cassio in conversation, but Cassio's body language is 
followed by Iago's comments, through which the lieutenant's gestures take on a new 
significance. 
215 G6za Klllay interprets the line as Iago's refusal of the basic prerequisite of the possibility of communication, 
and by denying this prerequisite, there is no use in speaking, its meaning is lost completely. G6za Killay, Nem 
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He takes her by the palm, ay, well said, 
whisper. With as little a web as this will I ensnare as 
great a fly as Cassio. Ay, smile upon her, do: I will 
gyve thee in thine own courtesies. 
(2.1.167-70) 
It is almost as if Iago were giving stage directions to Cassio, and the context Cassio is 
playing in instantly becomes the one envisioned by Iago. The audience sees the two 
interpretations of the same scene run parallel, or perhaps they see the two scenes in two 
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different plays at the same time. Cassio's courtesy becomes a sign of his adulterous 
relationship with Desdemona, and his thus endangered present lieutenancy a mere mask as 
well: 
If such tricks as these strip you out of 
your lieutenantry, it had been better you had not 
kissed your three fingers so oft, which now again you 
are most apt to play the sir in. 
(2.1.171-4) 
The method is indeed contagious. The next time the audience witnesses a scene where 
the dramatic world is further theatricalised by somebody's comments, the commentator will 
be not Iago but Othello. When Iago sets him to eavesdrop on his conversation with Cassio and 
Bianca (4.1.101- 66), Othello will interpret what he sees in sentences like "Look how he 
laughs already!," "Now he denies it faintly, and laughs it out"\ [Desdemona's] "Crying 'O 
dear Cassio!' as it were: his gesture imports it" or 'Wow he tells how she plucked him to my 
chamber." 
If Grudin says that Iago is the play's chorus,217 in this scene Othello actively takes 
over the part of the chorus, and in the metadramatic layer of the scene, Othello is not even 
singing off-pitch. It is uncanny how Iago's precise words "well said" ring in Othello's line: 
puszta szó (Budapest: Liget Műhely, 1996), 46. 
If the audience indeed sees two plays at this point, that of Iago and the play Othello, the latter one is not 
directed by the intriguer. The problem springs from the fact that the intriguer is also a character with a 
metadramatic awareness, which places him above the level of the plot. 
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Now he importunes him 
To tell it o 'ev, go to, well said, well said. 
(4.1.115) 
The progress with which Othello uses Iago's method of fictionalising scenes within 
the play, or creating playlets within the play, is outstanding. Three stages emerge from the 
three examples. In the first instance, we see Iago corrupting the reality of the world of the play 
with his fiction or in other words, with his presenting events in a context that he created for 
them and in which the events gain a new meaning. In the second example, he is setting up a 
scene in which Othello will have to do the same. The next stage, where the method is 
completely adopted by Othello, can be found in act four scene two. Here Iago is not needed 
anymore for Othello to carry on. The moor, in his outrage against Desdemona, sends Emilia 
away to leave them alone, and starts playing a wicked game of casting in which Emilia is the 
bawd and Desdemona a whore: 
Des. What horrible fancy is this? 
Oth. [to Emilia] Some of your function, mistress, 
Leave procreants alone and shut the door; 
Cough, or cry hem, if anybody come. 
Your mystery your mystery: nay, dispatch! 
(4.2.26.30) 
At the end of his visit, after more than 60 lines of conversation, he still has not fallen 
out of his role of a "procreant": 
You! Mistress! 
Enter Emilia. 
That have the office opposite to Saint Peter 
And keep the gates of hell -you, ay, you! 
We have done our course, there's money for your pains, 
I pray you turn the key and keep our counsel. 
(4.2.92-6) 
Clearly, Othello is acting and setting up this scene because he thinks it is closer to 
what he believes to be true, namely, that Desdemona has made him cuckold and Emilia must 
2 ,7 Grudin, 125. 
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have been a witness to and accomplice in it. But no matter why he is doing it, it demonstrates 
how the method of corrupting reality by fiction is increasing in impact. The estrangement 
effect of the scene within will spring not only from the increased number of layers, but also -
because of the seemingly automatized process of fictionalization - from the uncertainty 
whether the "original" or "real" meaning of the event is lost or may be restored. 
3.2.4 Representation as fiction 
The problem of reality fictionalised does not start solely with Iago in the drama. 
Hubert in his analysis of Othello, discussing the central role of narrative fiction in Othello's 
understanding of himself and his successful wooing of Desdemona, points out Othello's 
fictionalised existence and states that the "admirable fables have actually initiated a betrayal 
that the villain's lies will eagerly complete."218 He concludes his essay on the drama with the 
following: "Fictional discourse stands out as even more dangerous than the villain, who 
without the eminently theatrical separation between stage presence and stage persona might 
never have found a way to destroy his master."219 In his view, thus, it is not necessarily Iago 
himself who can be blamed for the events of the tragedy. The main problem is not posed by 
the devilish intriguer but rather by the gap between representation and perception, which is a 
threatening force behind the scenes of an assumed reality. However, to reach to this point we 
need to be critical of the society represented to a certain extent, a degree that we would be 
unable to reach without detecting the play's self-references and its references to the signifying 
practices of society. It is not Iago who is corrupting reality with fiction and making Othello 
carry on with the project he initiated, it is not pretence and playing that are turning the world 
218 Hubert, 82. 
219 Hubert, 87. 
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into a theatre, but it is rather the logic of any representation itself that is problematic to the 
extent a theatrical representation may be regarded as questionable or unreal. 
3.2.5 Iago's metadramatic effect—summary 
The most important metadramatic effect of Iago's machinations is, in the end, that he 
shows how it is possible to shape and generate reality. His strength is not so much in 
deception and misleading others, but much more in imposing his own machinations upon the 
world perceived by others and thus making everybody part of his game, a functioning element 
in the world that he generates. He is producing a plot and a play, making the others act the 
way he wants them to, by making them fit in his scheme, and by giving his own 
interpretations of their speeches as well as creating contexts which will generate meaning in 
accordance with his destructive plans. As for his effect on the audience, his deception is of a 
different kind, since it is the audience in whom he confides. The spectators will be enmeshed 
in his web in a different way: it is their participation that matters, the fact that they witness 
such an event. But in both cases Iago is simply able to deprive others of whatever reality they 
thought they were living in and make them enter his own world. 
Keir Elam has an intriguing explanation of "worlds-within-world: characters' and 
spectators' subworlds" - these subworlds being possible developments of the state of affairs 
in a drama hypothesized by dramatis personae and audience members. "When characters or 
spectators hypothesize a state of affairs in WD [world of the drama], whether it proves true or 
false, one can talk of the subworlds projected on to it."220 Using Bertrand' Russell's 
propositional attitudes, he distinguishes between different modalities a subworld can be 
founded on, "indicating the speaker's attitude to the proposition uttered." Such worlds are the 
world of the speaker's knowledge, beliefs, fears etc., including the world of his commands, 
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which is called the deontic world, "the state of affairs that he orders to be brought about."221 It 
is compelling to think of Iago as director (and indeed all the Vice-director intriguers) 
controlling the WD in such a way that they will assimilate it into their own deontic world. The 
audience has to face the fact that the engine of the state of affairs is not some divinity or 
essence that the world is based upon, but rather the director-villain is shaping them according 
to the way he "orders" them to be brought about. Although it is not directly his orders as such 
that move the play of Iago forward, the moments in the play when he conceives of the 
elements of his scheme can be understood as something similar to giving an order, something 
like "this is how I want it to be." Such examples are when Iago exclaims "I have't, it is 
engendered! Hell and night/ Must bring this monstrous birth to the world's light" (1.3.402-3) 
or "No, he must die. Be't so! I hear him coming'' (5.1.22).222 
Similar to Iago as a character, metadrama as a device works towards doing rather than 
representing, since it constantly reminds the audience not only of the fact of being in the 
theatre but also of the problematic nature of reality. Reality appears as problematic because it 
is theatrical in the sense that it can be manipulated, or even worse, that there is nothing to 
manipulate: it is constructed, and it can be constructed by a player-director in front of their 
eyes. To the extent constructing or "doing" is outweighing "representing," the play is not so 
much theatrical in its representational sense, but rather a ritualistic event. In a further step 
metadrama makes us see reality as a play, it makes us see perceived reality in the process of 
its production. Reality, thus, appears not as something that is possible to understand and in 
this way be contained in a play for safe examination as in a laboratory (and indeed as 
220 Keir Elam, The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (London and New York: Methuen, 1980), 114. 
221 Ibid. 
222 It was originally Bradley who expanded the idea of Iago as dramatist and conceiver of the plot: "Iago, finally, 
is not simply a man of action, he is an artist. His action is a plot, the intricate plot of a drama, and in the 
conception and execution of it he experiences tension and the joy of artistic creation. A.C. Bradley, 
Shakespearean Tragedy (London: Macmillan, 1965), 188. 
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"representable" as in later, Enlightenment-type theatre), but rather something that seems to be 
intermingled with the way it is represented,223 as if reality were entrapped in and by the play, 
something impossible to distinguish from its representation or rather, from the way it is 
presented - since this presentation coincides with its creation or birth. This is why the appeal 
of metadrama is so strong: what metadrama (and in our case also Iago) does can be 
understood as making a ritualistic performance out of theatre, a ritual in which we are 
involved in a performance which is not mirroring or representing any specific, pre-existing 
cultural content, but is making this content, is making it happen. 
The "meaning" of the play will thus unfold as a process of the play, which necessarily 
involves the audience as active participants: Iago is directing the play, and as discussed above, 
is making the audience his accomplice in a set of complex processes. He puts us on trial by 
making us see and reflect on what we are perhaps unwilling to face: the ways basic 
assumptions about what reality is and how it behaves may be proven false by showing that 
they are created and can be manipulated and are not necessarily different from fiction. 
3.3 Metadramatic aspects of the Fool 
I have already referred to Mares in chapter 2, who claims that the morality Vice had 
been established as a stage clown before he appeared in the morality at all. It seems to me thus 
that when considering Lear's Fool we are facing a figure who is both a descendant of and a 
root of the morality Vice. (He is a root because as a clown, he was originally part of the 
amalgamated figure of the Vice who ran a brilliant dramatic career.) Still, although sometimes 
on stage, the fool was originally not a specifically dramatic character, but rather a figure of 
entertainment with more or less precisely prescribed functions in society. The figure in King 
Lear's case is set into a play which enacts a legendary world including a court of a king, and 
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here the Fool as a character can be considered a necessary element of the playworld in which, 
following the principle of verisimilitude, he is part of the royal court represented, and there he 
carries out the usual functions of a fool. These functions do not need a drama as a context to 
be carried out - in contrast to a Vice. On the other hand, taking the play itself as some sort of 
festivity, the fool is still fulfilling the traditional role of involvement and entertainment. 
This latter role of Lear's Fool is not as explicit as in the case of Iago. While we 
understand the intriguer of Othello as essential for the play to move on - as we have seen Iago 
is making the whole play in a sense - the Fool's centrality to King Lear or being its "drive" is 
of different sort. It is exactly this "different sort" that I will try to explore by analysing how 
the Fool fulfils his metadramatic role. I have said above that the Fool is both root and 
descendant of the Vice. I have discussed in my second chapter why I see the fool and its 
tradition as an important root of the Vice. But I see the Fool as a descendant of the Vice too: 
in the specific case of Lear's Fool it is possible to establish links that connect some central 
aspects of him to the Vice-tradition. A crucial one of these aspects is exactly that the Fool has 
learnt the acting trade from the Vice, and has learnt to be metadramatic in a Vice-like fashion. 
3.3.1 The Fool and his audience 
There are several instances in King Lear where the fool is explaining and commenting 
on the events - some of which I will analyse below - and there are many among them where 
it is not clear whether anybody on stage gets the point or whether it is instead the audience to 
whom he directs his speech. There are two instances in the play, however, where it is the 
audience whom the Fool addresses directly. Unfortunately, both examples are rather obscure 
(similar to the case of Lear, sometimes not even the audience is able to get the point, 
supposing that there is one), but even if we cannot find a perfectly plausible explanation, it is 
clear that the Fool, occupying a platea-position, is establishing a contact with the context of 
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the play - the audience in the theatre - thus drawing attention to the theatrical quality of the 
situation. One of these instances appears at the end of Act 1: 
She that's a maid now, and laughs at my departure, 
shall not be a maid long, unless things be cut shorter. 
(1.5.48-9) 
The couplet, according to Kenneth Muir, means that "the maid who sees only the funny side 
of the Fool's gibes, and does not realise that Lear is going on a tragic journey is such a 
simpleton that she won't know how to preserve her virginity."224 If Muir is right, this instance 
is unique in the play in its pointing out the reverse side of the jokes or the sad side of the 
events. Normally the Fool does just the opposite: he tries to draw attention to the comic side 
of the tragic events. The other example where the audience is directly addressed by the Fool is 
a 15-line speech at the end of 3.2. after Lear and Kent leave and the Fool is left alone on 
stage. The Fool himself calls the speech a "prophecy," at some points quite in the manner of 
Haphazard's "When geese shall crack mussels"-speech. The Fool's speech begins with 
enumerating first the small vices of present times, such as "when priests are more in words 
than matter." These examples are followed by Utopian visions (e.g., "when every case in law 
is right"). The time to which all the examples apply, the time that they illustrate is the 
following: 
Then shall the realm of Albion 
Come to great confusion: 
Then comes the time, who lives to see't 
That going shall be us'd with feet. 
(3.2.91-4) 
The whole speech may be taken as typically nonsensical "wisdom" of the fool in the 
traditional nonsense of the Vice's rhetoric, but if taken literally, it suggests that the prophesied 
future coincides in time with the present of the speech, and that present is characterised both 
by petty vices of the times like brewers marring beer with water, as well as by a Utopian state 
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of affairs when bawds and whores are building churches of repentance. That future, which is 
both a confused and a perfectly normal time when feet are used for walking, is the present. 
And that present in the Fool's speech becomes clearly the present of the audience. It is in this 
manner that the Fool curiously concludes the speech by saying "This prophecy Merlin shall 
make, for I live before his time" - that sentence cannot be uttered without the perspective of 
the audience's sense of time, and the Fool's double awareness of his being both an element in 
a play set in a legendary and remote past, and a character playing that role in front of an 
audience who need some guidance. We can, of course, congratulate the Fool for trying to 
fulfil the function of the commentator, and perhaps wish for a clearer explanation. 
3.3.2 "All thy other titles" 
We have seen Iago juggling different masks in the previous section of this chapter, his 
repository of roles within the role, and the emptiness of his character which, in a certain sense 
can be regarded as a prerequisite for the parading of different roles he plays. Lear's Fool is 
not wearing masks or putting on a disguise like Iago; on the contrary, it is always the truth 
that he is trying to direct attention to. But he is similar to Iago in his representing an 
emptiness of character, a non-character. Through both his behaviour and his explicit 
references to the question of identity, the fool seems to present his own role, his own position 
within society as a "zero" position of character, something that provides a possibility for 
casting: being a fool is being ready to play and take on "other titles" by choosing any from the 
long-long line of occupations enumerated by Haphazard. 
His two most explicit remarks in this direction are both in act 1 scene 4. In the first, 
the Fool suggests that Lear was a bitter fool to give away his land, and Lear cries out of 
indignation "Dost thou call me a fool, boy?" upon which the Fool answers: "All thy other 
224 Kenneth Muir, Introduction to the Arden edition of King Lear (London and New Your:Methuen, 1982), 55. 
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titles thou hast given away, that thou/ wast born with," suggesting that being a fool is an 
inalienable characteristic of all humans, a "title" that remains beneath our changeable social 
positions and statuses. 
In the other example where the fool qualifies his position, it appears as something that, 
although rather worthless, is still better than the King's loss of his position: 
[NJow thou art an O without 
a figure. I am better than thou art now, lama 
Fool, thou art nothing 
(1.4.189-91) 
In the first quotation the Fool is defining his own position as one that is outside the 
social game of titles, "names" and positions that are not intrinsic to one's identity and can be 
given away. Being a fool is something that everyone starts from, a position that makes it 
possible to take on titles and start playing the assigned roles. In this setup, being a fool 
appears superior to "other titles" in its being intrinsic to humans. In the second example, the 
hierarchy again shows the Fool in a superior position, but this time it is not because he is 
representing the inalienable nature of a human being as opposed to mere titles, but because he 
is fulfilling his social position as a fool and is recognised to be one, while the king has given 
away his opportunity to be recognised as somebody, to fulfil his role in the given social setup, 
to be the king. Thus, in the second instance being a fool has a different meaning than in the 
first (according to which the King would be in a better position, actually equal with the Fool), 
and it is exactly the social title, condemned in the first example, that distinguishes the two of 
them and makes the Fool superior. He may be intrinsically a fool too, but he is recognised to 
be one, he has the "title" of being a fool as well. In other words, the Fool can always relate to 
or create contexts for himself, as opposed to Lear, who lost his context and thus his 
"meanings" as well. 
I see the two different treatments of social titles by the fool as more than a mere 
inconsistency, a contradiction or a typical paradoxical nonsense of foolish talk. As it will 
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appear through my analysis, I find this example typical of the fool's "logic" (and perhaps the 
curious "logic" of the drama as well): making obvious the emptiness or the lack of meaning of 
something, still not considering it as useless or a problem; no matter that certain things are 
empty of meaning, it is still possible to play with them. If the Fool's behaviour is taken as an 
example, it is actually our task to do as he does if we want to avoid being nothing, like the 
king who stopped playing his role. 
We cannot say that Lear has no feeling for playing with his identity in the way that 
seems advisable according to the Fool. I would like to illustrate this with an image of Lear 
begging for forgiveness from one of his daughters. The image appears three times in the play, 
and I will deal with two of them here, and return to the third one in 3.3.4. When Regan urges 
him to ask forgiveness from Goneril after Lear left her house, Lear ironically starts to pray 
and play as if he were talking to the unkind Goneril, pretending that he is just an old man who 
is not required, who is begging for some food and bed: 
'Dear daughter, I confess that lam old; 
Age is unnecesary: on my knees I beg 
that you '11 vouchsafe me raiment, bed and food.' 
(2.4.151-3) 
These tactics, this sort of ironic role-playing, could save Lear from madness, but the 
problem is that he thinks that playing is not all. He believes that there is a reality behind: the 
real irony is not this, not what Lear sees as ironic, but rather the fact that he still considers 
himself a king (in a position to play and pretend that he is not one), while actually he is rather 
a superfluous old man, and who is really in need of somebody else's help to get shelter and 
food. Later, when Lear has no choice but to identify with a wretched old man who is left at 
the mercy of the elements, the fool urges Lear to join this very pretence-game and the blessing 
of his daughters, foreshadowed by Lear's ironic role-play analysed above: 
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0 Nuncle, court holy-water [i.e., flattery, pretence] in a dry house is better 
than this rain-water out o 'door. Good Nuncle, in, 
ask thy daughters blessing; here's a night pities 
neither wise men nor Fools. 
(3.2.10-3) 
It seems the Fool, although he earlier expresses his regret about Lear's situation 
through his puns, can very well imagine Lear in the role that the king ironically played earlier. 
In this situation the Fool is not bothered either by the King's dignity or by moral issues such 
as sticking to the truth as opposed to the falsity of pretence: to take part in a false social game 
implying "court holy-water" is simply much more attractive than soaking in the wild storm. 
Earlier he is trying to make Lear see all the pretence that he is surrounded with and is taking 
part in, but once Lear is starting to get the point, in this particular scene the fool seems just to 
shrug his shoulders. Pretence? So what? 
3.3.3 Plays of the fool within and without 
1 have shown above that even without a proper play-within-a play, Othello, featuring 
the multiply metadramatic Iago, can be considered Iago's play, the play of the Vice-actor, the 
main performer and organiser of entertainment. Thus, a similar effect of alienation is achieved 
within the audience as Hornby finds characteristic of the operation of the play-within a play 
device: suddenly, reality within and without the play is multiplied in its layers, and it seems 
impossible to grasp or conceive it as a unified whole. Iago can achieve this effect by being the 
prime mover of the game. Although Lear's Fool is similar to Iago as commentator and chorus 
of the play, in his metaphoric summaries of the significant events, he is not central to his play 
to the extent Iago is; he is far from being the director of the chain of events. 
Still, he presents something that is the essence of playing, although not on the level of 
the plot. I consider him, or rather his playfulness, to be a prime mover of the play, a 
prerequisite of all theatre. He is playfulness per se, even professional playfulness if you wish, 
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which is realised within the play in his remarks on the level of the play's events, and outside 
the play-world in his addresses to the audience. Professionally or not, he surely does not take 
anything too seriously, because in his opinion everything is just a game. He seems to 
understand the weight and the consequences of Lear's defective behaviour but is still capable 
of playing with the serious events and of presenting them in the shape of comic metaphors, 
like Lear putting down his breeches and offering the rod to his daughters (1.4.168-74), or 
giving the crown away like two halves of an egg and leaving nothing in the middle (1.4.155-
160). This method of the Fool I will analyse in more detail in the chapter on the comedy of 
the Fool. Suffice it to say here that he is playfully creating new, extra contexts for the events 
and is thus recontexualising the happenings and pointing out the gist of the events through 
which he makes them part of his funny games. No matter that he is not directing the events or 
is not making them happen, he is still influencing them in his own way. Not in advance, but 
after they have happened, he is giving them a new, comic meaning by integrating them in his 
own world. 
He is similar to a stage, because just as the stage is the site of playing in the real world, 
he is the site and agent of playing among human beings. He is playing constantly. 
Metaphorically he never comes off stage, because he behaves the same way no matter who he 
is talking to or where he is - whether offstage or on. 
This is what Lear's bitter exclamation, " When we are born, we cry that we are come to 
this great stage of fools" (4.6.182) suggests as well. In his view where the whole world is 
meaningless, and both the stage and the fool refer to the emptiness of things, life is as empty 
of real meaning as a stage, where no reality can be presented but in play. Similarly, people are 
fools because they lack reason and are empty of real personality, just like actors, who pretend 
to be somebodies, but really are nobodies, just like fools. In the above quotation Lear is 
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capable of identifying the play and game aspect of the reality surrounding him, but he is 
incapable of appreciating it and actually is made desperate by the recognition. 
3.3.4 "The mystery of things": Fiction as reality 
In the opening ceremony of the play, Lear divides his kingdom according to his 
daughters' compliance with the roles he assigned them and their faithfulness to the playscript 
in Lear's mind. He is an author of an imagined ceremony but fails to be its successful director. 
He cannot conduct it to the end the way he planned and cannot force his vision of how things 
should be on the actual reality of the play. Another ceremony he will conduct later in the play 
is the mock trial, where he will accuse his evil daughters. Although the trial will not be played 
until the end, what is completed of it shows that Lear places himself in a different position in 
the game compared to the one at the beginning of the drama. When he is dividing his 
kingdom he is frustrated by his failure as an author of the scene. In the mock-trial the scene 
already involves the possibility of and need for improvisation: Lear will accuse his daughters, 
but he also includes an element of the indefinite, since he arranges the scene so that he does 
not know what the verdict of the authority will be. This element was lacking from his script of 
the opening ceremony, and here it is achieved by Lear's appointing the disguised Edgar and 
the Fool as judges, and ordering Kent to join them ("You are o'the commission, /Sit you too." 
(3.4.38-9). It seems he wants a fair trial, a fair play. He will do the casting but will play the 
role of the offended plaintiff only. There is a clear shift in his idea of controlling and directing 
these scenes or ceremonies. I see in this his improved sense of playing, the master of which in 
this drama is clearly the Fool. 
225 A good example for this is Will Kempe, who was practically constantly on stage, even when physically being 
off it, and who was constantly playing and acting, even when supposedly in "real life." For this remark I am 
grateful to my dear friend and colleague, Anikó Oroszlán. 
132 
The fool is "directing" reality in his special way. The improvised metaphors he uses to 
cast a different light upon the crucial events of the drama offer a different way of 
understanding them. He offers another option for Lear and the audience to conceive them. By 
presenting Lear as a child waiting to be beaten by his mother-daughters (1.4.168-70) or doing 
foolish things with both his golden and his bold crown and cracking his kingdom into halves 
like an egg (1.4.155-159), or unlike a snail, preserving no house to put his head in (1.5.27-30) 
- with all these examples, in these miniature but comprehensive "scenes" the Fool is using 
fiction to produce different versions of reality, to offer a different mode, a comic mode of its 
perception. He speaks as if in the meantime he were tipping out from reality its homogeneity 
and tragic weight. 
Thus, the purpose of the Fool's use of fiction seems quite different from Iago's. In 
King Lear it is only Edmund who uses fiction for his villainous lies in Iago's manner, in his 
negative use of fiction. Edmund's machinations (like feigning a real fight with his brother 
before Gloucester appears in 2.1.28-36) are solitary examples. Fiction prevails over 
deception; even lies are healing in this drama. Disguise will appear as entirely positive, 
actually life-saving in the case of both Kent and Edgar. When Gloucester is on the verge of 
committing suicide, Edgar even makes it explicit that he lies to his blind father in order to 
save and heal him: "Why I do trifle thus with his despair/Is done to cure it" (4.6.31-2). 
Similarly, the Fool's trifles seem to work upon Lear: the king is gradually taking over 
the Fool's sense of reality and fiction, where the dividing line between the two is not a 
particularly strict one. The peak of the healing power of fiction for Lear appears in Act 3 
Scene 5, when he, happy to be reunited with Cordelia, would not be bothered even by being 
put into prison: 
No, no, no, no! Come, let's away to prison; 
We two alone will sing like birds i 'th 'cage: 
When thou dost ask me blessing, I'll kneel down, 
And ask forgiveness: so we '11 live, 
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And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh 
At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues 
Talk of court news; and we '11 talk with them too, 
Who loses ad who wins, who's in, who's out; 
And take upon's the mystery of things, 
As if we were God's spies 
(5.3.8-17) 
Reality for Lear loses its weight, and he imagines himself finding his joy in telling old 
tales and songs (Muir explains "old tales" as "improbable fictions of bygone times"226), which 
would be indeed far from the cruel reality of their imprisonment, but Lear feels himself 
capable of transforming that reality into his and Cordelia's own fiction. Howard Felperin 
justly explains the scene as Lear's awakening, in the spirit of contemptus mundi, where he has 
"renounced his maddening effort to explain the world, to find out its true causes, he has 
renounced the world itself." The king "welcomes his life with Cordelia in prison with a 
religious joy," and he is similar to "several converted morality protagonists before him, 
clothed in fresh garments traditionally emblematic of an inner and spiritual 
reaccomodation."227 
I would like to draw attention here to the reappearance of the image of Lear kneeling 
down before a daughter and begging for forgiveness: " When thou dost ask me blessing, I'll 
kneel down/And ask forgiveness." The image has been already discussed in 3.2.2, and aptly 
illustrates the change in Lear's personality. It appeared first as Lear's ironical role-play, then 
as an unfulfilled suggestion of the fool during the storm, and here finally becomes a blissful 
event in Lear's imagination. 
The fiction of songs and tales in the quoted speech is juxtaposed with praying, and it 
involves both dealing with the petty and meaningless events of the court "game" of winning 
and losing, as well as playing their own game of being God's spies. Do the two types of 
playing appear here together because Lear sees no big difference between playing the game of 
226 Muir, 189. 
227 Felperin, 102-3. 
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the court and that of God's spies? Perhaps. This idea would certainly comply with the Fool's 
apparently inconsistent behaviour: his notion of titles bearing no intrinsic meaning but still 
scolding Lear for giving away his. In my reading, the passage shows how we are to imagine 
"the mystery of things" according to Lear, after he has learned the Fool's lesson: the way 
reality is transubstantiated with plays and tales and songs and prayer, and the way it exudes 
the aureole of fiction. 
3.3.5 Metadrama of the Fool - summary 
There was a potential in Elizabethan theatre to understand play and theatre as having a 
levelling power, because at the end of a play king and subject, rich and poor all took off their 
attributes. But this levelling power of theatre can be extended far above social difference, a 
difference that is annihilated by the end of the play in theatre in a similar fashion as death was 
traditionally represented: at the end of the worldly pilgrimage of a human being death makes 
everyone equal. 
The levelling power of theatre can refer not just to roles, but to society as a whole. 
There are references in plays where it is not only that social statuses lack intrinsic significance 
and not that the social differences of individuals are shown to be mere roles, but essential 
meaning per se is missing from life. Life as a whole itself, since theatrical, is meaningless. In 
Macbeth's exclamation, life as a play, since fictitious, is equated with an idiot's tale, thus 
having no meaning. "Life is but a walking shadow; a poor player, That struts and frets his 
hour upon the stage, and then is heard no more: it is a tale told by and idiot, full of sound and 
fury, Signifying nothing" (5.5.16-27). Similar to Lear's negative interpretation of life as a 
stage of fools, fiction, the lack of meaning is doubled in Macbeth's quotation too: a fancy tale 
told by a non-idiot or anything told by an idiot would already meet the requirements of 
fiction. It is, as I was trying to show, no accident that Lear in his exclamation " When we are 
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born, we cry that we are come to this great stage of fools" (4.6.182) juxtaposes two elements 
that embody the opposite of order, stability and integrity and reason: comparing the stage to 
"normal reality" is the same as comparing individuals to fools. The other side of the coin is, 
of course, that life is as meaningful (and playful) as any play is, and that without internalising 
the Fool, Lear cannot find his identity. 
Comparing the Fool to Iago as per Keir Elam's above mentioned system of sub worlds, 
the subworld that Iago represents, as I was trying to suggest, is indeed one of his command, 
much more than the Fool's is of his. The Fool's subworld is not the one of his beliefs, 
knowledge, fear, or his command, but rather the one of his playing. This subworld cannot 
suffer frustration to the extent Lear's subworld of command at the opening ceremony of play 
was frustrated. But Lear will learn a lot from the Fool during the play, because in the Fool's 
subworld of playfulness there is nothing to be unfulfilled or frustrated. This is because all the 
knowledge, fear, belief, command etc. - in other words everything that can generate 
subworlds, according to Elam - are contained by the Fool as parts of his play. In other words, 
his playfulness stands for the elimination of any idea that necessarily wants to impose itself 
upon the flow of events. 
3.4 Metadrama: conclusion 
So you can go ahead and forget that things, at 
bottom, rest upon shaky ground, the world an 
illusion, your own concoction, all built on 
hypotheses, including the similarity of other people 
to yourself; forget that your life is experimental in 
nature - because even if you don't, there is nothing 
you can do about it. If you accept what everyone 
else calls reality as existing for certain, it may lead 
to catastrophe, but in the meantime it is the best you 
can do - at least with your amalgamated spectator-
actor self, which is at the mercy of the arbitrary 
incidents of the free movie. 
Géza Ottlik: Buda 
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The fundamental question here is this: what is the difference between fiction and 
pretence? At this point the difference seems to be merely "haphazard": sometimes there is a 
difference, but sometimes there is no difference between the two. This is why, although 
perhaps we may say that the Fool loves Lear and Iago hates Othello (and consequently we 
like to see the Fool a positive and Iago a negative figure morally), the difference between Iago 
and the Fool is not necessarily that big at all in regards to Iago's most heinous crime, that of 
corrupting reality and meaning, playing with empty signs, concerning the game of role-plays 
and pretence, the lack of intrinsic meaning behind mere signs. This is so for two reasons. On 
the one hand, Iago is actually corrupting no reality, he is just showing that - since it can be 
proven corruptible - it does not exist as "real" in the sense it was taken to be real, and it 
applies both within and without the drama. On the other hand, the Fool is also pointing out 
how the difference between reality and fiction is vague, and in this context the idea of 
pretence is also blurred, because the notion of "pretence" is dependent on a clear picture of its 
opposite. Once the whole world is shown as pretentious, it is impossible to define this 
opposite. 
If we compare Iago with the evil understood as the privation of reality228 we see how 
far from the roots of the medieval Christian tradition of comic evil we have come. Perhaps 
here we also witness a privation of reality, but with a reversed sign, not necessarily the 
privation of reality it was before: Iago does not represent the lack of reality in his iniquity, but 
rather shows that all reality is illusion,229 making the characters of the drama as well as the 
audience realise that what they thought to be reality can be deprived of its realness by being 
turned into illusion. The Fool is not so radical in his actions. He does not work actively 
228 According to a certain explanation of medieval laughter at the comedy of evil, "laugher is the response on the 
part of Being to the exposure of non-Being. In other words, then, laughter occurs when that which is real 
perceives the absence of reality, and when that which is good becomes aware of that absence of good which we 
call evil." Charlotte Spivack, op. cit., 26. 
229 Another way to explain the way Iago seems to "eat away" or corrupt reality is to say that it is exactly illusion 
that is his reality. It is not such an illusion that hides a deeper reality, but an illusion that hides nothing: an 
illusion that is perfectly real. Cf Kallay, 119. 
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towards destroying the assumed reality of the others, but he does show the contextual nature 
of it, and shows how different contexts can be generated. 
The real difference between Iago's and the Fool's metadramatic activities, I would 
like to suggest, is in the ways they fictionalise the assumed reality of their respective 
playworlds. The new context the Fool creates to ridicule tragic events liberates them from the 
unbearable weight of their sincerity, their tragic pain, and with the help of this attitude he 
actually teaches Lear and the audience to survive. The way Iago shows that reality can be 
arranged and directed in a similarly fictitious way as plays in theatre, achieves the opposite 
effect: he seems to "eat away" the genuineness, the authenticity of supposed reality. 
Thus, it is possible perhaps to assert that the difference of the effect of Iago's and 
the Fool's metadramatic behaviour is rooted in their different attitudes towards fiction. Both 
characters, as the descendants of the Vice of moralities, act as Masters of Ceremony, and in 
this case it does not matter how much Iago's metadramatic role as the director of the play is 
more intrinsic to the play's dramaturgy than the counterpoint the Fool provides in the process 
of Lear's suffering. And both characters feature traditional involvement techniques and 
improvisation, encouraging the audience for more active participation, as it is typical for the 
platea-oriented characters. Also, they both stress the play's theatrical quality, making this 
quality part of their game. As for identity and role-playing, they both seem to suggest that 
there is no intrinsic identity, only roles. Still, the "fiction" generated by the Fool is healing 
nonsense. In addition, this nonsense seems to be closer to the logic of the play's universe than 
the reality Lear thought himself in possession of at the beginning of the play. Thus, the Fool's 
nonsense shows that what sounds fictional may be taken as a version of reality. On the other 
hand, the theatrical separation between play and reality, theatrical persona and offstage, non-
fictional individuals is used by Iago as a threatening and immensely powerful tool. When he 
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utters sentences that are actually true but make Othello disbelive what he says, he is creating a 
context where reality cannot function as not fictional: the fictional discourse he creates is 
capable of invalidating the Venetian reality and the identity of its distinguished individuals. 
Iago's fiction, it seems, works against the reality it corrupts exactly because he can 
count on the gap between assumed identity and fictional role, because this gap is a monstrous 
secret, a taboo. The Fool, on the other hand, wants to teach Lear, and apparently manages to 
teach him, exactly the fact that the gap, the tension between role and identity, is generated by 
the false idea that the identities, social functions and positions are more than mere roles 
played in specific contexts and specific situations. Similarly, I find it the effect of the Fool's 
activities that Lear, as in the Fool's examples, is capable of integrating fiction in his own 
world and appreciating it as the "mystery of things" - although, of course, this is not the point 
where the play ends. 
Once fiction is expelled from reality, it will turn into a sneaking monster, threatening 
that reality will be eaten up by fiction. As Jonas Barish has pointed out, the deepest root of the 
anti-theatricalism of the age belonged to the conservative ethical emphasis in which order, 
stability, constancy and integrity play a crucial role. The trickster in this sense is the 
epitome of theatre, entertainment and everything that anti-theatricalists were against. This is 
why it is fortunate that Iago's trickery on a marked place in front of the audience - the stage -
does not have to be identified necessarily with the trickery he plays on Othello. At least to this 
extent the monster is not put behind curtains: Iago is certainly not a devil on the metadramatic 
level, although he knows how to play one.231 
230 Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 117. 
231 Iago and the Fool thus become "generators of fiction." and it is perhaps similar to the way Austin imagines 
"performative utterance," quoted by Baldo, 100: "That brings about a state of affairs rather than merely 
describing one." A perfect illustration of this logic could be the line of Vindice in The Revenger's Tragedy, 
where he exclaims: "Is there no thunder left, or is't kept up / In stock for heavier vengeance? [Thunder] There it 
goes!" (4.2.196-7). 
139 
As I was trying to suggest, metadrama works towards doing rather than representing. 
This kind of literary presentation can be described in Stanley Fish's terms as dialectical 
(versus rhetorical):232 he analyses different ways of presentation, and says of a dialectical 
presentation (versus rhetorical) that it is "disturbing, for it requires of its readers a searching 
and rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in and live by." Both Iago's and the Fool's 
activities are disturbing because they invite the audience to see things they are not particularly 
at ease with, or do not want to see. 
The metadramatic qualities of the discussed plays unveil some major structural 
inconsistencies in the ways by which the audience perceives itself and the world. The effect of 
metadrama identified by Hornby as alienation will have a wide scope: the audience will be 
alienated not only from the play but also from the world they are set into, as well as from 
themselves: under such an experience all the familiar ways of perception are shaken. 
Bristol asks about the problem of boys playing female roles and its effect on the 
understanding of gender and its coding. "Were the boy actors in Shakespeare's company 
engaging in a conventional form of ridicule of the feminine? Or were they engaged in a 
general parody of the artifice of gender coding itself?"233 The question is clearly applicable, 
apart from the question of gender identity and gender coding, to "the artifice of coding" in 
general. Were Iago, the Fool, Shakespeare or Robert Armin engaging in a ridicule of the 
conventional forms of understanding reality? Where they parodying the ways the world was 
perceived as real? We do not have to answer it, we do not have to identify the drive behind 
Iago's or the Fool's, or the actor's or the author's parody, because even without that we can 
232 Stanley Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 3. 
233 Bristol, 148. 
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identify its effect on the audience and the necessity that the audience will have to reflect on 
their own ways of perception234. 
Utterances that communicate doubt about some fact, according to Fish, can be 
communicated in different ways. He makes a difference "between an uncomfortable, 
unsettling experience in which the gradual dimming of a fact is attended by a failure in 
perception, and a wholly self-satisfying one in which an uncertainty is comfortably certain, 
and the reader's confidence in his own powers remains unshaken, because he is always in 
control."235 Perhaps we can use this distinction to come closer to the nature of the above 
mentioned effect of a need to reflect on the artifice of coding, generated both by Iago and the 
Fool. The first instance Fish mentions, the "meaning" of which is not any reportable "content" 
but rather an event, is characteristic of what Iago and the Fool make of their plays: they will 
feature the great Signifying Machine at work, plays in which no curtains hide - yet - the ways 
meaning is produced. And it is produced exactly in the way fiction is produced. 
234 We are facing here situations where some problematic devices force us to reflect on the ways we perceive 
reality, by facing us with obvious problems in our method, via creating situations where our "normal" ways of 
understanding prove untenable. Thomas Kuhn's example of reactions of experimentees who were asked to 
identify cards with unconventional combination of colour and shape illustrate the puzzling experience when the 
automatized ways of perception fail to work. The result is an experience of crisis that opens the possibility for a 
new framework of understanding. One of the experimentees who failed to identify the unconventional 
combination but realised that something was "wrong" exclaimed: "I can't make the suit out, whatever it is. It 
didn't even look like a card that time. I don't know what color it is now or whether it's a spade or heart. I'm not 
sure I even know what a spade looks like. My God!" Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 63-4) 
235 Fish, 389. 
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4. Laughter and Comedy 
"The Fool is a creator not of beauty but of spiritual 
freedom." 
Enid Welsford236 
"He [the vice] is in fact the spirit of comedy." 
Northrop Frye237 
4.1 Carnival and subversion in the comedy of the Vice, Iago and the Fool 
4.1.1 Elements of Vice-comedy in Iago and the Fool 
I would like to reflect now on how and to what extent some major attributes of the 
morality Vice and its comedy discussed in Chapter Two are applicable to Iago and Lear's 
Fool, as well as to see to what extent the Bakhtinian context of carnival laughter is applicable 
to the comedy of the Vice. 
As shown in my discussion of morality Vices, these characters would frequently 
corrupt the hero, perhaps in a satiric way attacking his moral weaknesses, and in this way 
generating in the audience the same "corrective," morally condemning laughter which Keith 
Thomas regards as typical laughter of the Elizabethan era. The same type of laughter would 
frequently be directed towards the Vice character himself: the audience, in a Christian 
context, having in mind the Last Judgement, would see him as weak as the weaknesses of the 
fallible hero. This is the sense in which the Vice is carrying out a role in the moral setup. 
Happé is thinking along the same lines when he points out that one of the Vice's functions is 
to "humble all men." I will suggest that this is a parallel to the levelling function not only of 
the traditional fool, but also of Lear's fool, and is applicable to Iago as well. 
236 Welsford, 326. 
237 Frye 1953,274. 
238 Keith Thomas, "The place of Laughter in Tudor and Stuart England," TLS 21 (1977): 76-83. 
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As I have already claimed, the fool and the tempter can be understood as the two 
components of the Vice. In this distinction, surprising as it may sound, Iago is still closer to 
the first one, because his temptation is not based on the allure of traditional tempter Vices, 
namely secular spirit and pleasure. These would apply instead to a Falstaff-like character. 
Typical foolery, "verbal jesting without salt of mind," is not characteristic of Iago at all; in 
fact, it is rather the opposite, since the way Iago's words always have a meaning is rather 
frightening: the lack of meaning never characterises his words in the sense that what he says 
always has a place in his overall destructive scheme. 
Although not a traditional tempter-vice, Iago is close to the Vice described by 
Somerset or Happé in his being morally condemnable. Still, as we have seen, on a 
metadramatic level he is acceptable as an entertainer. Lear's Fool, however, in this respect is 
closer to the type of Mares: there is space for his foolery and^ absurd jokes, and it may be 
considered a relief that the audience does not necessarily have to condemn him. 
4.1.2 Bakhtinian carnival laughter 
The "temporary suspension" referred to by Somerset, the "momentarily suspending 
our moral judgements" can be interpreted as the carnivalistic topsy-turvidom that is controlled 
to a certain extent: a subversion that - as a built-in and officially licenced subversion - may 
even sustain the system rather than pose a real threat to it. Mikhail Bakhtin's highly 
influential description of carnival in the literature and culture of medieval and Renaissance 
Europe can serve as a background for interpreting the comic elements in the behaviour both of 
the Vice and his successors.239 Bakhtin talks about the carnival as the most important 
manifestation of the "folk culture of humour." "Carnival laughter" and the "carnivalistic 
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spirit" refer not only to the laughter of ritualistic popular festive forms, such as mock-
reversals, feasts of fools and the like, but several other social and literary phenomena, 
including the obscenities of the "language of the marketplace," parodies, riddles, popular 
curses, and references to the grotesque image of the body that emphasize its ambivalence and 
the lower bodily stratum. In his view, laughter is ambivalent because it is both degrading and 
triumphant, it celebrates egalitarianism and it has an overall validity concerning the world as a 
whole: 
Laughter has a deep philosophical meaning, it is one of the most essential forms of the truth concerning 
the world as a whole, concerning history and man; it is a peculiar point of view relative to the world; the 
world is seen anew, no less (and perhaps more) profoundly than when seen from the serious standpoint. 
Therefore, laughter is just as admissible in great literature, posing universal problems, as seriousness. 
Certain essential aspects of the world are accessible only to laughter.240 
Since laughter thus can create a world of its own, parallel to or counter to the serious 
one, Bakhtin sees a revolutionary potential in folk humour and carnival. It is for that reason 
that he is sometimes criticised for being Marxist.241 
4.1.3 Types of laughter in Medieval drama 
Treating the Baktinian tradition of laughter in the popular festive forms as a possible 
context of the Vice's comedy is an approach that is embedded in the debate on laughter in 
medieval English drama. In Chapter Two I have discussed the issue of the characteristic sense 
of humour that is attached to the Vice if we are unwilling to disregard its clownish-foolish 
aspects. I argued for the existence of that aspect of the Vice. Here I would like to argue for the 
possibility of understanding the laughter and comedy attached to him as popular, plebeian 
counterculture in the Bakhtinian sense, as opposed to the type of laughter that Kolve calls 
239 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Cambridge MA and London: The M.I.T. Press, 1968) 
240 Bakhtin, 66. 
241 The irony in this accusation is that Bakhtin himself was sentenced to internal exile in Kazahstan for alleged 
association with underground members of the Russian Orthodox Church. See Ronald Knowles ed., Shakespeare 
and Carnival {London: Macmillan, 1998), Introduction, 2. 
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"Religious Laughter" in the title of a chapter in his book entitled The Play Called Corpus 
Christi.242 He reminds his reader of the Wycliffite critic of drama243 who made an essential 
part of his attack the fact that Christ never laughed. 
A powerful case was established and reiterated throughout the Middle Ages that laughter and frivolity, 
the temporary abstention from involvement in all that is serious in the human condition, was an offence 
against God, a negation of the example of Christ, and a peril to men's souls.244 
As for comic elements in miracle plays, he holds the view that the dramatist "guided 
the spectator in understanding the comedy as part of a coherent and reverent whole," and that 
there was serious meaning behind the laughter."245 The tradition of popular laughter that 
Bakhtin describes stands for a very different culture of laughter, elements of which can clearly 
be detected in the behaviour of the Vice or playful villains that belong to that type, such as 
Mischief in Mankind. Such a view is held by Anthony Gash, and is convincingly illustrated 
by the Corpus Christi plays as well as Mankind. Gash argues that at least some specimens of 
medieval drama are ambiguous in displaying two contradictory schemes of value: the 
religious parts of plays may be in perfect harmony with the liturgy, but there are other parts 
where the popular, carnivalistic-type of blasphemy and mockery prevails. Gash suggests that 
in Mankind such a division may appeal to the difference in perspective among the audience of 
different classes: "What is diabolic 'perversion' from one point of view is festive reversal 
from another."246 Still, not everybody agrees that this perspective was easily and always 
available to the contemporary audience. Diller, for example, argues that our ancestors may 
have had different prejudices than we do, and laughed at different things.247 His view is that 
criticism of recent years interprets most laughter in medieval English drama to be the laughter 
of the marketplace (again, in the Bakhtinian sense) too easily, and does not consider the 
242 V.A. Kolve, The Play Called Corpus Christi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966) 124-44. 
243 Clifford Davidson ed., A Treatise ofMyraclis Pleyinge (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1993). 
244 Ibid. 126. 
245 V.A. Kolve, 174. 
246 Anthony Gash, "Carnival against Lent: The Ambivalence of Medieval Drama," in David Aers ed., Medieval 
Literature. Criticism, Ideology and History (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1986), 74-98, p.96. 
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possibility of a different laughter, laughter at somebody else's misfortunes. This other type of 
laughter he calls Schadenfreude, and describes it as pious, since it involves a good Christian 
or saint laughing at the misfortunes or humiliation of evil. Diller says that "it is by no means 
self-evident that the plays represent the 'universal' laughter of the marketplace rather than the 
'anathemising' variety preferred by the medieval Church"248. I agree with Diller that surely 
the 'universal' laughter of the marketplace is not the only possible laughter in medieval plays, 
and that Shadenfreude can be an effective alternative where laughter stands for moral 
condemnation or, Diller's 'anathemising' laughter. I would like to point out, however, that 
Schadenfreude is not necessarily pious. It is possible from points of view other than religious 
doctrine, and it can work according to a logic that is not necessarily incompatible with the 
laughter of the marketplace. One example can be found in Mankind, a play that Diller also 
brings to illustrate his point. He recognizes the spirit of the Carnival in the play but objects to 
the argument that the play is dominated by "folk-laughter." He analyses the speech habits of 
characters, the strongly latinized English of Mercy, the same style of Mankind in the state of 
grace and the macaronic Latin of Mischief, and comes to the conclusion that the variety of 
styles demonstrate that "the play contains a moral not only for its eponymic hero but also for 
his pseudo-intellectual tempters," suggesting that the Latin of the tempter reveals "a satire on 
linguistic half-knowledge and theological pseudo-arguments."249 Such a satire could indeed 
generate Shadenfreude when the tempters are defeated, but I see an important counterpart of 
the same satire that makes the picture more complex: Mischeif s parody of Mercy may 
generate Shadenfreude as well, as I have analysed in 2.1, exactly because of Mercy's 
pompous and pretentious way of speaking. Mischiefs logic rhymes wonderfully with the 
obscene jokes and gutter speech of the tempters, a speech that the audience certainly found 
247 Hans-Jiirgen Diller, "Laughter in Medieval English Drama: A Critique of Modernising and Historical 
Analyses," Comparative Drama 36. 1-2 (2002): 1-19, p.5. 
248 Diller, 6. 
249 Diller, 15. 
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delight in, specifically when they were invited to join in singing the obscene song. David 
Bevington appreciates the significant strength of the passage: "The stage direction indicates 
that all sing, and the resulting chorus is one of the most remarkable passages of scatology ever 
printed."250 
Diller does acknowledge the "spirit of the Carnival" in the play, but objects to calling 
it "popular." My sense is that part of the problem is merely terminological, and the other part 
springs from the Marxist overtones in Bakhtin's interpretation of the carnival as a quasi-
revolutionary phenomenon. The idea of Carnival is that it does counteract, or momentarily 
suspend, or subvert the dominant doctrinal structures of society, but as Peter L. Berger shows 
in his work on the "comic dimenson of human experience," although there was hardly ever an 
intent of overthrowing either secular or ecclesiastical authorities with a carnival, it 
does not touch upon the accuracy of Bakhtin's description, nor on the profoundly subversive force of 
the Dionysian comic, though this subversion must be understood in a metapolitical sense [...] such 
laughter is indeed subversive, but in the sense far removed from any Marxist theory of revolutionary 
consciousness.251 
So even if we see a moral message in our example, the play Mankind, given that it 
evokes the spirit of the carnival, it has opposite messages as well. The second reason Diller 
sees the term "popular" as problematic in this context of laughter is that the author of the play 
was most probably more than a "clergyman of modest training" as Bevington suggests, while 
the laughter in the play according to Diller "would not have originated in the marketplace but 
in the student's hall."252 
The fact that the author of the play was probably fairly learned while the audience 
could have been composed of present or former university students in my view does by no 
means exclude the possibility of terming its laughter "popular." Bakhtin's term "popular" in 
"popular laughter" does not refer exclusively to the laughter of lower social classes, but stands 
250 Bevington, 16. 
251 Peter L. Berger, Redeeming Laughter (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 83 
252 Diller, 15. 
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for the type of laughter not appreciated by medieval official Christian doctrine. The hostility 
of the Church to laughter is a well known fact and is best captured in Berger's witty phrase253 
in his reference to the long line of grim theologians in medieval Christianity. Bakhtin himself 
points out the problem of folk humour embedded in texts displaying considerable learning.254 
It is in this sense that the term popular laughter in the Bakhtinian sense refers to the type of 
laughter that created a counterworld, a counterculture versus the official one: 
Medieval laughter is directed at the same object as medieval seriousness. Not only does laughter make 
no exception for the upper stratum, but indeed it is usually directed toward it. Furthermore, it is directed 
not at one part only, but at a whole. One might say that it builds its own world versus the official world, 
its own church versus the official church, its own state versus the official state. Laughter celebrates its 
masses, professes its faith, celebrates marriages and funerals, writes its epitaphs, elects kings and 
bishops, even the smallest medieval parody is always built as part of a whole comic world.zss 
To summarize the possible laughters in the comedy of the Vice, it can be said that the 
Shadenfreude, the ridicule and the satire directed towards him are by no means the only kind 
of humour that the Vice can stand for. Elements in his behaviour that evoke the Bakhtinian 
understanding of carnival spirit - ridiculing authority in a carnivalistic fashion, nonsensical 
humour, coarse gutter speech - as we have seen earlier major elements in the Vice's comic 
repertoire, must have been appealing at least partly to the audience, and identified as elements 
of licentiousness, such as misrule, the Feast of Fools, mumming, topsyturvidom, May Games, 
Land of Cocaygne etc.256 As for the effect of such behaviour, we cannot fail to notice the 
general problem of the impossibility of controlling humorous effects in a play. This problem 
has not resulted from the shattered medieval world view, since we can find examples showing 
the discrepancy between intention and comic effect in drama as early as some mysteries, such 
253 "The negative attitude toward laughter continues in the patristic and medieval periods of Christian thought. 
There is a long line of grim theologians. Repeatedly there are negative comments on laughter, which is 
understood as expressing worldliness, sinful insouciance, and lack of faith [...] one does not have to be a 
Nietzschean to look upon the history of Christian theology as a depressingly lachrymose affair." Berger, 198. 
254 "There were other parodies of Latin: parodies of debates, dialogues, chronicles, and so forth. All these forms 
demanded from their author a certain degree of learning, sometimes at a high level. All of them brought the 
echoes of carnival laughter within the walls of monasteries, universities, and schools" Bakhtin, 14. 
235 Bakhtin, 88 
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as the masons of York who in 1431 complained that the audience did not take their play 
seriously and with devotion but instead laughed at it, and subsequently the masons were given 
another play by the city authorities. Philip Sidney was already perfectly aware that no 
matter how much pedagogical value satire may have, the laughter it generates cannot be 
regulated safely, implying that eventually other contexts for interpretation than the intended 
one were possible and imaginable. Sidney enumerates different examples that generate 
laughter and/or delight, and includes the following: 
We delight in good chances; we laugh at mischances. We delight to hear happiness of our friends and 
country, at which he were worthy to be laughted at that would laugh. We shall contrarily laugh 
sometimes to find a matter quite mistaken, and go down the hill against the bias, in the mouth of some 
men as, for the respect of them, one shall be heartily sorry, yet he cannot choose but laugh, and so is 
rather pained than delighted with laughter.258 
No matter that Sidney "validates" ideologically the latter example in a way that he 
takes away delight from laughter where one should not laugh, he still admits that there are 
cases when people who should be respected are degraded because they are laughed at. He 
does not try to prevent laughter that is disrespectful of authorities, but says that there is no 
delight in it. Still, his example implies that laughter is difficult to regulate. It cannot be 
controlled because its context cannot be prescribed. And it is the same context as the one that 
allows the Vice to be understood as something else than simply immoral and condemnable, 
the sufferer of Schadenfreude. Nobody can take away by force the delight that an audience 
feels at watching and laughing at their favourite tricksters on stage, even if these players are 
Vices. Bristol accounts for Sidney's position in the following way: 
What Sidney recognizes in the Apologie, and what is overlooked or neglected by more conventional 
theorists and apologists for the corrective or pedagogical value of satire, is that laughter cannot easily be 
regulated. It is linked not only to clearly recognizable aberration or deformity, but also to structural 
256 Cf. Weimann op.cit., 20-30 
257 The event is referred to by Diller, op. cit., 4. as well as by V.A. Kolve, op. cit., 130, where Kolve says the 
following about the play in question: "We know it was a source of great embarrassment to them, for they 
complained to civic authority in 1431 that it caused more laughter and clamour than devotion. They were given 
Herod to perform instead. The guild itself sought the change - the lay people too wanted a dignified and useful 
entertainment." 
258 Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry. In Pollarded. 146-165,p. 161. 
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ambiguity in the social system and to discord experienced as a result of that ambiguity. Furthermore, 
laughter is [...] in some texts at least [...] a full and genuine alternative to all serious world views.259 
This is another reason that laughter at the Vice's comedy can be directed not only 
towards a supposed aberration or deformity, but also against ambiguity within the system, and 
even the comic celebration of that ambiguity. 
To sum up, I would like to point out two things here. One is the fact of different 
explanations within the discourse on laughter in medieval English drama, and the other is the 
Vice's potentially subversive, carnivalistic comedy. I agree with scholars who see the source 
of this potential comedy in the popular roots of the figure. What is true for the 
institutionalised form of carnival as social festivity is true on a small scale of the carnivalistic 
figures on stage and their carnivalistic behaviour, including the Vice and his trickery: we may 
argue that the comic Vice as character was institutionalised and contained the way Carnival 
was the time of institutionalised disorder. However, this is just half of the truth. Burke's 
explanation of the complex meaning of Carnival can be illuminating in regards to the Vice as 
well. He states that it "is clear that the carnival was polysemous, meaning different things to 
different people," and in it "Christian meanings were superimposed on pagan ones without 
obliterating them, and the result has to be read as a palimpsest."260 Parallel to this, the 
interpretation of the Vice as unambiguously evil and devil-like should be understood as 
simplifying. I am in no way trying to rule out the possibility of Vices who are safely 
contained and actually reinforce an official doctrine, either by acting as a safety valve or as a 
didactic means of reminding the audience to avoid sinful behaviour. But I am insisting on 
their strong subversive potential, similar - again, on a small scale - to the one that Burke 
gives to the carnival. In spite of acknowledging the great value of 'safety valve' and 'social 
259 Michael B. Bristol, Carnival and Theater. Plebeian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance 
England (New York and London: Methuen, 1985), 129. 
260 Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (London: Temple Smith, 1978), 191. 
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control' theory, Burke describes specific occasions when Carnival revels lead to actual minor 
revolutions. In his words, "Protest was expressed in ritualised forms, but the ritual was not 
always sufficient to contain the protest. The wine barrel sometimes blew its top."261 We may 
be uncertain about when the Vice blew the top of the barrel, but the Shakespearean Vice-
successors I focus on undoubtedly did. 
4.1.4 Bakhtinian carnival and laughter in Shakespeare 
By the time Bakhtin's book on Rabelais had a considerable influence on Shakespeare 
studies, the appreciation of Shakespearean comedy had been influenced by works of C.L. 
Barber and Northrop Frye on the relationship between comedy and folk customs of 
Saturnalia, the reversal of everyday standards, the outburst of vitality and the return to the 
"green world."262 These works, however, concentrate on the comic in comedies and the 
perspective they take is, in Knowles's words "a fundamentally conservative approach" 
compared to Bakhtin's radical analysis which "brings out the deeply ideological significance 
of such phenomena in a way that has been claimed by Marxist, anarchist and humanist."263 
Two books that deal with comic elements in Shakespearean tragedy and Jacobean tragedy 
respectively were published in 1979 by Susan Snyder and Nicholas Brooke.264 Susan Snyder 
thinks that Shakespeare used the dramatic convention of comedy "as a point of reference and 
departure in developing tragic forms," and she treats comic and tragic elements in 
Shakespeare as parts of a single compound that contributes to the strong paradoxical feelings 
261 Burke op.cit., 203. Berger discusses the subversive potential of the carnival in similar terms: "The carnival 
may be seen as the final stage in the progression of the comic from brief interruption of social order to the full-
blown construction of a counterworld. These comic intrusions are temporary, but they are always there as 
haunting possibilities, simultaneously liberating individuals and making the guardians of order very nervous" 84. 
262 C.L. Barber, Shakespeare's Festive Comedy (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press: 1959). and "The 
Mythos fo Spring: Comedy" from Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957). 
263 Knowles, 7. 
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concerning tragedy which is "ultimately responding to the universal fact of mortality."265 
Nicholas Brooke's book is not primarily on Shakespearean plays, but he too comes up with a 
vision in which comic elements in tragedies are not merely normative but express "laughter 
that celebrates anarchy or generates chaos, and in either sense is hostile to any normative 
process." Such an understanding of laughter is in many respects similar to interpreting 
comic elements in Shakespearean plays with the Bakhtinian concept of carnival. Bakhtin 
himself makes many references to Shakespeare in his book on Rabelais, the most substantial 
of which is the following: 
The analysis we have applied to Rabelais would also help us to discover the essential carnival element 
in the organization of Shakespearean drama. This does not merely concern the secondary, clownish 
motives of his plays. The logic of crownings and uncrownings, in direct or indirect form, organizes the 
serious elements also. And first of all this 'belief in the possibility of a complete exit from the present 
order of this life' determines Shakespeare's fearless, sober (yet not cynical) realism and absence of 
dogmatism. This pathos of radical changes and renewals is the essence of Shakespeare's world 
consciousness. It made him see the great epoch-making changes taking place around him and yet 
recognize their limitations. 
Shakespeare's drama has many outward carnivalesque aspects: images of the material bodily lower 
stratum, of ambivalent obscenities, and of popular banquet scenes.267 
The first systematic collection dealing with the specific topic of the Bakhtinian 
carnivalistic elements in Shakespeare, entitled Shakespeare and Carnival: After Bakhtin came 
out as late as 1998,268 but an essay written a decade earlier by Manfred Pfister provides a 
genuine in-depth discussion of the possibilities of the Bakhtinian view of the comic in 
Shakespeare.269 Pfister poses the same question I have dealt with above concerning the type 
of laughter possible in medieval dramatic contexts: is the comic and laughter in Shakespeare 
rather the condemnatory, Shadenfreude-type, or is it perhaps the triumph of the carnivalistic, 
264 Susan Snyder, The Comic Matrix in Shakespeare's Tragedies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1979), and Nicolas Brooke, Horrid Laughter in Jacobean Tragedy (New York: Harper and Roy, 1979). 
265 Snyder, 9. 
266 Brooke, 2. Brooke's view is that in Shakespeare's tragedies powerful comic elements are accepted on the 
condition that the end is "purely solemn" and the conclusion is or seems to be "unalloyed emotional 
satisfaction." Therefore in his view what he calls "horrid laughter," where the grandeur and grotesquery are 
simultaneous, primarily apply to Jacobean dramas such as The Revenger's Tragedy, The White Devil or The 
Duchess of Malfi. 
267 Bakhtin 275. 
268 Knowles op cit. 
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or in Pfister's terms, "Is it the comic of ridiculed deviations from established norms, or is it 
the Bakhtinian comic, celebrating transgression and the levelling and inversion wrought on 
established hierarchies?"270 The sensitivity with which Pfister manages to treat the complex 
subject in a finely nuanced way is indeed intriguing. By giving examples of comic characters 
who rebel against authority, he is able to show how in some cases a double comic perspective 
emerges, like the Jack Cade's revolt in the fourth act of 2 Henry VI and the trio of Trinculo, 
Stephano and Caliban in Act 2 Scene 2 of The Tempest: they are simultaneously origins and 
objects of laughter. This is how Pfister sees that although the rebellious characters are 
ridiculed, the laughter they generate is not contained. What he writes about the first example, 
the Jack Cade revolt, fits particularly well in my argument, because in the end it is the Vice-
like characters who embody the ultimate ambiguity: 
The containment of the carnivalesque impulses within a framework of political orthodoxy is, however, 
not absolute. In vivid imagery of levelling down feudal hierarchies and of down-grading ideological 
abstractions to their material basis it survives the built-in strategies of containment. This applies 
particularly to Jack Cade's followers, who turn their corrosive wit against both the official power and 
Cade's upstart regal pretensions. Armed like the Vice of the morality plays with sword of lath, they 
share the Vice's ambivalent wit.271 
The cases of Iago and the Fool are interesting because they seem to reflect on the idea 
and possibility of subversion; in other words, they seem explicitly to reflect on this problem. 
The consequence of the shifting epistemological background is a context in which the 
successors of the traditional Vice characters get a role that is even more specific than 
originally. Earlier Vices may have been comic in a carnivalesque way, and as I suggested, 
may have been such that they did not fit in the moral message of a play, the message itself -
as in Mankind -perhaps carrying two contradictory systems of value. Still, although they 
embodied a different, carnivalistic logic, they may have counteracted but not discredited the 
269 Manfred Pfister, "Comic Subversion: a Bakhtinian View of Comic in Shakespeare," in Werner Habicht ed. 
Deutsche Shakespeare Gesellschaft West Jahrbuch (Bochum: Verlag Ferdinand Kamp, 1987), 27-43. 
270 Pfister, 35. 
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moral message for good. Otherwise, no authority would have tolerated them from the moment 
they appeared on stage. Later however, when the logic of the Medieval/Renaissance episteme 
is shaken, the subversive behaviour of the Vice-successor characters is no longer a temporary, 
isolated phenomenon within an otherwise stable setup, and it is also much more intermingled 
dramatically with the "serious" voices. The role of Vice-successors such as the Fool or Iago 
will be not simply to subvert (and this subversion later may or may not be contained within a 
play), but rather to make the already subverted context of the epistemological crisis (their own 
element) explicit, reflect on it, so to say "deal with it," or react to it. This is where the unique 
possibility of the post-Vices lies compared to their ancestors: there is no unquestionable 
authority anymore; in other words, subversive potential unfolds in the instability or crisis of 
the system. In this new context they may indeed have posed a much more explicit threat to the 
official system of values than earlier, and this is supported by the later development, when 
such trickster-like characters are expelled from plays and stages. 
I have discussed above how the problems in the Vice's interpretation are embedded in 
his comedy: as Keith Thomas pointed out, the effect of humour is hard to control, and this is 
what makes it dangerous. From the viewpoint of an authority - be it the one who is the actual 
author of a given morality or the one that permitted its performance - the problems with 
humour and comedy, as stated above, are that their effect can easily deviate from the path that 
it was designed to take. As for Lear's Fool and Iago, the effect of comedy is much more out of 
control, as it will appear from the following discussion. It is so complex and its interpretation 
so ambiguous, that this mere phenomenon could make us re-evaluate the safety-level of 
containment of similar humour in earlier plays. 
271 Pfister 36. 
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4.2 The comedy of the Fool 
Kent. But who is with him? 
Gentleman. None but the fool, who labours to out-
jest 
His heart-strook injuries. 
(3.1.15-7) 
4.2.1 Levelling 
According to Keith Thomas, a main source of humour in Tudor and Stuart England 
979 
was against the deviant and the eccentric. Actually, the fool's mocking of Lear can be 
interpreted from this perspective, because he is satirically commenting on Lear's deeds of 
giving away his land and crown, making his daughters his mothers, putting down his breeches 
etc.; in other words, he is ridiculing Lear's deviation from the royal and patriarchal norm. 
Lear from this perspective appears not only as a deviant king but also as a deviant father and 
simply an eccentric, foolish person. The vocabulary the Fool uses in his metaphors is perfect 
for levelling the king. As Susan Snyder points out, it is characterised by homely images, 
homely situations, and the commonplace wisdom of proverbs: "As mirrored in this reductive 
foolery, Lear is not primarily a king, but any father without 'bags,' any old man who was fool 
enough to give away his land. His experience is not peculiar to royalty or uniquely his, but is 
common to other men and even snails and hedge-sparrows."273 
But to regard this kind of mocking as one directed against the deviant, we must 
suppose that there is an "ideal" in the Fool's mind that he is implying with his mockery, 
compared to which Lear is deviant. In other words, we must answer the question whether the 
obvious fault in Lear's resignation from his throne and his idea to "retain/ the name and all 
the'addition to a king" (1.1.135-6) should be mended by restoration. Although the Fool never 
272 Thomas, 77. 
273 Snyder, 161. 
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fails to point out Lear's foolishness whenever he has a chance to do so, he is not giving 
suggestions to Lear about what he should do. He sticks to comments. (However, we have 
good reason to believe that it is partly these comments that drive Lear to madness - or 
enlightenment.) In other words, he offers no "solution." The Fool does not suggest any 
"proper way" of behaviour as opposed to the ridiculed, wrong one; in fact, he seems to have 
no attachment to an idea of "proper" conduct. 
The relationship of the Fool and Lear is a highly complex one not only in their 
personal relationship but in their functions in the dramatic structure as well. Traditionally, the 
fool should be a figure to turn everything upside down, and Lear should be the actual 
authority, carrying out his role and manifesting his authoritative position. This is not the case 
in this drama, however, because the king is the one who causes the topsy-turvidom himself. 
This carnivalistic topsy-turvidom and Lear as a deviant king are explicitly comic elements 
with the potential to generate laughter.274 But in this drama we cannot easily respond to the 
carnival-king-Lear's foolishness with laughter, because, as Susan Snyder defines our response 
to Lear as comic senex iratus "we are painfully inside his confusion and impotence, not 
outside looking on."275 Or perhaps we could say that it is not our being inside Lear's 
confusion, but we are too much outside, doubly outside from normal order. This is the root of 
the deep distress: a carnival king or a fool alone could be comic in themselves, and there is an 
identifiable tradition for that, but the two combined seem to be out of control. So the fool's 
role is not simply, as usual, to create a "counterculture" of topsy-turvydom within or against 
the existing order, because the carnival king has demolished the order already. There is no 
existing order any more, and the fool is not, as a traditional trickster, creating a sense of 
liberation by undermining and questioning the existing order. The order is given up here by 
274 An essay by Natália Pikli discusses exactly the possibilities of seeing Lear as a carnival king: Natália Pikli, 
"Lear, a karneválkirály," in István Géher and Attila Atilla Kiss eds., Az értelmezés rejtett terei (Budapest: Kijárat 
Kiadó, 2003), 111-28. 
275 Snyder, 144. 
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authority itself, but since the carnival king acts his part badly, not identifying with his role, 
the audience within and without the drama does not find it comic, so the fool's role is to 
remind us, as if we have forgotten to appreciate foolery, of the comic perspective inherent in 
the lack of order. His numerous references to Lear being a fool may point to the same: Lear 
does behave like a fool, or as a carnival king. Unfortunately, the king lacks the transforming 
power inherent in the magic of the comic perspective owned by his fool. This is why "that 
lord that counselled" Lear to give away his land, i.e., Lear himself, is a bitter fool, as opposed 
to the real, the sweet one (1.4.134-44). 
The Fool's levelling mockery degrades Lear in several respects. With the homely 
metaphors his royalty wears away. He is made a ridiculous father, behaving like a naughty 
child, who foolishly offers the rod himself to his daughters. Lear is multiply deviant: as a 
king, as a human being, even as a child. He is bitter even as a fool. And he does not make a 
good carnival king, either. 
What the Fool does with his satiric levelling is similar in its effect to the function of 
the morality Vice's "humbling all men." Lear, a king who had no consideration or genuine 
sympathy towards other humans because of his royal pride, will suddenly remember his 
subjects when he is going through the strain of miserable events: 
Poor naked wretches whereso 'er you are, 
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm, 
How shall your housless heads and unfed sides, 
Your loop 'd and window 'd raggedness, defend you 
From the seasons such as these? 011 have Ta 'en 
Too little care of this. Take physic, Pomp; 
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel, 
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them, 
And show the Heavens more just. 
(3.4.28-36) 
Lear is humbled finally not by the fool but by the storm. But while there is the 
potential for comedy in this gesture, and the storm's cruelty is just a more explicit 
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manifestation of the Fool's cruelly comic remarks; the scene does not lend itself to comic 
interpretation. The erring human being humbled may have been comic in a morality, but not 
here. 
4.2.2 A pretty reason: the sense-nonsense game 
Compared to the ways he humbles Lear, the Fool's sense of humour is less complex 
and more direct, more easily recognised and appreciated by an audience when he is playing 
with language, adding and taking away meaning from it as he pleases. He seems to employ 
pure verbal nonsense, sometimes mixing sense with nonsense, presenting absurdities and 
logical paradoxes. But since in some cases these absurdities convey the gist, the underlying 
meaning of events, we can never be sure which technique we should apply when approaching 
his words. In other words, the Fool seems to display the whole existing spectrum of degrees 
of meaning, from the absolute lack of it to the depths below the everyday surface. 
His words seem to carry no meaning whatsoever when he bursts into singing the first 
line of a song (or starts to sing a song but stops?) after identifying himself with an ass, Lear 
with a horse and Goneril with a cart that draws the horse: "May not an ass know when a cart 
draws the horse? / Whoop, Jug! I love thee" (1.4.221-2). Another (ostensible or real?) 
gibberish is the Fool's sentence after a satirising song on the cod-piece that will house too 
early and the man who mixes his heart with his toe, referring to Gloucester and Lear. The fool 
comes up with the nonsensical line as if it would follow from the song, maximising the effect 
of the non sequitur: "For there was never yet a fair woman but she made/mouths in a glass" 
(3.2.35-6). The curious thing is that, although it seems nonsense, because of the fool's 
unreliability, we can never be sure of it. Even the comment on this line by Kenneth Muir 
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maintains the idea of nonsense as only a probability: "Probably an irrelevant piece of 
nonsense, such as was often used to distract attention from too keen a piece of satire."276 
This comment suggests that it may be pure nonsense, but not certainly so. Even if it is 
nonsense, it may have the function of distracting attention from - and thus maintaining - a 
deeper sense. Even if Muir is right, I find it remarkable regarding our interpreting practices 
how unwilling we are to accept the lack of sense for its own sake, for the joy and the humour 
of it. How reluctant we are to interpret these lines of the Fool as a playful joke on logic, 
downright nonsense, the nonsense internalised by the mad Lear that is echoed, for example, in 
his "Peace, peace! this piece of toasted cheese / will do't" (4.6.89-90). Still, the fact that we 
encounter ambiguous lines that seem to carry some enigmatic meaning, such as "Winter's not 
gone yet, if the wild-geese fly that way" (2.4.45), which is similar to (the mad?) Hamlet's 
"When the wind is southerly, I know a hawk from a handsaw" (2.2.374-5), makes the game of 
sense-nonsense intriguingly inexplorable. 
The paradoxical self-references the Fool employs, however, undeniably present a 
straightforward assault on logic, featuring the ambiguity that we are familiar with from 
Erasmus' Encomion, as Enid Welford pointed out: as if human life was a vast sottie.277 The 
fool may say anything, be it verity, lie or gibberish, because the true "meaning," the truth 
value of the utterance, will be impossible to determine, just as in the case of the model 
paradox, Epimenides' Cretan, who claims that all Cretans are liars. The following two 
examples are such paradoxical self-references[of the Fool: 
[T]hou hads little wit in thy bald crown 
when thou gav 'st thy golden one away. If I speak 
like myself in this let him be whipp'd that first finds it so. 
(1.4.158-62) 
The expression "If I speak like myself," i.e., "if I speak like a fool," is the culprit: it 
does not let us decide on the meaning. The Fool is protesting against his being identified as 
276 Muir, 102. 
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someone who utters foolish nonsense and threatens to use physical aggression to endow his 
words with authority. But is it possible that someone does not speak like himself? In other 
words, is it possible for a fool not to speak foolishly, even if it is meaning in madness, or even 
if there is method in it? The bad news both for those sticking to precise meaning and those 
who are ready to exempt words from meaning, is that it seems quite impossible to interpret 
the lines so that we avoid whipping. 
The riddles of the Fool are again unreliable as to whether they contain any sense or 
not. As riddles, they invite the audience to solve them, and as a genre they make the audience 
believe that there is a solution to them. The solution frequently displays unexpected logic and 
is thus usually comic - another device targeting automatised ways of understanding. The 
riddles of Lear's Fool at the end of Act 1 sometimes indeed involve intellectual solutions, like 
in the case of "Why one's nose stands i' th' middle on's face" (1.5.20)278 or why a snail has a 
house (1.5.27),279 but the humour in the example quoted below (which is followed by the 
latter one of the above examples and is thematically connected to it) is really that there is no 
answer to it. Our expectation of the effective solution is simply frustrated, the convention 
disregarded, and meaning spectacularly left out: 
Fool. Canst thou tell how an oyster makes his shell? 
Lear. No. 
Fool. Nor can I neither. 
(1.5.25-7) 
The Fool, after criticising Lear for his bad performance as a fool, acknowledges Lear's 
skills when he demonstrates that he too has a knack for these foolish riddles. The lines in the 
following example are perhaps preparing our acceptance of the Fool's disappearance and his 
internalisation by Lear, as well as Lear's defiance of reason in the acts that follow: 
277 Welsford, 255-6,267. 
278 "To keep one's eyes of either side's nose, that /what a men cannot smell out, he may spy into" (1.5.21-3). 
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Fool.[...] The reason why the 
seven stars are no mo than seven is a pretty reason. 
Lear. Because they are not eight? 
Fool. Yes, indeed: thou would'st make a good Fool. 
(1.5.33-6) 
The verbal nonsense of the Fool fits well into the tradition of the nonsensical language 
which I touched upon concerning the Vice in Chapter Two, with examples of Mischief 
mocking Mercy in Mankind, or Haphasard mocking Appius in Appius and Virgina. This 
tradition is discussed by Berger in connection with the absurd: Berger refers to Esslin and his 
study on the topic. 
There is one important feature that recurs in the long history of the absurd: an assault on language. The 
experience of the absurd beats against the limits of taken-for-granted language, which is simply not 
made for expressing it. In this, once again, die absurd as a manifestation of the comic resembles both 
religion and magic. (...) Thus Esslin includes in the tradition of the absurd such phenomena as the 
distorted latin of the golliards, the peculiar language of Rabelais and Villon [... ]280 
We can read the Fool's playing with sense and nonsense - and the play's playing, as I 
will discuss in Chapter Five - as absurd and a manifestation of an important aspect of the 
comic. We have seen that according to Berger "the experience of the absurd beats against the 
limits of taken-for-granted language." Here we face instead an assault on language through its 
deprivation of meaning. The effect is that we learn to take neither language nor meaning for 
granted, just as we have learned from Iago that the social reality taken for granted can be mere 
illusion and play. 
4.2.3 Generating extra perspectives: the Fool's way of recontextualization 
In King Lear we see the centre of society, the anointed king, resign, performing a 
carnivalesque act: Lear is not waiting to be levelled by mockery; he dethrones himself instead. 
279 «[j]0pUt -s heaej ^ n0( (q give n away to his / daughters, and leave his horns without a case" (1.5.29-30). 
280 Berger, 176-7. 
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It is only the evil characters who do not see this abortively comic act as tragic - and the Fool 
who, with his grotesquely humorous comments on Lear in the tragic moments of the torment 
of his soul also offers the audience an example of how it is possible to refrain from 
submerging in the heart-breaking pain and sorrow and instead to identify the inherent comic 
potential in it. The Fool does this by providing a comic perspective, actually as a late 
successor to the example quoted in Chapter Two, the character called Merry Report from 
Hey wood's drama, who claims that he will report even the sad news merrily, or the Vice from 
Horestes, who did not want to identify with the negative context he was supposed to suffer at 
the end of the play. There are a number of examples in which the Fool, in providing a new 
context or a new perspective of an event, is stripping it from its tragic meaning. The best 
example is his overtly comic response to Lear when in Act 2, Scene 1 the king sees Kent in 
the stocks and cries in indignation: "O me! my heart, my rising heart! but, down!" (2.4.118). 
The Fool responds: "Cry to it, Nuncle, as the cockney did to the eels/when she put 'em 
i 'th 'paste alive; she knapp'd 'em o 'th' coxcombs with a stick, and cried 'Down, wantons, 
down "' (2.4. 119-23). Snyder analyses the scene in a wonderfully vivid way, making the best 
of the comic potential: 
The figure before our eyes is an old man on the verge of a heart attack. On this the Fool superimposes a 
ludicrous kitchen scene with a foolish woman struggling to slap down wriggling eels in a pastry. The 
degrading image, slipped in all at once between us and Lear's royal pathos, creates a distance in which 
there is room for perspectives other than sympathetic identification. The king is as stupid as that 
cockney. His suffering is no more consequential than a spoilt pie. He may give orders all he wants, but 
he is as little in control as an inept kitchen wench with a bunch of live eels.281 
Snyder ends the paragraph by saying that we feel strain and disequilibrium once this comes 
through, and our laughter is uneasy and without release. Although I agree with her, I would 
like to point out that the stress should be laid not so much on the impossibility of the 
audience's identification with the Fool's utterly comic perspective, but the fact that he does 
281 Snyder, 160. 
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embody and realise that perspective and is directing us towards it. The fool with his remarks 
is constantly preventing the audience from submerging into the "tragic" feeling. He does not 
let us sit back and identify with the horrific happenings but always forces us to 
recontextualize the tragic events in a way that they lose their otherwise truly heart-breaking 
sorrow. At the same time this last example embodies an immensely powerful paradox: while 
joking at Lear's tragedy, recontextualising him in a comic kitchen scene so as to reveal the 
comic potentials in the sorrowful events, the rhetorical figure the Fool uses as a means for his 
comedy contradicts to what he is doing. To make it more clear: the Fool, by teaching the 
audience to alienate themselves from the tragedy makes the king a butt of laughter when the 
king struggles to alienate himself from his misery and attenuate his sorrow, i.e., when the king 
wishes to keep down his "rising heart." It is as if the Fool was implying that such an attempt -
to which he gives the example to the audience - is perfectly in vain. 
Reading Lear as carnival king, the Fool is actually not doing anything else but 
showing the real function of the king within the world of misrule. The effect, however, is not 
pure comedy but confusion - a confusion that may, in fact, aggravate the effect of the already 
tragic events. As we have seen in the above quotation, the Fool's recontextualisation works 
towards alienation (Snyder calls it "distance"), because it generates a new layer as a different 
context for understanding an event. It works similarly to the way different levels in a play 
within a play hinder us from perceiving any single layer as genuinely real. A new meaning is 
superimposed on an earlier one either in chronological succession, as in the above kitchen 
scene, or in the example of Iago screening his story simultaneously with the ongoing reality of 
the play. The effect in all cases is puzzling. Identifying completely with the Fool and attaining 
his perspective would make us mad, but it is exactly madness that we are pushed towards, 
since re-examining our taken-for-granted reality makes it almost inevitable. 
163 
Lear has certainly managed to identify with the Fool's method of creating extra 
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perspectives, of comic recontextualising. Indeed, he has gone mad too. He trivialises 
Glocester's situation, which is genuinely tragic, but Lear jokes about it, employing precisely 
the sense of humour of the Fool when making a parallel between a light purse and a blind 
man: 
O, ho! are you there with me? No eyes in your 
head, nor no money in your purse? Your eyes are in 
a heavy case, your purse in a light: yet you see how 
this world goes. 
(4.6.143-6) 
Earlier in the play when the Fool offered his coxcomb to Kent and then to Lear 
(1.4.93-107), he was urging them to identify with foolery. At that point Lear was explicitly 
unwilling to identify with the Fool's role, and in answer offered a whip for the suggestion. 
Still, the Fool stands for a hidden layer of Lear's identity, one that he - just like all humans -
was born with, which Lear does not seem able to liberate within him, but he gains it by the 
time the Fool disappears from the play near the end of Act 3. This interpretation clearly 
accounts for the Fool's disappearance: when he is not needed any more, when he, as a 
potential, is activated in Lear's personality, he can leave the stage. 
The Fool succeeded in teaching Lear by presenting his examples of how it is possible 
to see tragedy as latently ridiculous. And he is teaching us, too, how to laugh at Lear, to laugh 
at ourselves taking seriously Lear's tragedy, to laugh at contextual meaning in a dissolving 
context and to laugh at the possibility of a radical shift in perspective, a startling change in 
meaning, or to laugh because we have to acknowledge that there is nothing (or nothing is 
282 The example Snyder gives for Lear taking over the fool's ways is at the trial of Goneril and Reagan. The 
King's accusation only starts in a formal way: "I here take my oath before this honourable assembly she kick'd 
the poor King her father" (3.6.47). Snyder points out that here "[w]e are back in the world of domestic bickering 
[...ijt is like the Fool's sudden contractions of scope, and all the more absurd here because we have recently 
learned from Gloucester that Goneril and Regan have in fact gone far beyond small domestic cruelties and are 
actively seeking their father's death" (165-6). 
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precisely what there is) instead of essential meaning. In other words, the Fool's behaviour 
shows that it is on us to adorn the tragic events with a comic halo. 
4.2.4 The Fool's final score 
It is as if at the beginning of the drama the natural element of the Fool, i.e., the 
potential carnival, had been first corrupted by Lear's failure to recognise himself as carnival 
king but then restored by the Fool. The exclusion of the counter-culture of folly that works 
against the existing order in society perhaps reflects the uncertainty of power and authority in 
its own validity. If the validity is indeed intrinsic and unquestionable, there is no reason to 
fear its mocking. The disappearance of the medieval type of Folly was a topical issue in the 
age. Fools were an endangered species at the rise of the early modem period. 
Lear's Fool cannot create a counter-culture against the authoritative one, because there 
is no real, coherent authoritative system. Lear should have been the authority, but he gives his 
authority up willingly and thus eradicates the power position within his playworld. Instead of 
creating a comic counter-culture - as would be usual for a fool - in a situation like this he can 
create a "counterculture" of the "normal" reaction to the tragic disintegration. And not 
perceiving the tragic event as tragedy in this situation of the collapse of order is a perfectly 
irrational and absurd answer. But this is not so much true for the restoration of the comic 
potential in the failed carnivalesque collapse of order. The Fool here is an anachronistic 
figure, soon to be expelled both from society and from the subsequent stagings of the drama, a 
character who is given here a last chance for explicit action. 
The paradoxical utterances of the fool in their effect are similar to the effect of 
metadrama's estrangement, but it is not precisely drama that they alienate us from, rather 
conventional meaning, or meaning altogether. In other words, on the one hand, the theatre 
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audience would tend to perceive a difference between play and reality, and would insist on 
meaning in both cases, concerning both theatre and the reality that is outside theatre. On the 
other hand, the metadramatic activities of the Fool and Iago showed us that they do not see a 
difference between playworld and real world, and what is more, here we see the Fool try to 
alienate us from our conventional expectations concerning meaning. 
Rosalie Colie has a complete chapter on the paradoxes in King Lear in which she deals 
with the peculiar idea of meaning in paradoxes. She shows that the play operates with stock 
paradoxes of the age, and concludes: "The essence of paradox is its doubleness, with its 
concomitant detachment and postponement of commitment. [...] Though they must call forth 
'wonder' from their audience, paradoxes do not require - indeed, normally they repel -
identification on the part of their audience." Thus, the alienation effect of paradoxes is 
parallel to that of metadramatic devices. Actually, metadrama can be taken as a paradox in 
itself in the way all self-references are paradoxical. Colie notes that self-reference, a 
paradoxical form itself, forces considerations of relativity."284 On the effect of Hamlet's play-
within-the play she points out that "[t]he Chinese box effect serves to remind us of the illusion 
involved in all imitation, of the tautology of identity involved in perfect matching. Paradoxes 
exploit the same critical relativism..." 
In the Fool's riddles and jokes and paradoxes, the "postponement of commitment" or 
the deferrance of meaning Colie discusses, thus results in a meaning that is more an event than 
a content, just as discussed above in 3.4 concerning the effect of metadramatic devices, since 
the event in question is exactly the event in which the content is being postponed or deferred. 
The Fool presents a mode of behaviour as (and even instead of) "meaning," and as we have 
seen, some crucial elements of this mode of behaviour are gradually taken over by the king 
283 Rosalie Littell Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966). 
284 Colie, 362. 
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and are perhaps appreciated by the audience as well. If they are appreciated, then we may 
realise that the lack or unreliability of reason in the comic games of the fool is parallel to the 
lack or unreliability of reason in the whole play. Several critics have already commented on 
this from different perspectives. G. W. Knight, for example, although he sees a healing 
potential in the Fool's laughter, characterises it as a "cruel, ugly sense of humour,"286 and 
finds that this sinister laughter is at the heart of the play. Empson compared Cordelia's death 
to "a last trip-up as the clown leaves the stage."287 
Susan Snyder detects elements of two different comedies in King Lear: the play's 
grotesque comedy and the comedy of redemptive learning. The Fool, she suggests, mostly 
belongs to the former but has a role in the latter, too. How redemptive can the Fool's 
method of mockery be in the Lear-universe, which seems to defy redemption? G. W. Knight 
reminds us of the grim humour of the play and warns against sentimentalising the cosmic 
mockery of it. He finds King Lear "supreme in that, in its main theme, it faces the very 
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absence of tragic purpose." 
Keeping all this in mind, my suggestion for the understanding of redemption in which 
the Fool takes part is the following: the Fool with his characteristic cruel or grotesque or 
absurd jokes is presenting the lack or ambiguity of meaning. He is unveiling and joking with 
the way meaning can be produced; he endows events with, and at the same time, strips them 
of significance. In other words, he is aware of the events, he reflects on them and could be 
desperate as well, but paradoxically with his behaviour he is keeping up a careless, playful 
attitude. He points towards redemption to the extent we are willing to understand redemption 
285 Colie, 363. 
286 G.W. Knight, The Wheel of Fire (London: Methuen, 1949), 165 
287 William Empson, The Structure of Complex Words (The University of Michigan Press, 1951), 150. 
288"[T]he protagonists are forced out from society into educative confrontations in a natural setting and then 
return to society again; and this process is accompanied by the traditional disorder of comedy - social hierarchies 
turned upside down, logic and even sanity violated." Snyder, 148-9. 
289 Knight, 175. 
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as a confirmation of the playful attitude (from the point of view of reason, a mad attitude) that 
the Fool maintains in his behaviour. 
Snyder quotes Thomson's formulation of the grotesque according to which 'it is not 
just that life is 'now a vale of tears, now a circus' but rather that the grotesque implies that 
'the vale of tears and the circus are one.'" He continues "[i]t places the tragic structure and 
suffering in uneasy proximity with the laughable, the irrelevant, the reductive."290 1 would like 
to suggest that redemption would be attained if this proximity were replaced with 
identification and the uneasiness wore away. 
4.3 The comedy of Iago 
4.3.1 Iago's sense of humour dislodged 
The way Iago communicates - actually the way he is lying - is fascinating. He is 
brilliant in manipulating ordinary words so that their ordinary meaning will be transformed 
into something else. It is as if, with skilful technique, he is making words "behave" in an 
unusual way, which gives a subtly poetic quality to his texts. He has power over them; he can 
transform their meaning the way he wants. An enormous power resides in the tension between 
face value of sentences and another meaning that the audience perceives. An example is 
Iago's frequent ironic hypocrisy on his iniquity by presenting himself as lacking it altogether: 
"Ilack iniquity / Sometimes to do me service" (1.2.3-4). Another similar example: "Iprotest 
in the sincerity of honest kindness" (2.3.323). In this case the irony is doubled, because on the 
one hand we know he is wicked and he still protests in the name of "honest kindness," and on 
the other hand, as I have shown in the section on his metadrama, his advice to Cassio is 
perfectly reasonable and potentially feasible - were it not Iago to put it in practice. 
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There are a number of examples of his cynical misuse or puzzling use of vocabulary. 
Honigmann quotes the following lines: 
For I mine own knowledge should profane 
If I would time expend with such snipe 
But for my sport and profit. 
(1.3.383-5) 
and he notes that Iago, when referring to knowledge, "cynically misuses the word, since his 
knowledge is evil, not sacred as usually understood," and pretends as if this knowledge 
(already an evil one) could be further profaned.291 However, it is not profaned from Iago's 
perspective, because his "sport and profit" validate it. Thus, the fun he gets out of the game is 
as important and valuable as the profit he gains through the money Roderigo will put from his 
own purse into Iago's. 
Iago has a whole arsenal of misuses of vocabulary. With sentences such as "/ think 
you think I love you" (2.3.304) he is pretending to be communicating something, but it is not 
the content or meaning of his sentence that is important, but rather its puzzling effect. It is, 
again, not what he says but what his sentence does that is crucial: he slaloms, dodging 
expertly the flags of straightforward meaning. Another example is the one analysed above in 
3.2.2 where he openly admits he is false (3.3.139), but Othello believes he is just modest - the 
point is that not even the truth in his line can be true, because the line will inevitably be 
misinterpreted. 
Iago is by far the wittiest and verbally most powerful character in the play. This 
enables him to carry out the traditional levelling function of the Vice, or the traditional 
levelling function of ridiculing in the carnival, or in its more aggressive form, a charivari - as 
I referred to it above when describing Burke's view of Iago. Still, no matter what kind of 
ridicule it is on Iago's part, it seems rather obvious that while he may find his levelling 
actions funny and entertaining, it is morally problematic for an audience to take part in his 
290 Philip Thomson, The Grotesque, Critical Idiom Series (London, 1972), 63, quoted by Snyder, 159. 
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carnivalesque activities. Yet, we may appreciate his witty humour. Within the play, however, 
there is no one to appreciate it, and any audience is rightly horrified concerning Iago's falsity 
within the drama. This is why it is possible to say that Iago's humour is necessarily dislodged 
from its original context of the world of the drama. His playful ingenuity, if at all, is 
perceivable and can be appreciated only from without. 
4.3.2 Irony and the question of the absurd 
No matter how spectacular Iago's juggling with words, the type of verbal nonsense we 
have seen that was so finely developed in Lear's Fool is not characteristic of Iago at all. It is 
only his notorious paradoxical sentence that remotely resembles in its atmosphere the silly, 
paradoxical or nonsensical self-references of the Fool: "I am not what I am" (1.1.65). The 
sentence in an inverted manner, however, does resemble Merry Report's mockery about his 
identity and echoes his "I am perse /." It also evokes the conduct of Ambidexter discussed in 
Chapter Two, where he too is reluctant to reveal his identity and is playfully hiding it, even 
pretending to forget his own name. 
Iago's notorious sentence may be interpreted on several levels. First, as the textual 
variation of A*A, it is opposed to a basic law of Aristotelian logic, or "reason" in its everyday 
sense. Secondly, Iago may mean that he is not what he seems to be to the others on the stage -
which is obvious to the audience. The first "I" of the sentence, the one who is speaking is, 
therefore, not the one who he appears to be, i.e., the second "I." Had Roderigo been wise 
enough to get even this message from the sentence, he would not have believed Iago any 
further. 
As a paradoxical self-reference, the sentence fits well in the tradition of self-
contradiction, and in that it is similar to the Fool's self references. It is impossible to define 
291 E.A.J. Honigmann, Introduction to the Arden edition of Othello (London: Thomson Learning, 1997), 383. 
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the truth value of this sentence since even if he is speaking the truth about his being not what 
he seems to be to other characters, or what he seems to be in the eyes of the audience, he is 
undermining his credibility at the same time. On the other hand, there is an even deeper truth 
in this paradoxical sentence, as Rosalie Colie observes: "Iago lies and does not lie; for he is in 
fact what he is not, since he is, and proves himself by the action of the tragedy to be, not 
really a man, a member of human kind."292 
Iago'sentence is also a variation of the tautological sentence of the Lord of the Old 
Testament: "I am that I am." This, as a mirror image, leads to infinite oscillation between the 
thing and what it reflects. Therefore Iago in his utterance of this sentence not only identifies 
his position as the opposite of God's, but blurs his position so that it loses its referent no 
matter from which side we are examining it. As Géza Kállay puts it, from the point of view of 
language philosophy this sentence shows that behind Iago's name there is no signified, there 
is nothing behind the name, and thus Iago in this sense is nobody.293 
It is the same line that Robert Weimann uses to show the two sides of 
representation.294 He claims that they both were characteristic of the Renaissance stage. He 
borrows the terminology of Jean Alter to describe the inherent duality of codes. The two 
different types of sign and behaviour on stage are as follows: one is a performative statement 
("I am acting") and the other is a representational code ("I am not acting" - "I am another 
person"). Weimann explains that "as opposed to the modern proscenium stage, where a 
representational mode strongly predominated, the Elizabethan stage tended to project both 
these codes in intriguing patterns of entanglements." He finds that Iago's sentence is an 
example when he introduces his own inherent duality. 
292 Colie, 243. 
293 Killay, 118. 
294 Robert Weimann, "Playing with a Difference: Revisiting 'Pen' and 'Voice' in Shakespeare's Theater," 
Shakespeare Quarterly 50 (1999): 415-432, especially p.425. 
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As we have seen, Iago is similar to his predecessors who have employed the method 
of making jokes about the difficulty in getting to know their identity, because they too were 
playing with rather than disclosing their names or concocting long riddles about who they 
were and what their occupation was. Although Iago encapsulates this tradition in his single 
sentence, the effect of his sentence is similar to the predecessors' not so much in its 
potentially comic allure - we indeed have to dig down deep to detect the comic appeal in 
Iago's sentence that reverberates with the antics of his earlier Vices - but in the way it puzzles 
the audience. The intricate nature of this puzzlement, and its close relation to the puzzlement 
created by Iago's metadramatic behaviour, can be expounded with de Man's explanations of 
the comic, the ironic and the way duplication is essential for the understanding of irony.295 
The notion of duplication that de Man takes from Baudelaire's dédoublement involves a 
reflective activity of the self on itself, and he sees it essential for the ultimate comic, "le comic 
absolu," which Baudelaire also calls irony. The connection between self-doubling and the 
comic appears from the following quotations of Baudelaire: 
The comic and the capacity for laughter are in the one who laughs, not at all in the object of laughter. It 
is not the man who stumbles who laughs at his own fall, unless he be a philosopher, a man who has 
formed by habit the power of rapid self-doubling, and thus assisting as a disinterested spectator at the 
phenomenon of his own self.296 
My view of Iago is that he does have this sense of humour, he is capable of self-
doubling, and the best examples for it spring from his metadramatic quality discussed in the 
previous chapter; the director Iago has a sense of humour towards himself as an actor in the 
play. Moreover, his behaviour reflects on the dramatic quality of drama exactly in the way de 
Man points out that a self-conscious narrator's intrusion disrupts the fictional illusion.297 Still, 
Iago's humour, the irony with which he treats the other characters in the play, in its effect 
295 Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle eds., Critical Theory Since 
1965 (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986), 198-222. 
296 Charles Baudelaire, "De l'essance du rire" in Curiosités esthétiques: L'Art romantique et autres Oeuvres 
critiques, H. Lemaître, ed. (Paris: Garnier, 1962), 215, quoted by Paul de Man, 212. 
297 De Man, 216. 
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remains indirect. His comic potential is not fulfilled because he does not teach (or at least 
does not teach directly) the audience what "le comic absolu " is. The reason for this failure I 
will discuss in section 4.4.2. Here I would just like to note that the duplication, the distance of 
the reflexive self from the empirical self, this reflective disjunction that is so essential 
according to de Man for irony, works the same way in irony and metadrama, and the effect in 
both cases is a démystification of earlier assumptions. 
A major irony in the play is that we can develop so distinct and different, but 
nonetheless valid and functioning, views of Iago as, on the one hand, his being the master of 
hypocrisy, the liar par excellence, the master of pure illusion, while on the other hand, as 
Stallybrass points out, he is the voice of common sense, the repetition of the always already 
known and culturally given. In other words, it is not merely his wicked intelligence that is at 
the bottom of Iago's irony. He uses his irony not only to fool the others, but also to unveil the 
ways - defective ways, as it turns out - of how social mechanisms work to generate meaning 
He is able to show how commonly accepted things, like the stability of Othello's identity, 
simply do not exist, or even that ultimately it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the 
authenticity of what is understood as reality. 
4.3.3 Decontextualisation 
Charlotte Spivack thinks evil is funny because it represents the privation of reality. 
This notion is partly true for morality Vices. Iago also features a privation of reality, but with 
a reversed sign. It is not necessarily the same privation of reality it was before: Iago does not 
represent the lack of reality in his iniquity, but rather, as I have already pointed out regarding 
the effect of his metadramatic activities, shows that all reality is illusion, and makes the 
characters of the drama as well as the audience realise that what they thought to be reality can 
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be deprived of its realness by being turned into illusion. This is what makes Iago as the 
successor of the Vice so interesting. As I argued above, the Tudor Vice itself comprised in 
itself different characters. In this case if we go back to its root in the devil, we see that Iago is 
doing things that the devil traditionally did - what Augustinus termed the privation of reality. 
However, another aspect of Iago emerges if considered not from the already shattered 
Christian episteme as a devil, but rather as a trickster that finds its own element in such an 
ambiguous context. I am not suggesting that as a consequence of appreciating Iago's 
characteristic sense of humour and his irony we should not consider Iago as evil, but rather 
that there are relevant perspectives from which he is not necessarily such. This perspective 
appears most significantly if we imagine him in his element, on stage, acting, because it is in 
his metadramatic quality that he can be understood as trickster. I suggested that we should not 
try to expel the fool-trickster tradition from the Vice and should not seek unconditionally to 
condemn him morally. Similarly, Iago's discrediting others, the audience, us from our notions 
of reality does not have to be necessarily condemnable. The corruption of reality as perceived 
according to a given tradition can be carried out not only by the devil, but by a trickster as 
well. By ironically distancing the audience from what they perceive as reality, Iago is 
decontextualising the "culturally given," and thus becomes the subversive agent in Othello. 
4.3.4 Iago's sense of humour - conclusion 
If the metadramatic, Vice-successor game-maker Iago is the director of the play, the 
question arises as to why he had to stage such a complicated and painful play, one in which 
not even he will ultimately triumph. At the end of the play it is impossible for Iago to 
continue with his ironic witticism. He does not even speak in the end, but merely refuses to 
talk. Although the Fool disappears rather early before the end of the drama, his grotesquely 
comic point of view is continued or carried on in the drama. Iago's perspective, on the other 
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hand, after his lies have surfaced, seems to disappear together with the world he discredited. 
How can such a conclusion, one that is so unfavourable to the chief playmaker, be explained 
in an interpretation such as this one, where Iago is given such a powerful position? 
I see Iago as a character who did enjoy playing and performance, as well as making 
"sport and game" and entertaining the audience with his ironic jokes of multiple meaning. 
Even as the chief entertainer, he may be a trickster-Vice who does not insist on a consistent 
ending - "consistent" in his overall power as director of the game. Consistency is not the 
attribute of any Vice, but rather "haphazardness." Iago has directed a play that is rather absurd 
and difficult to account for from a moral point of view: the evil is revealed and silenced in the 
end, but virtue perished together with it. The question remains of how we are to interpret 
Desdemona's and Othello's deaths. If we see the tragic events in the end as noble, dignified 
and heroic deaths, does this recuperate the otherwise absurd outcome of the play? 
I would argue that Desdemona is indeed glorified in her death with her heroic 
endurance of the realisation that she was betrayed. There is heroism in Othello's suicide as 
well, because it is the "Venetian" that decides on the fate of the "circumcised dog" in the end. 
There is genuine tragic pathos in these deaths, while in Lear's case no heroism is achieved; it 
is rather the pain of madness that dominates the end of that play. 
Thus, perhaps the final joke in Iago's play is that, after he has destroyed the faith of 
the audience in reality and meaning, with an absurd step he does allow the audience to take its 
share in the pathos of real tragedy - tragedy, that was previously rendered impossible by his 
machinations, because for real tragedy a solid background and a solid moral worldview are 
prerequisites. 
Since the humour of the clown-fool has been expelled from Othello, the jokes of Iago 
in which the comedy of the Vice-clown reverberates are appreciated at most by the audience. 
The Clown that appears by that name for a short while in this play is neither a powerful nor an 
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influential character, neither is Iago's function within his own society in the drama that of the 
comedian. Given the irony in his remarks, which may provide a source of humour appreciated 
by the audience but not perceived by the participants of the play, his relationship with the 
characters of the drama is quite different from the one with his theatrical audience. Lear's 
Fool, on the other hand, was more or less the same fool within the world of the drama and on 
the stage. The fact that Iago is necessarily interpreted differently by the audience, the fact that 
only we, if anyone, will appreciate the humour in his ironic remarks, shows the split in Iago's 
character between the dramatic and the metadramatic layers. Such a split does not open up in 
the Fool, because although Lear does not always get the point in the remarks, the Fool is not 
misleading Lear the way Iago misleads his victims. 
4.4 Two comedians: alike, but different 
4.4.1 The similarities between the comedy of Iago and the Fool 
The sense of comedy that the Fool realises on the verbal level, which Chambers 
criticised as empty, incongruous and without wit, is realised by Iago as dramatic jesting, and I 
consider neither to be "without the salt of mind," quite the contrary. This type of nonsense 
may embody the freedom of not pertaining to meaning and generate the type of laughter that 
Bakhtin calls the camivalistic, or the type of laughter that made Foucault laugh while reading 
Borges's novel on the "certain Chinese encyclopaedia" where fragments of possible systems 
are juxtaposed in an absurd and highly comic manner, because they are ridiculing the idea of 
any system, including the one they paradoxically make up. This is the same type of the 
comic that I have referred to above quoting Berger, who discusses it in connection with, 
among other things, the theatre of the absurd in his chapter entitled "The Eternal Return of the 
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Folly." It is interesting from my point of view because the theatre of the absurd seems to 
imply that reality may lack any pattern. 
The carnivalistic affinities of both the Fool and Iago make them akin. These two 
characters, although perhaps with different aims, are nonetheless ridiculing the protagonists 
and stripping them of their assumed or real dignity. Thus it is not just the positive features of 
the Fool that are applicable to Iago but also the negative or destructive features of Iago that 
are characteristic of the Fool. Perhaps we more readily refrain from condemning the Fool's 
deeds because we accept him as an outsider in a moral system of values (even traditionally an 
outsider as a fool-madman). Still, the Fool is driving Lear mad, following the script of the 
Vice on the destruction of the hero by the Vice. The Fool mocks and ridicules Lear, he 
destructs what remained of him after the king dethroned himself, so in this respect he is not so 
different from Iago making Othello mad. 
These destructions may fit well within the trickster-tradition: Lear's Fool is constantly 
reminding his master of his nothingness, and Iago is making a jealous monster of his. But 
beyond that, they are great critics of everything that is culturally given, and they are great 
craftsmen in creating ideologically ambiguous spaces around themselves. Both the Fool and 
Iago seem implicitly to touch upon the root of the comedy of the absurd: they deny meaning. 
If we accept the Fool's acts only because we see a "rationale" behind them, namely, to 
address Lear's fault in renouncing his kingdom, we are missing the point. It is Kingship in 
itself, that is, any authority in itself that necessarily invites the possibility and need of its 
subversion. According to some experts there is an anthropological need for trickster fools in 
298 In Michel Foucault's Preface to his Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), xv-xxiv. 
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every society.299 It is not that the faulty step of Lear requires correction by the Fool. It is 
rather that in a medieval/Renaissance world Folly was a necessary element in the whole setup, 
and when this setup dissolves, the fool, a remnant of an old world order, indeed, a residual 
element, is still capable of showing how such a tragedy may be "dealt with": it is possible not 
to take the whole thing "so seriously," as if he were acknowledging the "absence of 
significance" of the discourse, but would not make a big problem out of it. 
Margaret French points out that the most important values of the play Othello are 
power, control and possession.300 These are, in fact, the same values that motivate Iago in his 
actions: "the values that motivate and characterise an Iago are accepted and respected values 
in the Western world."301 If the Fool's comedy is targeting mostly one character, the King, 
then Iago is targeting the whole setup of Venetian society, where values that are considered 
authoritative are discredited by him through the way he uses them. 
In my analysis I have shown that Iago is always concerned with meaning. His verbal 
humour that the audience can perceive is frequently based on irony. He never uses the sort of 
verbal nonsense of the Fool. Comparing the two attitudes, the difference in their behaviour 
emerges: it is not the "absence of significance" found also in the Fool's words that poses the 
real threat to Iago's environment, but much more an obstinate insistence on meaning. Still, on 
the level beyond dramatic representation the situation is different: in conclusion about the 
similarities between the comedy of Iago and the Fool it should be pointed out that on the 
metadramatic level Iago is sustaining the same absurd, ambiguous, paradoxical playfulness as 
the Fool, but in the former case this playfulness is not present in the level of the playworld. 
We might call it the sub-dramatic level of the play. Looking at Iago with the metadramatic 
backdrop (actually if it is a backdrop, it needs to be a transparent one) he may appear in a 
299 "It seems plausible that folly and fools, like religion and magic, meet some deeply rooted needs in human 
society," says Berger, 78. 
300 Margaret French, "The Late Tragedies," in John Drakakis ed., Shakespearean Tragedy (London and New 
York: Longman, 1992), 232. 
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rather surprising light. What Berger says about the absurd as surreal, i.e., transcending 
everyday life, can lead to a near apotheosis of this character: "all expressions of the absurd are 
surreal - that is, they literally transcend what is taken for granted as a real in normal, everyday 
life."302 Iago is doing precisely the same. While he shows how he can generate reality, and 
thus how in turn things taken for granted may be deprived of their reality, how things may be 
proven to be mere shows and illusions, he is also doing something else: if there is a possibility 
of any transcendence of everyday reality, it is exactly his way, through discrediting its 
everyday meaning. 
4.4.2 The difference in the comedy of Iago and the Fool 
Both Iago and the Fool give their own interpretation of the events of the drama; 
however, their methods are different. The Fool's technique is to create a new context, while 
Iago's is to decontextualise. Iago is more active (or aggressive, if you like) in realising the 
collapse of a system himself. He is the one driving the events towards disaster, while the Fool 
is only making the absurdity of the system explicit. Both characters point out the elusiveness 
of social certainties, of guarantees of meaning. But although the remarks of both are cruel and 
wicked, identifying with the Fool's sense of humour can be a genuine relief for the audience. 
Regarding all the parallels between Iago's and the Fool's trickery, why isn't Iago's satiric and 
demystifying behaviour as potentially liberating as the Fool's? I call it liberating because the 
Fool relaxes our strictures and constraints in understanding justice, reality and world order. 
Actually, he allows the unease of uncertainty but makes it comic, even acceptable. One 
difference between the effects of the two is probably that the Fool is already one step further 
301 French, 239. 
302 Berger, 177. 
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in the tragedy compared to Iago: the disaster has been established, and a comic attitude can be 
developed to recontextualise it and take away the pain and fear that the tragedy (in Reiss's 
words the "absence of significance") represents. Ridiculing the tragedy of Lear is not equal to 
anything that we may call "comic relief'; it is not forgetting for a few moments while the 
jokes last how sadly unreliable and unjust the whole universe is. It is indeed developing a 
different view of the world, one that Bakhtin emphasizes in his explanation of carnival 
laughter, the capability to build a counterworld of laughing culture, making the world whole, 
which necessarily involves a great deal of flexibility, an attitude that does not insist on the 
original idea of its supposed "wholeness."303 The audience is given the possibility of laughing 
at Lear together with the Fool. This laughter cannot be a threat to the system that has 
demolished itself, and it cannot be condemning either but rather is the liberating laughter of 
the clown/trickster archetype, of the kind that was supposedly not welcome or even 
unimaginable in a morality, one that scholarship is so reluctant to acknowledge.304 
Both Iago and the Fool seem to deny the existence of the inherent, intrinsic meaning 
of any phenomenon, and this is indeed the main source of their humour as well, namely that 
they are capable of presenting satirically the lack of meaning in places or situations where 
ostensibly there is or should be intrinsic significance. Still, the Fool may allow for a 
contextual meaning (he shows that meaning exists only within context, but nothing suggests 
that he would repudiate meaning once and for all. His criticism of Lear's folly rather makes us 
think that he disapproves of the way Lear squanders his authority as a king - perhaps this is 
303 In Iago's comedy the elements of the Bakhtinian carnival are also clearly detectable, but because of the 
differences between the two characters, Iago's carnivalesque comedy is pure only on the metadramatic level. For 
a more systematic discussion of Iago's comedy in the context of Commedia dell' Arte in Bakhtinian terms see 
Faherty op. cit., 190-2. 
304 It would be perhaps interesting to compare Iago and the Fool based on the differences in the ways diverse 
types of tricksters are generated by diverse social structures. Perhaps the contrast between the two characters 
examined here could be explained by such differences as the structural setup of the plays: in King Lear the King 
is still the centre of events, and he resigns, while in Othello the centre is missing in another way: all the central 
characters may be seen as "others" in the Venetian power structure: the woman, the moor and the devil. 
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exactly why he tells Lear in the storm as I analysed above to go back and take part in the petty 
intricacies of the court, and perhaps Iago does not suggest anything positive in this sense. 
There is no "ideal" in either plays compared to which the mocking is carried out, but in 
Othello there is not even an ideal being stripped of its absolute meaning - as there is in Lear. 
The Fool does strip Lear and the type of kingdom he should ideally stand for of their ultimate 
meaning, but by laughing at it, he does not seem to try to annihilate this ideal completely. The 
Fool's method is not denial, but rather ridicule and démystification, while Iago seems to be 
actively destructive. Is the Fool perhaps paradoxically denying meaning and thus maintaining 
it? This would accord with the explanations that see Lear's development in his making the 
role of his Fool intrinsic to him.305 Unfortunately, although the Fool may succeed to a certain 
extent as a missing element from Lear's consciousness that is gradually becoming part of the 
king, or as a repudiated element of Lear's identity finally being acknowledged, on the social-
signifying level of society he necessarily has to fail in maintaining anything, because that 
system has already been shown to demolish itself, just the way the drama can be interpreted as 
displaying the dissolution of the Medieval way of signification. The way the Fool makes us 
see the nothingness of Lear, and the way he makes Lear see his own nothingness, is by 
constantly referring to his embeddedness into his context, as, for example, when accusing him 
of being "an o without a figure" because of Goneril's frowning. 
Iago's technique is different: he cynically shows the entire failure, the intrinsic 
faultiness of the working of the system based on cultural codes and accepted values, as well as 
the idea of intrinsic meaning. He does offer the possibility of the absurd, but without the 
liberation offered by the Fool. 
305 See William Willerford, The Fool and His Scepter (Northwestern University Press, 1969), 208-225. 
306 Alessandro Serpieri, "The Breakdown of Medieval Hierarchy in King Lear," in John Drakakis ed., 
Shakespearean Tragedy (London and New York: Longman, 1992), 84-95. 
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In my argument, Reiss's theory about this age being transitory and capable of 
disclosing the absence of meaning is relevant, because it is always this trickster figure who 
has the task of dealing with this absence, or creating this absence, making it an ever-present 
absence: not because the trickster wants to destroy anything by showing that the whole system 
is faulty, rather, it is serving society with the necessary sense of the possibility of liberation 
from its codes. Perhaps the trickster makes us believe that it is our choice to live in "normal" 
society, since it is clearly shown that an opposite of that "normal" may also exist. In the 
transitory epistemological age this absence of significance is revealed, and its agents are in 
this case the Fool and Iago. But in Othello the audience is not any more given the opportunity 
to employ the residual medieval/Renaissance way of dealing with this absence through 
accepting the existence and the necessity of the comic counter-culture, because this way of 
dealing with the world is fading, parallel to the solidification of the dominant culture's 
seriousness. The fact that Nahum Tate's version of Lear of 1681307 seems to have found the 
play more bearable when the Fool was expelled clearly shows the logic towards which society 
was moving: it is not the tool that helps us dealing with the incongruous that is a solution to 
our feeling of grief, but rather the control of the world in a way that grief and incongruity are 
expelled from it. 
4.4.3 Iago as the missing fool 
I have said above that the fool is already one step further than Iago in dealing with 
tragedy. But this is true only if we consider a theoretical sequence of dealing with a tragic 
event: it is common in the two dramas that a whole system collapses, which makes it clear 
that general assumptions about the working of society and signification were wrong. The Fool 
307 Tate's version of Lear is available in Christopher Spencer ed., Five Restoration Adaptations of Shakespeare 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965), 201-274. 
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and Iago, as descendants of the Vice (himself already, according to Mares, a symptom of a 
dissolving episteme), point toward different directions. The Fool with his acts is embodying a 
technique that is at home with the culture of camivalistic folly which existed in the Middle 
Ages through the Renaissance. He shows a certain ease in dealing with situations when the 
world comes too close to chaos. He can create a counterworld where the entire universe is 
comic, and it may be liberating that there is no guarantee of meaning. With all this he is 
pointing backwards, just like the traditional costume of the fool worn by Robert Armin in 
King Lear, which was already an outdated prop, part of an extant repertoire.308 Iago, on the 
other hand, cannot make his humour of destruction appealing - apart from its play and game 
aspect. We, as audience, are unwilling to identify with the point of view from which the tragic 
events of Othello would lose their weight. Perhaps we may see Lear's fault in giving up his 
kingdom, and thus see his being forced to come to a certain "enlightenment" as justified, 
accepting the comments of the Fool as necessary parts of the process.309 There is no such 
possibility offered in Othello. The comic view of the world, the counterculture of subversion 
as liberating is not accessible: in this drama there is no proper agent for it. 
Iago is a perfect trickster on the metadramatic level. He is carrying out the ritual of 
levelling destruction through mockery in front of a theatrical audience. The Fool does the 
same both inside and outside the play. Inside the play Othello (actually, Iago's play), 
however, the trickster's camivalistic behaviour is restricted to the mockery of a supposedly 
improper couple, to a charivari, itself supposing laughter of corrective, "normative" nature, 
not in the least the Fool's liberating kind. That laughter has been expelled from the world 
towards which early modern England was heading. Jonson already represents this distinctly 
different view on laughter, when he condemns laughter in his Discoveries, and finds "laughter 
308 Wiles, 155 
309 On the question of Lear's enlightenment see also Willeford, 208-225 and Hillman 203-206. 
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unfitting in a wise man." And I suggest that the way laughter was gradually expelled is 
precisely parallel to the ways critics sometimes insist on the absence of moral ambiguity in 
morality plays, the ways we force ourselves to understand the comedy of vice as supportive of 
the morality structure. Hillman has a most enlightening explanation of Iago replacing the 
Clown as a doorkeeper in Othello1 s act 3 scene l.311 This, in my view, is indeed the epitome 
of the disappearance of the trickster who is capable of the liberating magic, and its turning 
into Iago, a successor of the trickster-vice, whose magic works only on the metadramatic 
level. The play Othello thus may be a tragedy of the disappearance of the popular fool and the 
Vice's becoming - perhaps retrospectively - unequivocally evil. Social and consequently 
theatrical space will become such, so that there is no room for Folly. And once the fool is 
expelled from the Vice, the only thing that remains, although already in a psychologically 
rather complex, almost human form, is the devil. I cannot but regard it as fortunate that the 
antitheatrical writers of the age were not successful in banning theatres completely, and 
together with them making even the metatheatrical foolery of the late Vices disappear. 
Regarding the difference between the Fool's and Iago's laughter in the society of their 
respective dramas, that other, hypothetically complete disappearance could have had more 
frightening consequences than me not having foolish vices to laugh with and talk about. 
310 Pollard, 299. 
3 ,1 Hillman ibid. 187-188. 
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5 King Lear and Othello as contexts of playing 
Taking the two dramas, King Lear and Othello as wider contexts of the findings of my 
previous chapters, in this final chapter of my study I would like to re-examine the two 
characters and the logic of representation that manifests itself in their playing. I would like to 
reflect on how the acts of the Fool and Iago are organically embedded in the world of the 
plays, and are echoed at several levels in these worlds. I will demonstrate that both these 
characters can be seen not only as functions of the plays in their own respective ways, but also 
as prerequisites of making meaning which in turn is questioned by their absurdity, yet, is 
maintained by their play. I will also deal with the consequences of the denial of folly, which 
in a curious way may be paralleled with the denial of the immoral, and will discuss the wider, 
philosophical and epistemological consequences of such a denial both in the early-modem 
and in the post-modem context. 
5.1 Meaning and identity in King Lear 
[Laughter] leaves behind areas that are accessible to 
speech to 'hang suspended', neither affirming, nor 
assuaging anything.312 
5.1.1 The king who stopped playing 
» 
A central and obvious fault in the drama is Lear's resignation from his throne and his 
idea to "retain/the name and all the 'addition to a king" (1.1.135-6). Once he would like to be 
called king but does not want to behave and act like one, a gap opens up between the sign (the 
king) and its meaning (that he is indeed the king). Such a gap could not open under an earlier 
logic of signification, when meaning was guaranteed by a precisely set place in the universe 
on the great chain of being, and when an infinite networks of inherent correspondences, along 
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with signifier and signified were not discrete categories but rather reflected one another. The 
gap could not open up simply because, as Foucault has described, representation was based on 
resemblance, and the relationship between sign and meaning was motivated. 
Serpieri in his analysis of the drama explains that in King Lear we see how "the 
'received' (medieval) signs and systems were collapsing into blanks."313 Within the society 
depicted in the drama, his vision of the collapse of the medieval system of signification is as 
follows: "Whoever is excluded from the medieval hierarchy of signs is nothing-, and whoever 
thinks (as does Lear himself) that he may give up his position in the system with impunity and 
maintain the identity derived from that position will lose his reason and will be nothing,"314 It 
is as if the drama would suggest that no extradiscursive meaning is allowed. After Lear 
resigns and loses his context, he becomes an "Idle old man / That still would manage those 
authorities / That he hath given away!" (1.3.17-19). Lear himself very soon realises that there 
is something wrong with his identity, when he says: 
Does any here know me? This is not Lear: 
Does Lear walk thus? speak thus? Where are his eyes? 
[•••] 
Who is it that can tell me who lam? 
(1.4.223-7) 
Upon which the Fool answers,"Lear's shadow."31S 
While Lear suffers for losing his identity because he lost his context, on the other hand 
it is also essential within the logic of the play that the loss of identity, the loss of one's 
"meaning," is a prerequisite for one's survival, at least most certainly so in the case of Kent 
and Edgar. 316 The play is constantly addressing questions concerning the relationship 
312 George Bataille, Guilty (San Francisco: The Lapis Press, 1988), 101. 
313 Serpieri, 1992,95. 
314 Serpieri, 1992, 87. 
315 The scene is parallel to another scene in Richard II (4.1.:276-91) where the king, after losing power, examines 
himself in the mirror and tries to establish if his identity has changed or not with the loss, at the end of which he 
smashes the mirror. The answer of Bolingbroke, just like the Fool's answer in King Lear, deals with the former 
king's shadow: "The shadow of your sorrow / hath destroyed the shadow of your face" (4.1.292-3). 
316 The idea is formulated by G. K. Hunter, in his Introduction to the New Penguin Shakespeare edition of King 
Lear (Penguin Books, 1972), 43. 
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between men and their social identities, as well as the extent to which social identity is 
identical with the person. Apart from the Fool' jokes on Lear's and his own "nothingness," it 
is Edgar's obvious lack of identity as a madman that will help Lear realise that Poor Tom in 
his wretched nakedness is "the thing itself," with no fake and perishable titles and 
embellishments. The real significance or the central question regarding this line of Lear's is 
whether the "thing itself' is a human being or not, whether there is a "thing" as a human 
being, or rather whether it is the titles, names, clothes etc. that make the "thing" a human 
being, embedded in social, civilizational, semiotic context, that give him "meaning." 
I read the drama as validating the Fool's attitude, who is constantly stressing 
nothingness and never stops playing with it: one is not identical with titles but is born as a 
fool ("That thou wast born with") which is the same as a madman ("the thing itself), but the 
task is to put on the role and play, the other alternative being symbolic or real death. Although 
the Fool sees clearly that Lear is not intrinsically a king, because titles are just consequences 
of the social signifying context, he still seems ridiculous when he stops playing and is 
explicitly ridiculed by the Fool. 
This is why nothingness is equal not to the acknowledgment of the absence of intrinsic 
meaning behind the idea of self or, in other words, to symbolic death, but to the point when 
one stops playing. The context may be a dissolving medieval one, or an improvised one 
generated by a playful Fool, but in either case, there is still no possibility for any meaning 
outside it. 
I read Cordelia's lines as echoing the same idea when she says to her father in the 
ominous opening ceremony that she loves him according to her bond, no more, no less 
(1.1.92-3). It is again the context and their relationship within it that will define, in Cordelia's 
view, how she should behave towards Lear, the king, her father.317 Cordelia's awareness of 
317 Tibor Fabiny reflects on the same line the following way: "This bond is in tune with man's fixed nature, 
which the Elizabethans called: kind. Sin, whether it is flattery (sisters) hubris (Edmund) or hamartia (Lear) is 
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her own role within the network of her bonds is thus similar to the Vice's knowledge about 
the logic of the system. Seeing herself as defined by a place in a system and deciding to act 
accordingly actually alienates Cordelia from the possibility of identifying completely with 
this role. It is her decision to take it on. Still, it is always precisely alienation that makes us 
aware of the play as play and that involves us within its world, a practice that the Vice 
employs so brilliantly. Cordelia's line scandalizingly exposes the fact that it is not intrinsic 
qualities that govern the system, but rather the system depends on the interrelatedness of its 
elements - a knowledge that is constantly explicated by the Fool. The lines the mad Lear 
utters with the dead Cordelia in his arms - "And my poor fool is hang'd" (5.3.304) - underlies 
the mysterious kinship between Cordelia and the Fool. 
When talking about the questionability of identities and roles in renaissance drama, 
Hornby seems to assume that there is one deep identity within us, one that plays no roles, one 
with which we can get in touch in rare moments. He even uses the phrase "who we truly 
•j | a 
are." I see that the most powerful element of the Fool is his freedom not to have to play a 
"self." He does not have to pretend that there is something behind the mask, his mask of the 
Fool, exactly because everyone assumes that he cannot be taken seriously as a person, as an 
individual. His mask is par excellence empty, and in this respect he is as good as a madman. 
Perhaps an even better example is the fool of Tarot cards who has no number and thus is able 
to "take on" the roles and numbers or signs represented by all the other twenty one cards in 
the set. This is following precisely the logic presented by Haphasard, the vice of Appius and 
Virginia referred to in Chapter 2, when he enumerated a huge list of possible identities and 
selves and stated that he is identical to none but rather juggles all. This example shows why 
the Fool as a role is not a long-term option for anyone in solving the problem of one's 
working against man's kind." Tibor Fabiny, '"Veritas Filia Temporis' The Iconography of Time and Truth and 
Shakespeare," in Tibor Fabiny ed. Shakespeare and the Emblem (Szeged: JATE, 1984), 215-72, p.237. 
318 Hornby, 73. 
188 
identity. The fool is no identity; he is rather a necessary function of a system that is in turn 
dependent on it. 
I have said above that Lear stopped playing at the beginning of the play. In the end, 
however, in Act 5, Scene 3, he starts playing again, wholly identified with the fictitious nature 
of play, shifting the scene of life from the reality of a prison to his private reality of gilded 
butterflies, old tales, praying, singing and laughter. Finally he has gone mad. The only thing 
that distinguishes him from genuine folly is the lack of a double perspective, the eye for self-
reflection that has proven so vital for irony, the "comic absolu." 
The dance of Death and the Fool 
Seeing Lear as the previous centre of the kingdom who becomes a piece of excess 
within the community after he does not fulfil his role, may lead one to interpret Lear's Fool as 
a seer or priest, one who knows that the reintegration of the community is possible only at the 
expense of the excess through sacrifice and who acts as a hospice-worker, attending Lear on 
his final journey, escorting him to his death. Although this interpretation is plausible for 
several reasons, it is only partly accurate, mainly because the fool does nothing actively and 
explicitly towards reintegration, with one possible exception: .he provides Lear with a certain 
kind of knowledge. This "knowledge" is close to death, because it is the knowledge of the 
lack of meaning, the knowledge that it is madness, or "absence of significance" behind the 
fragile meaning within the games of the social context, and this knowledge is parallel to the 
one that is the ultimate end of the game, which strips everything of its significance, no matter 
how intricately built the networks of meaning could have been. The Fool acts as hospice 
indeed, which entails the paradox of teaching the dying king to detach himself from things he 
insists on, but nevertheless insisting on maintaining the game. 
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It is in this sense, understanding the fool as hospice who ushers Lear to death, that I 
see the crucial importance of the parallel representations of Death and the Fool in the 
iconography at the end of the Middle Ages.319 The two figures were leading figures in a 
carnival-like revelry, the ultimate festivity, the dance of death, a picture in which kings and 
beggars are lead by death the same way in this dance, where the threat of the carnivalesque 
appears to be much deeper than the threat of a counterculture to a ruling ideology, because it 
stands for death itself as inevitable, and with death everything will be stripped of its 
320 
meaning. 
5.1.2 "The tyranny of the open night": The end and beyond 
"Laughter alone exceeds dialectics and the 
dialectician: it bursts out only on the basis of an 
absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute 
risking of death... 
As an undercurrent of the unreliability of meaning in the Fool's games there is a tragic 
irony behind the events of the play itself, exactly because of the unreliability of the meaning 
of tragic happenings. This again vindicates a multiple-layered, complex perspective on the 
events. A highly ironic working of "fate" reveals itself when the blind Gloucester utters his 
deepest wish to have Edgar in his touch, and the wish is fulfilled although he is not aware of 
it, since he does not recognise Edgar who is there with him. 
Oh! dear son Edgar, 
3 , 9 "In the late Middle Ages, in a curious synthesis, folly merged with death, as expressed in the carnivallike 
'death dance' (Totentanz). Zijderveld observed that folly and death appeared here as 'twin revelers.' Folly, 
which relativized and subverted all social order, finally foreshadowed death, which obliterates all social order 
once and for all." Berger, 74. 
320 An interesting connection between the culmination of tragedy and the Dance of Death is made by Willard 
Farnham. "The Christian European spirit which one may call Gothic is strongly bent upon concluding tragedy 
with death and giving it a final seal of authenticity in death. In its religious Contempt of the World it dwells upon 
the ills of mankind as having their origin in the Garden of Eden with the sin of Adam. Chief among these ills, 
that toward which the others all tend, is the death of the body. Hence, death becomes for the Gothic mind a 
primary symbol of the imperfection in mortal life. It is thought of as a necessary culmination of tragic adventure. 
In a sense all Gothic tragedy [... ] is a Dance of Death." Willard Farnham, The Medieval Heritage of Elizabethan 
Tragedy, (University of California Press, 1936), 79. 
321 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1978), 256. 
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The food of thy abusedfather's wrath; 
Might I but live to see thee in my touch, 
I'd say I had eyes again. 
(4.1.21-4) 
The irony here derives again from the possibility of a double perspective. In other 
words, no matter how miserable we might feel, we can never know how things look from an 
external point of view. The problem is not that there is no possibility of a metaperspective 
from which truth and the workings of justice can be safely identified, but rather that this 
perspective frequently disappears. It simply is not reliable. 
At the opening of Act 3, Scene 4, when Lear and his companions find a shelter in the 
storm on the heath, Kent shows Lear to the hovel with the following words: 
Here is the place, my lord; good my Lord, enter: 
The tyranny of the open night's too rough 
For nature to endure. 
These lines in my reading are the epitome of Lear's experience of the horror when meaning 
disappears from things and there is not one reliable point in the world that remains 
meaningful. The tyranny of the open night is the mad experience of the absence of 
significance, and it becomes an experience that the audience of the play is forced to witness, 
an experience that has always worried critics of the drama. 
It is difficult not to accept the play as a complete renunciation of meaning and see 
accordingly that by the end of the play, as G.K. Hunter formulates in a dense sentence, "the 
action of the play has reached the final nothing, not only of death, but of the world emptied of 
meaningful content." Such an understanding, since it excludes a view of a providential 
universe where suffering will reach its purpose in a larger setup of redemption, seems strongly 
anti-Christian, or pagan. Actually in this respect, i.e., understanding the play where suffering 
has no purpose, and the play offers no hope for redemption, the effect of the play's lack of a 
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clear cut moral message makes it an intensified, or blown-up version of moralities that have 
slightly ambiguous messages, instances where the activities of the Vice character do not 
sustain a moral world-view. It is so because in such plays, as discussed above, the Vice may 
be understood as acting according to a logic that is different from the one of the morality, but 
is not necessarily immoral in itself. 
Kenneth Muir tries to combat the interpretation of the play that I illustrated above with 
Hunter's opinion. Muir says that "[t]he play is not, as some of our grandfathers believed, 
pessimistic and pagan: it is rather an attempt to provide an answer to the undermining of 
traditional ideas by the new philosophy that called all in doubt."323 
As divergent as these two views exemplified by Hunter and Muir may seem, they are 
both true in their own right. On the one hand the action of the play has indeed reached the 
final nothing of the world emptied of meaningful content, but despite the fact that the 
audience experiences this death, which may obliterate their belief in the meaningfulness of 
life and the world, it does not obliterate their consciousness. I am not speaking of any sense of 
catharsis. The pain of the tyranny of the open night, without any answer to it, is far from 
being an elevated experience, let alone an experience enhancing reintegration in any future. 
The "answer," however, is that in spite of all that has happened, in spite of our having seen 
how the world can be emptied of meaningful content, yet, paradoxical as it may seem, we, the 
audience are still here. Lear died, but we did not. This is parallel to the disappearance of the 
Fool from his play as well as the refusal of Iago to speak at the end of his. It is we who are left 
after the play ends; it is we who have to do something with what happened. Stanley Cavell's 
interpretation of King Lear, together with the other mature tragedies of Shakespeare, stresses 
that these plays maintain us in a present. "At the close of these successions we are still in a 
present, it is another crossroads. [...] as if to say, what has happened has stopped but it has not 
322 Hunter, 26. 
323 Muir, 50. 
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come to an end; we have yet to come to terms with what has happened, we do not know 
where it will end."324 
The meaning of tragic suffering has been obliterated within the play, and it has 
remained pending outside of it. We do not know where it will end. What we do see is that the 
loss of meaning as a prerequisite for survival gestures towards acknowledging the nothingness 
of meaning. Yet simultaneously, this nothingness is a prerequisite of play through which 
meaning in turn is generated in the Fool's manner, for the sake of play. 
5.2 Social structure and meaning in Othello 
5.2.1 "Past thought!": Society and its "Others" 
Similar to the tragedy of King Lear, in Othello there are two different logics of 
representation at work. The one that is working for Othello is what Karen Newman calls 
"transparent" representation, which means that for him there is a direct link between sign 
and its meaning. The opposite of this is a new type of representation, nicely contrasted with 
the old one in the lines, "The hearts of the old gave hands/But our new heraldry is hands, not 
hearts" (3.4. 46-7). The lines are Othello's, who, as it appears from the quotation, on the level 
of his speech is aware of the discrepancy which may blur the transparency of representation. 
However, he is unable to employ this knowledge properly, because he directs it towards 
Desdemona's behaviour, while he misinterprets Iago's "flag and sign of love / which is indeed 
but sign" (1.1.155-154-59) for a sign that is transparent in its meaning. The crucial problem 
here is not so much the deception, but rather the possibility of deception, the fact that the flag, 
the sign of love, can be generated without love because there is no intrinsic connection 
324 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 112-3. 
325 Karen Newman, Fashioning Femininity (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 88. 
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between the two. The old logic of representation is discredited in the play, or in other words 
the logic of motivated language proves untenable in its conflict with arbitrary language. 
Apart from Othello, there is another important character in the drama, Brabantio, who is 
unwilling to give up the set of values in which a strong old system of views guarantees 
meaning and truth. His belief in the old system and the logic of its proper functioning is so 
strong that he cannot imagine this system to be shattered, only that wicked magic is employed 
against it. Desdemona's decision to marry Othello and leave her father is a horrific thing for 
Brabantio much less because he is betrayed by his daughter than because such a betrayal is 
unimaginable for him, it is "Past thought!" (1.1.164); such a thing simply cannot be, it is 
"[ajgainst all rules of nature" (1.3.102). If "nature" proves to work in a different way than he 
imagined, his explanation is not that his conception was wrong about what he thinks "nature" 
is, but rather that what he cannot take is simply not a natural event. It must be due to spells, 
witchcraft, or simply the lack of sense: 
She is abused, stolen from me and corrupted 
By spells and medicines bought of mountebanks, 
For nature so preposterously to err 
Being not deficient, blind, or lame of sense, 
Sans witchcraft could not. 
(1.3.61-5) 
Brabantio's "Past thought!" is the equivalent of Lear's "tyranny of the open night": it 
is the horrifying experience of the impossibility of making meaning of what one experiences. 
It is an experience of losing touch with the world as well as losing the self. In addition to 
experiences that do not fit one's way of perceiving the world, there are identities of others that 
can also pose a threat to one's integrity. 
326 As quoted above in the theoretical chapter of this paper, the opposition between motivated and arbitrary 
language is explained within the epistemological context, the classical-medieval-renaissance heritage versus the 
relativism of the modern age by Alessandro Serpieri, 1985, especially pages 125-6. 
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The curious thing in Othello is that all three main characters can be considered 
"others" to Venetian society and its dominant values. Desdemona is a woman - and she 
undermines the patriarchal system by disobeying her father. Othello is a moor, the 
"extravagant and wheeling stranger" (1.1.134), who is an outsider to Venice. He is an 
unidentifiable sign within its order, although he functions within it well as a soldier - up to 
the point when he is disturbed and commits two heinous crimes: a murder and a suicide. Iago 
at the end of the play is described with epithets of the devil, and in the eyes of the audience he 
is very similar to the Vice, that "other" of the morality plays who in this drama will suspend 
the everyday set of values and even the idea of everyday reality not just for a moment but for 
good. 
There is a peculiar unity binding the three characters - the woman, the stranger and the 
devilish villain. All are threats to the existing order, each embodying something that 
potentially shows the precariousness of society. Fear of the threatening Other is central to the 
play, where the subversive potentials sooner or later in the drama prove to be indeed 
destructive to the system: the woman-daughter to her father, the stranger within society to 
himself and his family, and the devilish villain to traditional ideas about the stability of things 
tinging all reality with a drop of mad illusion. 
If Iago is the ultimate agent of subversion, Desdemona is the ultimate impossible 
target for subversion because she shows no fear of whatever might come. In her marital 
choice I see one of the main indicators of her attitude. Although Othello established himself 
as a noble warrior, an excellent soldier and supporter of the Venetian order, his being foreign 
and a moor, as well as the exotic tales he told about his past, played a primary role in 
Desdemona's choice of this "extravagant and wheeling stranger" against her father's choices, 
whom Brabantio describes - and perhaps advertises - as the "curled darlings" (1.2.63) of the 
nation. Marrying the moor in Venetian society is embracing the unpredictable. There are 
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several specific occasions in the play where Desdemona demonstrates her bravery in facing 
the unknown. She seems to have been aware of the dangers inherent in her choice. When it is 
debated whether she should go to Cyprus with her husband, she argues in the Senate, "if I be 
left behind/ A moth of peace, and he go to the war, the rites for which I love him are bereft 
me" (1.3.256-8). She seems to have faith in coming to terms with whatever will happen to her. 
I find remarkable the contrast between how husband and wife relate to the possibility of their 
betrayal by the other: Othello's suspicion is unfounded in reality, while Desdemona literally 
has to face her husband strangle her. Othello wants to "tear her all to pieces" (3.3.432) and 
"chop her into messes" (4.1.209), while Desdemona's final reaction to the ultimate betrayal of 
her are the puzzling lines where she takes the blame off her murderer, announcing that she 
was the one to kill herself. The paradox of these lines is that although we do not find it likely 
that Desdemona in lying, it is difficult to find an acceptable meaning in her illogical words. In 
her last lines I see her ultimate acquiescence to the events, where in her answer she embraces 
her life and death as they are and regrets none of her choices. The source of her calm at this 
point I find in her openness towards the unknown, which she does not lose even at the 
threshold of her death. Desdemona's words seem illogical, because they do not comply with 
what the audience has perceived as the fact of the play: Othello was the one to strangle her. In 
her marital choice she acted against the patriarchal standards of Brabantio; here she acts 
against the audience's understanding of the play's reality, and from this point of view she is in 
a curious sense distructive; a pendant to Iago's schemes through which he reveals the lack of 
significance, the emptiness of meaning. In other words, her action is a morally impeccable 
pole to Iago's trickery and lies, and a remote parallel to it in its "disregard" of what one - be it 
Brabantio or the audience - understands as reality. 
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5.2.2 The denial of folly 
A new understanding of Iago arises from within the drama. He as the great illusion-
maker is clearly a representative of a new logic of signification, a logic that is not based on 
inherent resemblance but rather is arbitrary. Within the drama he appears as an 
unambiguously wicked destroyer of lives, loves and values, but at the same time the validity 
of the values he destroyed is questioned. The system within which Brabantio imagines his 
life, the one the system that Othello worked so hard to acquire, is untenable, and in this 
respect Iago is the champion of the game, because once it appeared that there is no essential 
difference between truth and illusion, it is impossible to re-establish the former firm belief in 
its unquestionability. 
In this respect Iago can be understood as the inherent self-destructive mechanism 
within modern society: he is the fool, or the one who was supposed to be the fool, but who in 
this case takes revenge on society for its denial of folly, for the lack of his being 
acknowledged. If we want to build upon a knowledge of pure sense and solid reason, we have 
to deny the expense at which such a thinking is made possible. We have to forget that 
knowledge and reason do not exist in themselves, that they are not absolute categories, but 
that they work only within a given context that is accepted by a given community. Stanley 
Cavell addresses the issue in the following way: 
What we forgot, when we deified reason, was not that reason is incompatible with feeling, but that 
knowledge requires acknowledgement. (The withdrawals and approaches of God can be looked upon as 
tracing the history of our attempts to overtake and absorb acknowledgement by knowledge; God would 
be the name of that impossibility.)327 
Iago, putting the possibility of knowledge or truth into cynical brackets, shows how it 
is acknowledgement that makes things work. And he also shows that without the liberty of the 
fool, whom he replaces as doorkeeper in the scene discussed above in 4.3.4., the awareness of 
327 Cavell, 117. 
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the necessity of acknowledgement will become a sheer destructive force. The denial of the 
fool, that is, the denial of the necessity of acknowledgement in CavelTs sense for the benefit 
of unquestionable knowledge, will result in the destruction that is carried out by a diabolical 
fiend, an Iago. 
From this perspective the utter incapability of Brabantio to suppose that he might have 
been wrong in his perception of reality as well as to revise his views of it, depicts him as 
someone for whom the carnivalesque liberation from meaning (be it merely formal or 
genuinely subversive) is hopelessly out of reach. Actually, the carnivalesque is similarly out 
of reach for him (and within reach for the audience only in Iago's metadramatic activities) as 
it will become inaccessible through the solidification of the new episteme, which required the 
disappearance of the carnivalesque as well as the disappearance of folly its denial.328 
The irony in Othello is that the faults for which Iago is condemnable, namely his lies 
and pretence, prove to be an inherent core of a system that tries to deny folly. In other words, 
it is precisely Iago's lie that the new episteme is built upon, namely, "selling" a fiction as the 
ultimate reality, presenting a "made up" truth as genuine knowledge, forgetting that it is based 
on a construct. However, at the same time Iago is showing, in Cavell's terms, that mere 
acknowledgement can generate the seemingly solid knowledge, while the fact that it is 
dependent on acknowledgement remains hidden in the background. Iago, the villain who is to 
328 The denial of folly at the advent of rationalism is described in similar terms by various scholars. Berger 
argues as follows: "Folly as a general cultural phenomenon began to decline ip the early modern period. 
Zijderveld explains this fact in terms of what Max Weber called rationalisation. He is very probably correct in 
this explanation. If so, the principal culprit is the rising bourgeoisie, that most rational and serious class" (Berger, 
74). The same phenomenon, the disappearance of folly, is described similarly by Foucault in his Madness and 
Civilization. Foucault says that folly is expelled from the seventeenth century forward and the experience of 
foolish Reason and reasonable Folly, so common in the Renaissance, becomes inaccessible by a new line of 
division. Between Montaigne and Descartes an important development is realised: ratio gains power. The 
passage I am referring to is translated into Hungarian from a 1972 edition of the original, and is missing from the 
English edition, which uses a 1961 original from French. Michel Foucault, A bolondság története (Budapest: 
Atlantisz, 1991), 72; in English: Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization (London: Tavistock Publications, 
1967). 
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be condemned, is no more to be condemned than the idea of reality that tries to deny the 
illusion at its roots. 
One difference between Iago and the Vice is the lack of nonsense in Iago's words and 
acts. Although he capitalizes on illusion, it is not nonsense that governs him, but rather his 
vision of himself as director of the play. When comparing him with Lear's Fool it appears that 
a certain sense of madness, the suspense of reason, is actually missing from him. The lack of 
verbal nonsense from Iago's speeches is an indicator of this difference. He may act in a way 
that is difficult to explain, but he gives a plausible explanation to the audience for what he 
does. And the explanation is nothing else but a thing that admittedly lacks surety, but there is 
nothing easier to take it for granted for the sake of putting on a play and once the explanation 
is accepted, one can build whole performances on it: 
I hate the Moor 
And it is though abroad that 'twixt my sheets 
He's done my office. I know not if't be true, 
But Ifor mere suspicion of that kind 
Will do as if for surety. 
(1.3.385-9) 
Iago is not bothered in his play about whether the impetus for his acts (his being 
cuckolded by Othello) is simply not true. Ironically, this logic of acting or doing "as if for 
surety" but seeing clearly that nothing is for sure, is not only the logic of Iago's play and his 
lies, but of theatre plays in general. In Iago's lesson, though, we see this as true of the entire 
concept that is called "reality." 
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5.3 Moral corruption, amoral presence, or authenticity? 
"Objections, son-sequiturs, cheerful distrusts, joyous 
mockery - all are signs of health. Everything 
absolute belongs in the realms of pathology." 
Nietzsche 
I would like to continue the previous train of thought with the discussion of another 
denial in order to demonstrate why I find it so important to point out the roots of Iago in the 
trickster-Vice. As it will turn out, disregarding or denying the fool in Iago has surprising and 
rather unfortunate consequences. 
We have seen that the characteristic comedy of the Vice is rather controversial, and 
there are clear cases in which the final comedy is not upon the victim, but upon the Vice, and 
in which the audience cannot but perceive the workings of justice. This justice, however, is 
entirely missing from King Lear and Othello. And this is why Reiss's terminology is useful in 
this case in describing such theatre as "dialectical theatre" as opposed to "analytical theatre." 
The main reasons for the impossibility of perceiving justice at the end of the play are that we 
cannot be certain about what justice could possibly be in the given situation, and also that the 
ideas taken up by the play do not end with the performance, but as Cavell has it in a passage 
quoted above, they maintain us in a present. The task of the audience therefore could be to 
take on the responsibility of the lack of closure, the lack of a soothing idea of a final 
explanation, the lack of the perspective from which the ultimate struggle for meaning would 
turn into an overall understanding. 
Regarding the effect of these plays, it is possible to detect a parallel between Iago's 
and Shakespeare's theatre: they both reveal that whatever is taken as reality is inevitably a 
construct, just as a play on a stage; it is possible to have a look at the tiring house of events, 
where there are no identities or selves, just players. 
Although such an understanding might seem to lead to utmost disillusionment, there is 
actually a radically different and positive outcome, namely that Iago and the Fool are the only 
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possible characters who may be regarded as authentic. They are aware of the interrelatedness 
of role play and identity within the drama, and their metadramatic awareness, their platea-
oriented behaviour, endow them with a unique possibility that is out of reach for other 
characters: they do not have to maintain the pretended difference between the world of theatre 
and the world of the audience. They are the ones who do not play anything else than what 
they admittedly are, and this makes them matchless in their authenticity. From the audience's 
point of view, Iago and the Fool are the possibilities of self-reflection, of double-perspective 
within the drama. 
As Enid Welsford remarks: "The buffoon gives most pleasure, by being most 
himself."329 The authenticity of the clown or fool within the drama is nicely illustrated in a 
stage direction found in the second quarto text of Romeo and Juliet, "Enter Will Kemp." 
David Wiles explains that this line of text not only shows that the particular role was played 
by Will Kemp, but also it provides an example of "how Shakespeare's mind could not 
separate the actor from the role [...] The scene anticipates Kemp's appearance with the 
musicians after the play is over, when he will return to sing and dance his jig."330 This 
example again gives us good grounds to suppose that Kemp was not the only clown whose 
"role" was simply to "play" himself, whether on or off-stage. As I argued in 2.4, the same 
applies to Robert Armin, the fool who was replaced by Iago as doorkeeper in Othello, but 
who fully developed his play in King Lear. 
An interesting layer is added to the authenticity of the Fool with Wiles's reference 
quoted in Chapter 2 to the distinction between the Vice who acts the fool's part and the born 
or natural fool,331 which means that "behind" the Fool who pretends to be foolish but is 
indeed wise, actually there is a Vice, and this is where the Fool's wisdom derives from. In 
329 Welsford, 27. 
330 Wiles, 88. 
331 Wiles, 4. 
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other words, it is the Vice who is wise in the stage-Fool. Thus the Fool remains authentic as 
much as he reveals that he is just playing the fool. The curious thing, however, is that the 
agent "behind" the "mask" of the Fool is actually the par excellence non-identifiable, whose 
essence is precisely shape-changing. 
Another understanding of the question of justice in Shakespeare's major tragedies is 
that there is some sort of moral explanation possible, although the punishments seem unfair in 
their volume and intensity compared to the fault. The "punishment" is directed towards a 
particular passion of the main hero by which he is obsessed. Hillmann, when discussing the 
late tragedies, shows the complexity of such an understanding. 
At the core of each of these plays, by generic definition, lies the 'larger-than life' agon, both inward and 
outward, of a central male character. The external subversive elements function to construct the inner 
struggle, too, in terms of the trickster-principle. Typically, the protagonist falls victim to a subversive 
threat, which he then internalises in a self-destructive form - jealousy, madness, heroic fury, and so 
forth. By itself, this is merely to supply a new vocabulary for the old 'slaves of passion'. But 'passion', in 
these tragic heroes, is already beyond the pale, wholly negative. By going a layer deeper, cutting below 
tragic passion to subversiveness itself, with its potential for creation and destruction, it is possible to 
expose the hero's vulnerability as reflecting his prior exclusion of disruptive energy. As Richard III is 
made monstrous by his world's failure to break its closed cycle of bloodshed, so the microcosms that are 
the tragic protagonists project outside themselves the deformed and the dangerous incarnations of the 
form of subversion most threatening to them. They are possessed, in short, by what they refuse to 
own.333 
And by a curious leap of logic, it seems that it can be exactly the exclusion of the 
"immoral" that is severely "punished." Parallel to this understanding would be the 
interpretation of Othello by Long, who sees "Cassio's 'inability to hold his drink' as 
332 This is, of course, not to deny the obvious importance of the contemporary tradition of the "wise fool" (a very 
fine and perfectly developed example of which would be Erasmus's Encomium Moriae), and the fact that this 
tradition also influenced Shakespeare's theatre. Most probably a very strong impact was given by Robert Armin 
who himself wrote texts following this tradition, which brought new elements to the customary stage buffoonery: 
Armin's foolery is somewhat different compared to the earlier two clowns, who were less wise and more 
"rumbustinous." Still, I argue that it is impossible to imagine that Armin on stage could have avoided to rely on 
the traditional, metadramatic stage trickster, in whom the Vice and the fool are inseparable. It is in this sense that 
I understand the authenticity of Lear's Fool on stage, and the idea that his wisdom roots in the Vice. For the 
comparison of the clowns in Shakespeare's company and the influence of these actors on the parts they played 
see Felver op. cit. He is explicit in stating that "to the play-going publick Armin was a good clown in the older 
Tarlton-Kempe tradition perhaps before he became a witty fool." (Felver, 11). For the Praise of Folly and the 
tradition of the "sage fool" who could see and speak the truth with impunity see Welsford op. cit 238-40. 
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indicating Venetian society's denial of 'the entire Falstaff-element in man' - the key to the 
tragedy."334 Thus in Othello the remnant of the Vice-fool is expelled from society to such an 
extent that society is incapable of normal functioning. It is ironic that the descendant of the 
expelled Vice (although one in which the tempter-Vice of the moralities has undergone a 
much greater transformation compared to Falstaff) will carry out the collapse and the tragedy. 
I have argued in my chapter on metadrama that there is an essential element of the 
Vice that Iago can stand for not within the drama, but through his metadramatic awareness. 
Similar to the situation where a Vice-characteristic was expelled from the dramatic but not the 
metadramatic layer of the play, from the point of view of the audience, the place where the 
Falstaff-element in man can be restored is the theatre. This, however, is not possible beyond 
the historical moment where theatre consolidates as photographic, perfectly mimetic theatre. 
Parallel to the denial of illusion in reality outside theatre, theatre as an institution will be 
based on the automatic acceptance of whatever happens on stage "as if real," and will require 
the exclusion of metadramatic elements that remind the audience that it is not. 
This understanding of theatre - one that allows a parallel between theatre and the 
Falstaff-element or the ambiguously appealing game-maker's, or entertainer's element 
inherent in the Vice - explains an important aspect of the moral implications of the appealing 
nature of the Vice's entertainment. The laughter that the comic evil generates is also the 
laughter generated by the actor-entertainer. In Iago's case this means that as long as we are 
willing to see and capable of understanding him on the metadramatic level as entertainer, we 
are still operating within the late-Renaissance logic of play, which will soon completely 
disappear from the new type of theatre. 
333 Hillman, 187. 
334 Michael Long, The Unnatural Scene: A Study in Shakespearean Tragedy (London: Methuen, 1976), 44, 
quoted by Hillman, 262 
Antonin Artaud in his theatre of cruelty attempted to reach something similar: in his view theatre can 
maintain an idea of authenticity via play, which is lacking from representational-illusionistic theatre. Jacques 
Derrida appreciates Artaud's attempt, but finds that such a theatre is impossible. Jacques Derrida, "The Theater 
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5.4 "Tarry, take the Fool with thee": On problems with Shakespeare, Derridean 
spectacles and theatre 
5.4.1 Is language enough? 
Let us imagine the line "The world is but a word" (2.2.156) - from Shakespeare's 
Timon of Athens - as it is uttered by an actor playing on stage in a production of the play. Or, 
let us imagine the same line read by a reader of the dramatic text. The problem the line 
reflects on can be paraphrased in the following way: The world is but a word, because at the 
place where we should find the world in its reality, the only thing we find is a word. And this 
does not mean that the place of the world and a mere word have been changed by some 
regrettable accident, but rather that a mere word ("but a word") has taken the place where the 
world was supposed to reside. The world in this setup can have no reality, and even if it did in 
some remote past, it is terminated. Or its reality is the one of a word - a thing that refers to an 
absent reality.336 
No matter whether the actor utters the line or we read it in the text of the drama, in 
both cases we are facing an insolent line, and the insolence unfolds itself when we realise that 
the word that is uttered by the actor, or the one that we read in the dramatic text, seems to 
claim an absolute authority for itself, the authority that is supposed to belong to the world. 
The sentence suggests that the word - uttered or written, a crucial medium of both an actor 
and a book - makes up the world itself. And albeit this world is but a word this way, still, it is 
exactly the thing that the actor or the book is in control of. 
of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation," in Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978,232-250. 
336 The context of the sentence in the play finely resonates with such an interpretation. The words are uttered by 
Flaminius, Timon's faithful servant, and with this line he draws Timon's attention to how easily the realness or 
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Another Shakespearean line - and this one has indeed run a distinguished career - is 
similarly double-dealing: All the world's a stage. The sentence is derogatory of the world if 
some solid reality is demanded of it, but it gives infinite power to theatre in its conjuring of 
any reality it decides to put forward, to present. The idea of reality experienced as worthless 
was not alien to a theatre-goer who witnessed a performance that was a mystery, a miracle-
play or a morality: it was exactly on stage, as opposed to the off-stage, everyday world, that 
the "real" reality was present, and compared to it the world of the audience was just a 
corrupted, defected version. However, the defected nature of reality that these Shakespearean 
lines refer to do not offer an ideal as opposed to the corrupted version of reality, and they 
particularly do not offer it on stage, since it is exactly the theatrical nature of reality that 
discredits its validity - or upgrades the world of the stage. If we try to imagine the author of 
the lines inserting such lines in a script (and again, it does not matter whether the script was 
written before, during or after the performance), it is impossible not to detect the irony, and 
perhaps the self-assurance of the author, the one who has power over words, over stage - that 
is, over the world - since the sentences suggest that there is no difference between words and 
world, or stage and world. 
The Shakespeare-cult of the Romantic age roots itself exactly in such an image of the 
playwright: Shakespeare, the creative genius who is creating worlds. Hugo's example is 
typical, where Shakespeare is compared to God: "Next to God, Shakespeare created most."337 
However, those who do not belong to the group of devoted admirers may object against this 
same thing, i.e., that Shakespeare created, or conjured up worlds. In this understanding 
Shakespeare's works are autotelic, he is just playing with words and does not reflect reality. 
In other words, it is as if he did not fill his words with real, solid meaning, but rather created 
only illusion in which he seemingly shares the secrets of the world with the audience while 
stability of the land, even the whole world may be gone merely by using words. At the same time he also reflects 
on the power of words which have the world at their disposal. 
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actually being just an illusionist, dishonestly serving his audience a trick, or indeed, playing 
them false. 
A similar image of Shakespeare is presented by George Steiner in a lecture given in 
1986, in which he analyses fragments of Wittgenstein in which the philosopher reflects on 
Shakespeare. Wittgenstein complains that he could never make anything of Shakespeare ("nie 
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etwas mit ihm anfangen"). According to Steiner, there is a certain "semantic individuation" 
in Shakespeare which enforces "a seeming significance, a spectacular meaningfulness with 
the emphasis on 'visibility', on 'spectacle' in the root sense" . Taking all spectacularity and 
seeming significance into consideration, for me it seems that Steiner's real problem is not so 
much this spectacularity per se but rather the fact that the spectacle is empty of real 
significance; behind the playful words there is no content, no acceptable semantic meaning, 
but mere "semantic individuation." 
Neither Wittgenstein nor Steiner refers to the fact that no matter whether it is 
Shakespeare or any other playwright under discussion, it is indeed difficult to imagine a 
theatre which lacks spectacle and playful creation of worlds - actually things that Shakespeare 
is questioned for. Wittgenstein and Steiner would accept that grandeur of Shakespeare's 
power of creating illusion, but it is illusion itself that they find objectionable, and this is why 
they find Shakespeare immoral. Still, the counter-example adduced as an opposite and 
morally acceptable artist is not another dramatist or playwright, but the poet, the Dichter in its 
Heideggerian sense, and even more Beethowen, the par excellence composer. These counter-
examples have clearly little to do with the illusion-creating aspect of theatre. It seems that the 
problem Wittgenstein and Steiner have with Shakespeare can be attributed to the whole 
institution of theatre. Indeed, what else would theatre be than the world of seeming, illusion 
337 Quoted by Felperin, 87. 
338 George Steiner, A Reading against Shakespeare. The W.P.Ker Lecture for 1986 (Glasgow: University of 
Glasgow, 1986), 9. 
339 Steiner, 10. 
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and play? The difference between the detractors and the supporters may be only in whether to 
regard this as positive or negative. 
In a small detour I would like to stress that this "seeming significance" in Shakespeare 
that Steiner and Wittgenstein are criticising is not identical to objections against Shakespeare 
exemplified by Tolstoy's stance, according to which Shakespeare is not true to life, as seen in 
examples like Gloucester's leap off the Dover cliff. Such examples I regard only as 
constructed along the lines of a different theatrical logic, one that is not based on a mimetic 
and referential theatrical code Tolstoy would have expected. Since he was unfamiliar with the 
code, he thought it defective. In my view Steiner's and Wittgenstein's objections are much 
deeper, because they feel Shakespeare is betraying both his audience and the tool he uses for 
representation - words and theatre - since he abuses them, using them in an immoral way 
through pretence but no content. Their opinion implies that some truth, outside the illusion of 
theatre, could possibly validate the playful creation of theatrical worlds, but it is simply left 
out or not taken into consideration by the bard. 
The final verdict of Steiner on Shakespeare emerges in his comparison with the 
Dichter who, in contrast to the bard, communicates an articulate moral vision of life - and is 
skilful not only in constructing spectacular imaginary worlds: 
The Dichter is not only a matchless artificer and imaginer, but the beneficiary, the communicant with 
and communicator to his fellow-men of a high, articulate, religious-moral-philosophical vision and 
criticism of life. What Wittgenstein asks Shakespeare, in the name of an urgent and tragic moral need, 
in the name, finally, of music, is simply this: is language enough?340 
No one can accuse a morality or mystery play of the same charges as Shakespeare 
was accused of, namely that his works are not "real" but playful representations, words empty 
of genuine meaning and moral substance. This accusation is linked to the appearance of the 
possibility for reflecting on representation, which is preceded by the idea of a sign understood 
340 Steiner, 15. 
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as separate from the thing it represents. The Renaissance logic of representation was 
essentially based on resemblances, in which one thing and the other that stood for the first 
were intertwined within the network of similitudes. This network did not remain valid in the 
plays of Shakespeare. Whoever accuses Shakespeare of the above mentioned defect, must 
take a different position from the one I imagine Shakespeare's was, in which the "realness" of 
reality was not stronger than the "realness" of a play - exactly because of the peculiar 
epistemological context and theatre's place within it. In this case I do not see that there is any 
other option, after accepting the lack of any reality to rely on, the lack of point of reference as 
a fact, than to rely on the play - albeit "empty" or "theatrical" play - of representation.341 
5.4.2 The Iconoclasts' Scourge 
"I know thee not, old man" 
(2H4 5.5.47) 
"Nuncle Lear! Nuncle Lear! 
Tarry, take the Fool with thee." 
(KL 1.4.314) 
Reading Brian Vickers' very strongly argued book Appropriating Shakespeare,342 and 
particularly a sub-chapter "Reference, representation, make-believe" in which he deals with 
mimesis and problems of representing reality in literary world, made me conclude that the 
accusations he makes against the "iconoclastic theories of the '60s,"343 and the Shakespeare 
criticism that was inspired by it 344 are similar to the ones Shakespeare was accused of by 
those who regarded him an iconoclast. In other words, the moral problem of Steiner and 
Wittgenstein with Shakespeare, in my view, is established along the same lines as the problem 
341 The novelty here is not that everybody is playing a role in their lives, since this is implied by the Theatrum 
Mundi metaphor, which in the Middle Ages clearly could not have the same meaning as I am discussing here. It 
is rather that role-playing is epistemologically reinterpreted. It comes to mean not playing a part in the drama of 
life that is designed by God, but being part of a play that is played instead of a lost reality. 
342 Brian Vickers, Appropriating Shakespeare (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993) 
343 Vickers, 141. 
344 Cf. pl30: "[...] deconstructive literary theory, and its catastrophic effects on the interpretation of Shakespeare 
- deliberately catastrophic, demonstrating the workings of human intentionality at its most intransingent [...]." 
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of Vickers with Shakespeare critics who read Shakespeare "with Derridean spectacles" and 
follow the "iconoclastic movement of the mid 1960s," a movement that denied "that language 
could reliably convey meaning about or reference to the world we live in."345 Just the way 
Shakespeare's imaginary world in theatre is morally problematic because of its lack of real 
significance, the iconoclasts' approach is problematic because they claim that regarding 
literary texts as if they were denoting reality is indulging in "the referential illusion." 
When Brian Vickers is writing to ridicule the post-structuralist, deconstructionist 
notions of language and literature as a self-enclosed system, he quotes Robert Alter to present 
the "pseudo-Saussurian inheritance" of the iconoclasts and their attack on mimesis, an attitude 
to which "even such an intelligent critic as Gerard Genette falls victim, because he believes 
that a consequence of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign is that the motivation of the sign 
and particularly of the 'word', is a typical case of realist illusion."346 
Vickers' attitude is revealing not only of his anxiety concerning the criticised notions 
of language and literature, but also of the parallels between his objections and the ones against 
Shakespeare discussed above. In his apology for mimesis and representation against the 
attacks of critics who do not recognise that "reading through Derridean spectacles is not 
necessarily good for the eyesight,"347 Vickers is making clear his stance by stating the 
following: 
Only magicians and frustrated Derrideans believe that language could 'literally deliver* an idea or state, 
as if it could arise from off this page and we could enter into it. Such a confusion between the actual and 
the represented is amusing when we find characters in films (Buster Keaton's Spite Marriage, or 
Woody Allen's The Purple Rose of Cairo) who can walk into and out of the screen. But such a 
confusion coming from professional philosophers and literary critics, and then being used to discredit 
language and literature, is absurd and debilitating.348 
345 Vickers, 129. 
346 Vickers, 131. 
347 Vickers, 133. 
348 Vickers, 134. 
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From this quotation it is possible to reconstruct the opinion of Brian Vickers on how 
his world is not only safe but different from the one represented on screen. He does not see 
that the films he watches are applicable unproblematically to his world. The two are separate 
and safe: Buster Keaton on the screen is one thing, while a professional philosopher in the 
cinema is another: the two simply do not belong together. I strongly oppose his idea, and I 
find it particularly sad if the two worlds, the one of Keaton and the one of the professional 
philosopher are so distant. Don't we professionals find most pleasure in Keaton and Allen 
when we see them show that the denial of the absurd in self-assured professionalism is absurd 
itself? 
Although probably not on purpose, with the distinction between figures walking off 
screen in a Keaton or Allen movie and professional philosophers, Vickers makes his world 
safe from the otherwise threatening impact of the absurd on screen. It is as if he were saying 
that he finds it acceptable in fiction to mix the boundaries between reality and fiction, and 
perhaps this mixture may function as a source of humour, but in reality we should make clear 
the difference between the two. Unfortunately but not surprisingly, in his defence of mimesis 
and artistic attempts to represent reality, Vickers does not deal with these instances of 
"absurd" boundary-crossings as possible cinematic mappings of boundary crossings in reality 
- say, such, with which even some philosophers, wearing extravagant glasses have the 
audacity to experiment. And also there are instances, where these boundary crossings between 
fictional and non-fictional worlds are not deemed absurd, as we have seen is clearly the case 
with the morality Vices. 
Now that, as I hope, I have managed to provide grounds for parallels between the 
aversions to Shakespeare and deconstructionist Shakespeare critics, I would like to extend the 
pair of parallels with another element to make it a set of three. I have already mentioned in my 
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discussion of Steiner's criticism of Shakespeare that I see it as no accident that the moral 
opposite that he matches against Shakespeare is not another playwright, most probably 
because the objections raised against Shakespeare can be applied to theatre in general. And 
this is why it is no surprise that the negative attitude towards crossing the boundary between 
reality and representation, or reality and fiction in serious circumstances - an attitude that 
Vickers exemplifies when he implies that deconstructionist critics are being absurd in their 
mixing the actual and the represented - is based on similar grounds as the fierce anti-
theatricalism of the puritans in Elizabethan and Jacobean England,349 who found faults with 
the institution of theatre because in their view its fiction seemed to contaminate the realness of 
reality. Prynne's Histriomastix (quoted above as the text that equates playhouses with "the 
School of Vice") published in 1633 can be read as the peak of the attack, in which the author 
condemns all types of plays and all theatre.350 I accept Barish's insightful explanation 
according to which Prynne's opinion of theatre is indicative of "the fears of impurity, of 
contamination, of 'mixture', of the blurring of strict boundaries."351 
Clearly, being in the movies and being in theatre are not identical in regards to the 
safety factor of the audience. While no Woody Allen or Buster Keaton is likely to walk off 
the screen so that they will pose a direct threat of walking physically into the life of a 
movigoer deconstructionist or anti-decontsructionist critic, one may perhaps see that these 
comedians are followers of a tradition where the threat of direct contact between the world 
represented in a play and the world of the audience was real. I have already hinted above that 
349 The opposers of theatre were not exclusively puritans by belief; in using this term I follow Jonas Barish's 
practice of understanding and terming the opposers of theatre "puritans" Cf. Barish, 82. notes. 
A passage illustrative of the text that is included in the Argument of Prynne's work and is later repeated 
several times with variations is the following: "[A]ll popular and common stage-plays, whether comical, tragical, 
satyrical, mimical, or mixed of either (especially as they are now compiled and personated among us) are such 
sinful, hurtful, and pernicious recreations as are altogether unseemly and unlawful unto Christians" (Pollard, 
285). In Barish's vivid description Prynne's work is a "a gargatuan encyclopedia of antitheatrical lore which 
scourges every form of theatre in the most ferocious terms, in a stlye of paralizing repetitiousness from which 
everything resembling nuance has been rigidly excluded" Barish, 83. 
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morality Vices could, as it is evident from Mankind, not only walk off the (real or imaginary) 
stage, but they could walk to and fro among the crowd, or even bang the audience on their 
heads. 
The two characters I dealt with exhibited similar boundary-crossings between the 
world of the play and the real world or the actual presence of the audience. The threat they 
embody is similarly real - a threat that can be detected in theatre, in Shakespeare or in gazes 
through Derridean spectacles. 
In this sense the figures I am focusing on can indeed be "absurd and debilitating," if 
we expect them to act according to the representational code that Weimann describes as "I am 
not acting" - "I am another person" rather than pointing out their inherent duality of using 
both this code and the one that is characterised by the performative statement "I am acting." 
Weimann explains that "as opposed to the modern proscenium stage, where a representational 
mode strongly predominated, the Elizabethan stage tended to project both these codes in 
intriguing patterns of entanglements."352 In my understanding Iago and the Fool employ the 
representational mode of playing in a self-reflexive way and this is how they can show that 
reality is constructed the same way fiction is, and that that the border between reality and 
fiction is absurdly traversable. When a proscenium and a curtain were added to the stage, this 
traversing was ended, and the "wound caused in nature by the beginning of representations" 
in Knapp terms353 was put behind that curtain. And apart from that, the ways meaning is 
produced - the process that so disturbingly and painfully revealed itself in Shakespeare's 
mature tragedies - were started to be taken for granted. 
351 Barish, 87. 
352 Weimann 1999,425. 
353 Knapp, 135. 
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Conclusion 
Boy. Syr, I pray you, be not you master god? 
Mery Report. No in good fayth sonne, but I may say 
the I am suche a man that god may not mysse me. 
Play of the Weather (1003-5) 
In my study I have compared Iago and Lear's Fool, arguing that they can be paralleled 
based on their common theatrical ancestor, the Vice. I re-examined the Vice to claim that he 
displays a unique merger where the clownish-foolish and devilish characteristics are 
intrinsically intermingled. I have taken a look at how the fool within the Vice was seen as 
uncharacteristic of the figure by many and argued that we are missing an essential feature of 
the character by insisting on his unambiguous immorality, by disregarding his genuine appeal 
and his powerful sense of humour and satire. By examining several Vices and Vice-
successors I showed that they all display similar characteristics and argued that these 
characteristics have different effects in various epistemic contexts and various genres. My 
idea was that Iago and the Fool are not unique in the ways they behave, because several other 
characters within the family can be paralleled with them, but these two are made special 
because of the explicit context of the dissolving episteme, and thus they may become real 
agents of representational crisis. 
Through interpreting these two characters I also reflected on how the disappearance of 
the Fool from the Vice may explain their different effects, but that Iago can be regarded still 
not a condemnable but a more complex, foolish Vice on the metadramatic level of the play. 
In my analyses of Iago and the Fool I have shown that the appeal of the Vice may 
remain the same in his successors as well: I gave examples where these characters may be 
understood as presenting the essence of playing, a prerequisite of all theatre, as well as a 
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prerequisite of making meaning.354 I came to the conclusion that the effect of their 
metadramatic and comic behaviour is similar: it is distancing and alienating; they both invite 
the audience to face disturbing things about our perceptions of reality, and they push us away 
from what we thought about reason in making us re-examine our ideas of reality taken for 
granted. I considered a major difference between the two characters, namely the way they 
generate their "realities" in play, the way they create fictions. In the Fool's case, fiction 
appeared as a version of reality, while in Iago's case fiction was built on the taboo of reality's 
fictitious nature. A reason for this difference might be that the Fool can be understood as 
residual, since he represents a Medieval logic that still has a comic method for dealing with 
the experience of madness, an experience that is generated by the collapse of what is taken as 
reality and reason. 
Regarding the dramatic changes of the Vice and its successors, I argued that this 
metamorphosis is part of a larger, dramatic, epistemological and representational change. 
Vices of the Medieval allegorical theatre may have delivered a message contrary to the 
official Christian one, but they did not obliterate that message, while Vice-successors of the 
Renaissance stage, although rooted in the old system, gestured towards modern photographic, 
realistic theatre. Within the context of epistemological uncertainties they are capable of 
pointing out the illusory nature of any reality: they are at the threshold of the new episteme, 
revealing how meaning is produced, and by the time that meaning is taken for granted, they 
disappear from the stage. Actually, the old stage, platea disappears with them, and it is 
exchanged with a proscenium and a curtain. 
In conclusion, I would like to return to the parallel between Shakespeare as morally 
condemnable, and the playmaker Vice who is supposedly condemnable as well. We have seen 
3S4 A complex description and analysis of the ways play is essential in the production of meaning is described by 
Jacques Derrida in his influential article "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in 
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some consequences of the denial of folly, of the illusory nature of reality, as well as the denial 
of the absurd: once the fool is expelled from the Vice, the thing that remains is the devil, once 
the acknowledgement of truth is replaced by knowledge, truth will be eaten away by the 
denied fiction. As for the consequences of embracing the idea of "the world is but a word," 
we can either object, like Vickers or Stein, and understand the idea of reality created by 
language as condemnable (be this reality created by a playwright or one claimed to exist by 
deconstructionist critics), but we can also take it as an infinite opportunity for playing, and 
understand the word and theatre not as empty tools of signification, but as possibilities for 
creation. Perhaps the difference between the audience and the Vice is that the latter has 
knowledge of the creative power of words, the power with which all worlds are built. 
If characters, playwrights, theatrical institutions or critics crossing boundaries have an 
impact, an effect on ours lives (and this seems a point on which we agree with Vickers, 
namely that the make-believe of fiction will become our experience through participation355), 
it is exactly in making us aware of the possibility of participating in a fictional world and 
understanding the two as not necessarily and safely different from each other. I hope to have 
shown through the examples of the Fool and Iago that there are perspectives - and necessary 
ones, too - from which facing the danger of this possibility is not morally condemnable, but a 
magically and infinitely liberating one. 
A view of Shakespeare's "mature tragedies" as the climax of Shakespeare's 
development of the tragic genre perhaps obscures the importance of these plays as what Reiss 
calls "dialectic tragedies." If we stick to the term "greatness" and claim that it is a valid 
attribute of these plays, this greatness is not so much greatness in stating something, but rather 
David Lodge ed., Modern Criticism and Theory (London: Longman 1988), 107-23. 
355 Cf. Vickers' discussion of Walton, op. cit., 141. "Walton's theory is based on the fundamental point, often 
lost sight of in iconoclastic anti-theories, that works of art exist in order to be appreciated, and that the 
appreciator's experience involves him or her in participation." 
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in questioning. I feel that Jonathan Baldo is addressing the same thing when he points out the 
self-subversive elements in these plays. He says that viewing Shakespeare as a culmination 
rather than a transitional figure has not helped to enrich Shakespeare criticism but caused us 
to undervalue the self-subversive elements in his "mature tragedies."356 Such self-
subversiveness is hardly compatible with an explicit moral stance. When talking about 
catharsis, Reiss point out that such "moral uplift" is really "the result of tragedy's affirmation 
that a knowledge of the kind just indicated is possible."357 Therefore, the role of tragedy is 
really in the production of a particular episteme, providing the pleasure of overcoming the 
fear of a lack of all order and knowledge. The tragedies I examine seem too explicit in taking 
part in the production, the creation of an episteme, to make its acceptance unproblematic as 
"real beyond discourse." Thus they inherently reject a moral interpretation - one that must be 
based on a solid episteme. From this point the moral concerns about Shakespeare get a new 
dimension: whether purposeful or not, if it is indeed a representational crisis that is expressed 
in Shakespeare's dramas, he had no other choice than to leave no space for a reassuring 
system of moral values, the establishment of which is no different in its discursive nature than 
the establishment of any other truth or the playing of a play. 
For more than two decades now in Renaissance criticism approaches building upon the 
premises of new historicism and deconstruction have been widely used and highly influential, 
or, to use the terminology favoured by the critics of the new historicist school: these were the 
dominant approaches in Renaissance literary studies. It is difficult to see yet which are the 
germs of an emergent, new approach that will perhaps displace the ageing assumptions of the 
early eighties, since scholarship today is still very much dependent on them. In my approach I 
tried to use a sensitive methodology combining, on the one hand, an analytical and 
356 Baldo 16. 
357 Reiss 1980,36. 
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comparative reading of texts, revealing the deconstructive potential in the dramas, and on the 
other hand a historical perspective, where such potentials are interpreted in a wider dramatic 
and epistemological context. I hope that such an approach has gained validity with my 
findings and has supported the overarching idea of my dissertation, of using the Vice-figure as 
a way to understand the crisis of representation. Some possible paths for the continuation of 
the same project also emerge. It appears that my questions concerning the comedy of the Vice 
and its successors could be examined within the current investigations in the realm of ethics 
and moral philosophy - the route that some students of deconstruction took as well, but this 
approach was not within the scope of my undertaking. A new task emerges, however, in 
continuing the research in the context of literary anthropology, and in general, examining 
Vice-like characters - like Brighella, a version of zanni of the Commedia dell 'Arte - and their 
potential careers in a broader, European context as metadramatic agents of involvement, as 
representatives of the carnivalesque spirit, as diabolical tricksters who stand for their own 
logic, and might be genuinely appealing, paradoxically benign, perplexing, and surprisingly 
playful and inspiring. 
As for the answer to the original question asked by Wittgenstein of Shakespeare, and 
by Vickers of deconstructionists, namely whether language is enough, the answer might be 
negative, since even language is capable of reflecting upon its own defective nature, upon the 
fact that the only truth it can refer to will always be discursive, and that it may obscure but not 
obliterate the "absence of significance" at the root of a discourse. But perhaps this is exactly 
why some people, including playwrights, actors and characters, feel they have to play with it. 
As we have seen, according to some, it is in such playing that the formation of emerging 
epistemes, tragedies and truths is made possible. 
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